Django Access Review
SentryOfficialPublished by Sentry
- Skill
- Review and audit
- Security
- Apache-2.0
- No issues found
AutoGineer summary
Written by AutoGineer from the skill’s own files, not by the author
This skill provides a structured methodology for auditing Django and Django REST Framework (DRF) codebases to identify authorization gaps. Rather than relying on pattern matching, it guides the user through a deep investigation of the application's specific authorization model, including how permissions are enforced, how queries are scoped, and how ownership is managed. It emphasizes tracing data flows from input to database access to confirm whether User A can access User B's data, ensuring that findings are based on verified code behavior rather than assumptions.
What it does
- Maps the authorization model including middleware, decorators, and custom managers.
- Identifies sensitive endpoints that handle user-specific data.
- Traces data flow to verify if ownership checks exist between input and database queries.
- Provides a framework for confirming IDOR vulnerabilities through code investigation.
- Guides the creation of actionable, code-based security fixes.
- Categorizes findings by confidence level to ensure reliable reporting.
When to use it
- When performing a security audit on a Django or DRF application.
- When investigating potential IDOR or broken access control reports.
- When reviewing new features that handle sensitive user data.
- When assessing the effectiveness of custom permission classes or mixins.
Advantages
- Reduces false positives by requiring manual confirmation of authorization gaps.
- Adapts to any custom authorization implementation rather than forcing a single pattern.
- Encourages deep understanding of the codebase's specific security architecture.
- Promotes robust, code-level fixes over documentation-based recommendations.
Usage examples
- “Audit the DocumentViewSet for potential IDOR vulnerabilities.”
- The agent will trace the view's inheritance, check permission_classes, inspect get_queryset() for scoping, and determine if any object-level checks exist, reporting any confirmed access control gaps.
- “Review how our organization handles tenant isolation in API endpoints.”
- The agent will map the tenant-scoping logic across the codebase, identifying if middleware or custom managers are correctly filtering queries to prevent cross-tenant data access.
Install
Download the skill as a ZIP:
https://mp-staging.autogineer.com/agent-skills/getsentry/django-access-review/downloadUnzip it into the cross-client skills folder of your project:
mkdir -p .agents/skills && unzip django-access-review.zip -d .agents/skills
Documentation by Sentry
<!-- Reference material based on OWASP Cheat Sheet Series (CC BY-SA 4.0) https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/ -->
Django Access Control & IDOR Review
Find access control vulnerabilities by investigating how the codebase answers one question:
Can User A access, modify, or delete User B's data?
Philosophy: Investigation Over Pattern Matching
Do NOT scan for predefined vulnerable patterns. Instead:
Understand how authorization works in THIS codebase
Ask questions about specific data flows
Trace code to find where (or if) access checks happen
Report only what you've confirmed through investigation
Every codebase implements authorization differently. Your job is to understand this specific implementation, then find gaps.
Phase 1: Understand the Authorization Model
Before looking for bugs, answer these questions about the codebase:
How is authorization enforced?
Research the codebase to find:
□ Where are permission checks implemented?
- Decorators? (@login_required, @permission_required, custom?)
- Middleware? (TenantMiddleware, AuthorizationMiddleware?)
- Base classes? (BaseAPIView, TenantScopedViewSet?)
- Permission classes? (DRF permission_classes?)
- Custom mixins? (OwnershipMixin, TenantMixin?)
□ How are queries scoped?
- Custom managers? (TenantManager, UserScopedManager?)
- get_queryset() overrides?
- Middleware that sets query context?
□ What's the ownership model?
- Single user ownership? (document.owner_id)
- Organization/tenant ownership? (document.organization_id)
- Hierarchical? (org -> team -> user -> resource)
- Role-based within context? (org admin vs member)Investigation commands
# Find how auth is typically done
grep -rn "permission_classes\|@login_required\|@permission_required" --include="*.py" | head -20
# Find base classes that views inherit from
grep -rn "class Base.*View\|class.*Mixin.*:" --include="*.py" | head -20
# Find custom managers
grep -rn "class.*Manager\|def get_queryset" --include="*.py" | head -20
# Find ownership fields on models
grep -rn "owner\|user_id\|organization\|tenant" --include="models.py" | head -30Do not proceed until you understand the authorization model.
Phase 2: Map the Attack Surface
Identify endpoints that handle user-specific data:
What resources exist?
□ What models contain user data?
□ Which have ownership fields (owner_id, user_id, organization_id)?
□ Which are accessed via ID in URLs or request bodies?What operations are exposed?
