Generated banner for Gha Security Review
Generated logo for Gha Security Review

Gha Security Review

SentryOfficialPublished by Sentry

  • Skill
  • Review and audit
  • Cloud and DevOps
  • Apache-2.0
  • Medium risk

From the author

GitHub Actions security review for workflow exploitation vulnerabilities. Use when asked to "review GitHub Actions", "audit workflows", "check CI security", "GHA security", "workflow security review", or review .github/workflows/ for pwn requests, expression injection, credential theft, and supply chain attacks. Exploitation-focused with concrete PoC scenarios.
— the description by Sentry

AutoGineer summary

Written by AutoGineer from the skill’s own files, not by the author

This skill provides a structured methodology for auditing GitHub Actions workflows to identify exploitable vulnerabilities. It focuses on real-world attack patterns such as pwn requests, expression injection, credential theft, and supply chain attacks. The skill requires users to trace complete attack paths and provide concrete proof-of-concept scenarios for any reported findings, ensuring that only actionable, high-confidence vulnerabilities are identified.

What it does

  • Audits .github/workflows/ and associated configuration files for security flaws.
  • Identifies vulnerabilities exploitable by external attackers without repository write access.
  • Maps workflow triggers to specific threat models like pull_request_target or issue_comment.
  • Provides guidance on validating findings through attack path tracing.
  • Categorizes findings by confidence level to prioritize actionable security issues.
  • Suggests remediation steps for confirmed vulnerabilities.

When to use it

  • When you need to perform a security audit of your GitHub Actions CI/CD pipeline.
  • When investigating potential workflow exploitation vectors in a repository.
  • When reviewing pull requests for CI/CD configuration security.
  • When you need to verify if a workflow is susceptible to external attacker manipulation.

Advantages

  • Focuses on concrete, exploitable attack paths rather than theoretical risks.
  • Reduces noise by excluding vulnerabilities that require repository write access.
  • Provides clear, actionable criteria for classifying findings.
  • Includes specific detection patterns for common CI/CD vulnerabilities.

Usage examples

“Review my GitHub Actions workflows for security vulnerabilities.”
The agent will scan the .github/workflows/ directory, analyze triggers and permissions, and report any high or medium confidence vulnerabilities with a PoC.
“Check if my CI is vulnerable to pwn requests.”
The agent will specifically audit workflows using pull_request_target and check if they unsafely check out or execute code from forks.
“Audit my issue_comment workflows for command injection.”
The agent will examine workflows triggered by issue_comment to ensure they include proper author_association checks to prevent unauthorized command execution.

Install

  1. Download the skill as a ZIP:

    https://mp-staging.autogineer.com/agent-skills/getsentry/gha-security-review/download
  2. Unzip it into the cross-client skills folder of your project:

    mkdir -p .agents/skills && unzip gha-security-review.zip -d .agents/skills

Documentation by Sentry

<!-- Attack patterns and real-world examples sourced from the HackerBot Claw campaign analysis by StepSecurity (2025): https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/hackerbot-claw-github-actions-exploitation -->

GitHub Actions Security Review

Find exploitable vulnerabilities in GitHub Actions workflows. Every finding MUST include a concrete exploitation scenario — if you can't build the attack, don't report it.

This skill encodes attack patterns from real GitHub Actions exploits — not generic CI/CD theory.

Scope

Review the workflows provided (file, diff, or repo). Research the codebase as needed to trace complete attack paths before reporting.

Files to Review
  • .github/workflows/*.yml — all workflow definitions

  • action.yml / action.yaml — composite actions in the repo

  • .github/actions/*/action.yml — local reusable actions

  • Config files loaded by workflows: CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, Makefile, shell scripts under .github/

Out of Scope
  • Workflows in other repositories (only note the dependency)

  • GitHub App installation permissions (note if relevant)

Threat Model

Only report vulnerabilities exploitable by an external attacker — someone without write access to the repository. The attacker can open PRs from forks, create issues, and post comments. They cannot push to branches, trigger workflow_dispatch, or trigger manual workflows.

Do not flag vulnerabilities that require write access to exploit:

  • workflow_dispatch input injection — requires write access to trigger

  • Expression injection in push-only workflows on protected branches

  • workflow_call input injection where all callers are internal

  • Secrets in workflow_dispatch/schedule-only workflows

Confidence

Report only HIGH and MEDIUM confidence findings. Do not report theoretical issues.

ConfidenceCriteriaAction
HIGHTraced the full attack path, confirmed exploitableReport with exploitation scenario and fix
MEDIUMAttack path partially confirmed, uncertain linkReport as needs verification
LOWTheoretical or mitigated elsewhereDo not report

For each HIGH finding, provide all five elements:

  1. Entry point — How does the attacker get in? (fork PR, issue comment, branch name, etc.)

  2. Payload — What does the attacker send? (actual code/YAML/input)

  3. Execution mechanism — How does the payload run? (expression expansion, checkout + script, etc.)

  4. Impact — What does the attacker gain? (token theft, code execution, repo write access)

  5. PoC sketch — Concrete steps an attacker would follow

If you cannot construct all five, report as MEDIUM (needs verification).


Step 1: Classify Triggers and Load References

For each workflow, identify triggers and load the appropriate reference:

Trigger / PatternLoad Reference
pull_request_targetreferences/pwn-request.md
issue_comment with command parsingreferences/comment-triggered-commands.md
${{ }} in run: blocksreferences/expression-injection.md
PATs / deploy keys / elevated credentialsreferences/credential-escalation.md
Checkout PR code + config file loadingreferences/ai-prompt-injection-via-ci.md
Third-party actions (especially unpinned)references/supply-chain.md
permissions: block or secrets usagereferences/permissions-and-secrets.md
Self-hosted runners, cache/artifact usagereferences/runner-infrastructure.md
Any confirmed findingreferences/real-world-attacks.md

Load references selectively — only what's relevant to the triggers found.

Step 2: Check for Vulnerability Classes

Check 1: Pwn Request

Does the workflow use pull_request_target AND check out fork code?

  • Look for actions/checkout with ref: pointing to PR head

  • Look for local actions (./.github/actions/) that would come from the fork

  • Check if any run: step executes code from the checked-out PR

Check 2: Expression Injection

Are ${{ }} expressions used inside run: blocks in externally-triggerable workflows?

  • Map every ${{ }} expression in every run: step

  • Confirm the value is attacker-controlled (PR title, branch name, comment body — not numeric IDs, SHAs, or repository names)

  • Confirm the expression is in a run: block, not if:, with:, or job-level env:

Check 3: Unauthorized Command Execution

Does an issue_comment-triggered workflow execute commands without authorization?

  • Is there an author_association check?

  • Can any GitHub user trigger the command?

  • Does the command handler also use injectable expressions?

Check 4: Credential Escalation

Are elevated credentials (PATs, deploy keys) accessible to untrusted code?

  • What's the blast radius of each secret?

  • Could a compromised workflow steal long-lived tokens?

Check 5: Config File Poisoning

Does the workflow load configuration from PR-supplied files?

  • AI agent instructions: CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, .cursorrules

  • Build configuration: Makefile, shell scripts

Check 6: Supply Chain

Are third-party actions securely pinned to full SHAs?

  • Pin third-party / external actions and reusable workflows only

  • Do not flag first-party actions/* or github/* on version tags

  • Do not flag same-repo / vendored (./.github/actions/...) as supply-chain pinning issues

  • Only report when the job has secrets, OIDC, write token, release, deploy, package, or signing power — unprivileged read-only CI is not a finding

Check 7: Permissions and Secrets

Are workflow permissions minimal? Are secrets properly scoped?

Check 8: Runner Infrastructure

Are self-hosted runners, caches, or artifacts used securely?