For each resource, map:
List endpoints - what data is returned?
Detail/retrieve endpoints - how is the object fetched?
Create endpoints - who sets the owner?
Update endpoints - can users modify others' data?
Delete endpoints - can users delete others' data?
Custom actions - what do they access?
Phase 3: Ask Questions and Investigate
For each endpoint that handles user data, ask:
The Core Question
"If I'm User A and I know the ID of User B's resource, can I access it?"
Trace the code to answer this:
1. Where does the resource ID enter the system?
- URL path: /api/documents/{id}/
- Query param: ?document_id=123
- Request body: {"document_id": 123}
2. Where is that ID used to fetch data?
- Find the ORM query or database call
3. Between (1) and (2), what checks exist?
- Is the query scoped to current user?
- Is there an explicit ownership check?
- Is there a permission check on the object?
- Does a base class or mixin enforce access?
4. If you can't find a check, is there one you missed?
- Check parent classes
- Check middleware
- Check managers
- Check decorators at URL levelFollow-Up Questions
□ For list endpoints: Does the query filter to user's data, or return everything?
□ For create endpoints: Who sets the owner - the server or the request?
□ For bulk operations: Are they scoped to user's data?
□ For related resources: If I can access a document, can I access its comments?
What if the document belongs to someone else?
□ For tenant/org resources: Can User in Org A access Org B's data by changing
the org_id in the URL?Phase 4: Trace Specific Flows
Pick a concrete endpoint and trace it completely.
Example Investigation
Endpoint: GET /api/documents/{pk}/
1. Find the view handling this URL
→ DocumentViewSet.retrieve() in api/views.py
2. Check what DocumentViewSet inherits from
→ class DocumentViewSet(viewsets.ModelViewSet)
→ No custom base class with authorization
3. Check permission_classes
→ permission_classes = [IsAuthenticated]
→ Only checks login, not ownership
4. Check get_queryset()
→ def get_queryset(self):
→ return Document.objects.all()
→ Returns ALL documents!
5. Check for has_object_permission()
→ Not implemented
6. Check retrieve() method
→ Uses default, which calls get_object()
→ get_object() uses get_queryset(), which returns all
7. Conclusion: IDOR - Any authenticated user can access any documentWhat to look for when tracing
Potential gap indicators (investigate further, don't auto-flag):
- get_queryset() returns .all() or filters without user
- Direct Model.objects.get(pk=pk) without ownership in query
- ID comes from request body for sensitive operations
- Permission class checks auth but not ownership
- No has_object_permission() and queryset isn't scoped
Likely safe patterns (but verify the implementation):
- get_queryset() filters by request.user or user's org
- Custom permission class with has_object_permission()
- Base class that enforces scoping
- Manager that auto-filtersPhase 5: Report Findings
Only report issues you've confirmed through investigation.
Confidence Levels
| Level | Meaning | Action |
|---|---|---|
| HIGH | Traced the flow, confirmed no check exists | Report with evidence |
| MEDIUM | Check may exist but couldn't confirm | Note for manual verification |
| LOW | Theoretical, likely mitigated | Do not report |
Suggested Fixes Must Enforce, Not Document
Bad fix: Adding a comment saying "caller must validate permissions" Good fix: Adding code that actually validates permissions
A comment or docstring does not enforce authorization. Your suggested fix must include actual code that:
Validates the user has permission before proceeding
Raises an exception or returns an error if unauthorized
Makes unauthorized access impossible, not just discouraged
Example of a BAD fix suggestion:
def get_resource(resource_id):
# IMPORTANT: Caller must ensure user has access to this resource
return Resource.objects.get(pk=resource_id)Example of a GOOD fix suggestion:
def get_resource(resource_id, user):
resource = Resource.objects.get(pk=resource_id)
if resource.owner_id != user.id:
raise PermissionDenied("Access denied")
return resourceIf you can't determine the right enforcement mechanism, say so - but never suggest documentation as the fix.
Report Format
## Access Control Review: [Component]
### Authorization Model
[Brief description of how this codebase handles authorization]
### Findings
#### [IDOR-001] [Title] (Severity: High/Medium)
- **Location**: `path/to/file.py:123`
- **Confidence**: High - confirmed through code tracing
- **The Question**: Can User A access User B's documents?