Safe Patterns (Do Not Flag)

Before reporting, check if the pattern is actually safe:

PatternWhy Safe
pull_request_target WITHOUT checkout of fork codeNever executes attacker code
${{ github.event.pull_request.number }} in run:Numeric only — not injectable
${{ github.repository }} / github.repository_ownerRepo owner controls this
${{ secrets.* }}Not an expression injection vector
${{ }} in if: conditionsEvaluated by Actions runtime, not shell
${{ }} in with: inputsPassed as string parameters, not shell-evaluated
Third-party actions pinned to full SHAImmutable reference
First-party actions/* / github/* on version tagsOutside third-party pinning policy — do not flag
Same-repo / vendored local actionsNot third-party supply chain (review pwn-request separately)
pull_request trigger (not _target)Runs in fork context with read-only token
Any expression in workflow_dispatch/schedule/push to protected branchesRequires write access — outside threat model

Key distinction: ${{ }} is dangerous in run: blocks (shell expansion) but safe in if:, with:, and env: at the job/step level (Actions runtime evaluation).

Step 3: Validate Before Reporting

Before including any finding, read the actual workflow YAML and trace the complete attack path:

  1. Read the full workflow — don't rely on grep output alone

  2. Trace the trigger — confirm the event and check if: conditions that gate execution

  3. Trace the expression/checkout — confirm it's in a run: block or actually references fork code

  4. Confirm attacker control — verify the value maps to something an external attacker sets

  5. Check existing mitigations — env var wrapping, author_association checks, restricted permissions, SHA pinning

If any link is broken, mark MEDIUM (needs verification) or drop the finding.

If no checks produced a finding, report zero findings. Do not invent issues.

Step 4: Report Findings

## GitHub Actions Security Review

### Findings

#### [GHA-001] [Title] (Severity: Critical/High/Medium)
- **Workflow**: `.github/workflows/release.yml:15`
- **Trigger**: `pull_request_target`
- **Confidence**: HIGH — confirmed through attack path tracing
- **Exploitation Scenario**:
  1. [Step-by-step attack]
- **Impact**: [What attacker gains]
- **Fix**: [Code that fixes the issue]

### Needs Verification
[MEDIUM confidence items with explanation of what to verify]

### Reviewed and Cleared
[Workflows reviewed and confirmed safe]

If no findings: "No exploitable vulnerabilities identified. All workflows reviewed and cleared."

Files

references/permissions-and-secrets.md

Permissions and Secrets

Overview

GitHub Actions workflows have access to GITHUB_TOKEN (automatic) and repository secrets (configured). Overly broad permissions amplify the impact of any vulnerability. Proper permission scoping is the single most effective mitigation for GitHub Actions attacks.


GITHUB_TOKEN Permissions

Default Permissions

GitHub offers two default permission modes (configured in repo Settings > Actions > General):

ModeDefault Permissions
Read and write (legacy default)contents: write, packages: write, etc.
Read-only (recommended)contents: read only
Explicit Permission Scoping
# VULNERABLE: No explicit permissions — inherits repo default
on: pull_request
jobs:
  build:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - run: echo "What permissions does GITHUB_TOKEN have?"

# SAFE: Explicit minimal permissions at workflow level
on: pull_request
permissions:
  contents: read
jobs:
  build:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - run: echo "GITHUB_TOKEN can only read"
Permission Scopes
PermissionReadWriteUse Cases
contentsClone, read filesPush commits, create releasesMost workflows need read
pull-requestsView PRsComment, approve, mergePR review bots
issuesView issuesCreate, comment, closeIssue management
packagesPull packagesPush packagesPackage publishing
deploymentsView deploymentsCreate deploymentsCD workflows
id-token—Request OIDC tokenCloud authentication
actionsView workflow runsCancel/rerun workflowsWorkflow management
security-eventsView alertsUpload SARIF, dismiss alertsSecurity scanning
statusesView statusesCreate commit statusesCI status reporting
Dangerous Permission Patterns
# DANGEROUS: write-all grants everything
permissions: write-all

# DANGEROUS: Broad permissions on untrusted trigger
on: pull_request_target
permissions:
  contents: write
  pull-requests: write
  packages: write

# SUSPICIOUS: id-token on workflows that don't deploy
on: pull_request
permissions:
  id-token: write  # Why does a PR build need OIDC?