- **Investigation**:
1. Traced GET /api/documents/{pk}/ to DocumentViewSet
2. Checked get_queryset() - returns Document.objects.all()
3. Checked permission_classes - only IsAuthenticated
4. Checked for has_object_permission() - not implemented
5. Verified no relevant middleware or base class checks
- **Evidence**: [Code snippet showing the gap]
- **Impact**: Any authenticated user can read any document by ID
- **Suggested Fix**: [Code that enforces authorization - NOT a comment]
### Needs Manual Verification
[Issues where authorization exists but couldn't confirm effectiveness]
### Areas Not Reviewed
[Endpoints or flows not covered in this review]Common Django Authorization Patterns
These are patterns you might find - not a checklist to match against.
Query Scoping
# Scoped to user
Document.objects.filter(owner=request.user)
# Scoped to organization
Document.objects.filter(organization=request.user.organization)
# Using a custom manager
Document.objects.for_user(request.user) # Investigate what this doesPermission Enforcement
# DRF permission classes
permission_classes = [IsAuthenticated, IsOwner]
# Custom has_object_permission
def has_object_permission(self, request, view, obj):
return obj.owner == request.user
# Django decorators
@permission_required('app.view_document')
# Manual checks
if document.owner != request.user:
raise PermissionDenied()Ownership Assignment
# Server-side (safe)
def perform_create(self, serializer):
serializer.save(owner=self.request.user)
# From request (investigate)
serializer.save(**request.data) # Does request.data include owner?Investigation Checklist
Use this to guide your review, not as a pass/fail checklist:
□ I understand how authorization is typically implemented in this codebase
□ I've identified the ownership model (user, org, tenant, etc.)
□ I've mapped the key endpoints that handle user data
□ For each sensitive endpoint, I've traced the flow and asked:
- Where does the ID come from?
- Where is data fetched?
- What checks exist between input and data access?
□ I've verified my findings by checking parent classes and middleware
□ I've only reported issues I've confirmed through investigationFiles
- ATTRIBUTION.mdAdded by AutoGineer874 B
- LICENSELicence file added by AutoGineer10.5 KiB
- SKILL.md10.0 KiB
- references/django-orm.md1.7 KiB
- references/django-views.md1.8 KiB
- references/drf-permissions.md2.0 KiB
- references/tenant-isolation.md1.5 KiB
references/drf-permissions.md
DRF Permissions - Context for Investigation
Background on how DRF handles permissions. Use this to understand what you're seeing, not as patterns to match.
How DRF Permission Flow Works
Request → permission_classes.has_permission() → View method → get_object() → has_object_permission()has_permission()
Called on EVERY request
Checked BEFORE the view method runs
Good for "is user authenticated?" or "is user admin?"
NOT good for "does user own this specific object?"
has_object_permission()
Only called when
self.get_object()is calledNOT called for list views (no specific object)
This is where object-level checks can happen
Critical: If a view does Model.objects.get(pk=pk) directly instead of self.get_object(), the has_object_permission() is NEVER called.
Things to Check When Investigating
1. What's in DEFAULT_PERMISSION_CLASSES?
# settings.py
REST_FRAMEWORK = {
'DEFAULT_PERMISSION_CLASSES': [...]
}This applies to ALL views unless overridden.
2. What does each permission class actually do?
Don't assume from the name. Read the class:
# IsAuthenticated only checks login, not ownership
# DjangoModelPermissions checks model-level perms, not object-level
# Custom classes - read the implementation3. How is data fetched?
# Uses get_object() - permissions apply
instance = self.get_object()
# Direct query - permissions DON'T apply
instance = Model.objects.get(pk=pk)4. What's in get_queryset()?
This determines what objects are even reachable:
def get_queryset(self):
return Model.objects.all() # Everything
return Model.objects.filter(owner=self.request.user) # ScopedSerializer Considerations
Serializers control what fields are readable/writable:
class Meta:
fields = '__all__' # What's included?
read_only_fields = [...] # What can't be set?Key question: Can the client set the owner field, or is it server-controlled?
Requirements and compatibility
Works with: Claude Code, Claude apps, OpenAI Codex, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, Gemini CLI, Kiro, OpenCode, Goose, Amp, Roo Code, JetBrains Junie, Factory Droid, Devin (ex-Windsurf), Mistral Vibe, OpenHands, Letta
“Works with” means the tool reads the open Agent Skills format; a skill written for one tool may use features others lack.
Needs: Declares allowed tools, Needs Python
Security
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Attribution and licence
- Published by
- Sentry
- Publisher
- Sentry (Official)
- Source
- getsentry/skills · skills/django-access-review · commit e94f222
- Licence
- Apache License 2.0 (redistribution allowed)
- LICENSE (added by AutoGineer from LICENSE)
- ATTRIBUTION.md (written by AutoGineer)
- Synced
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