Secret Management

Secret Exposure Vectors
Via Expression Injection
# VULNERABLE: Secret value ends up in shell where injection can capture it
env:
  API_KEY: ${{ secrets.API_KEY }}
steps:
  - run: echo "Processing ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}"
    # Expression injection here can access $API_KEY from environment
Via Workflow Logs
# VULNERABLE: Derived values from secrets may not be masked
- run: |
    ENCODED=$(echo "${{ secrets.API_KEY }}" | base64)
    echo "Encoded key: $ENCODED"  # GitHub only masks the original secret value

GitHub Actions automatically masks secret values in logs, but derived values (base64-encoded, truncated, transformed) are NOT masked.

Via Artifacts
# VULNERABLE: Secrets written to files that become artifacts
- run: |
    echo "${{ secrets.DEPLOY_KEY }}" > deploy_key.pem
    # If this file ends up in an artifact, the secret is exposed
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
  with:
    name: build-output
    path: .  # Includes deploy_key.pem!
Via Pull Request Target
# VULNERABLE: Fork code can access org secrets
on: pull_request_target
jobs:
  build:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
        with:
          ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
      - run: ./build.sh  # Fork code can read all secrets via ${{ secrets.* }}

Important: Secrets are available to pull_request_target workflows. Combined with fork checkout, this exposes every secret to attacker code.


Detection Patterns

# Find workflows without explicit permissions
grep -L "permissions:" .github/workflows/*.yml

# Find workflows with write-all
grep -rn "write-all" .github/workflows/

# Find workflows with broad write permissions
grep -rn "write$" .github/workflows/ | grep -v "#"

# Find secret usage
grep -rn "secrets\." .github/workflows/

# Find secrets in pull_request_target workflows
for f in .github/workflows/*.yml; do
  if grep -q "pull_request_target" "$f" && grep -q "secrets\." "$f"; then
    echo "ALERT: $f uses secrets with pull_request_target"
  fi
done

# Find workflows that write secrets to files
grep -A2 "secrets\." .github/workflows/*.yml | grep -E ">\s|>>|tee "

# Check for environment-level secrets
grep -rn "environment:" .github/workflows/

OIDC Subject Claim Misconfiguration

GitHub OIDC tokens include a sub (subject) claim that cloud providers use to authorize access. Misconfigured subject claims can allow unauthorized workflows to assume cloud roles.

# VULNERABLE: Subject claim too broad — any branch can assume role
# AWS IAM trust policy
{
  "Condition": {
    "StringLike": {
      "token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub": "repo:org/repo:*"  # Any ref!
    }
  }
}

# SAFE: Restrict to specific branch and environment
{
  "Condition": {
    "StringEquals": {
      "token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub": "repo:org/repo:environment:production"
    }
  }
}
OIDC Best Practices
Claim FilterRisk LevelWhen to Use
repo:org/repo:*HighNever — any branch/PR can assume role
repo:org/repo:ref:refs/heads/mainMediumOnly main branch, but any workflow
repo:org/repo:environment:productionLowRequires environment protection rules

The Fix: Minimal Permissions Pattern

Workflow-Level Defaults
# Set restrictive defaults at workflow level
permissions:
  contents: read

# Override per-job only when needed
jobs:
  lint:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    # Inherits workflow permissions: contents: read
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - run: npm run lint

  deploy:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    permissions:
      contents: read
      id-token: write  # Only this job needs OIDC
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4
Secret Scoping with Environments
jobs:
  deploy:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    environment: production  # Secrets only available in this environment
    steps:
      - run: deploy --key ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_KEY }}

Environment protection rules add:

  • Required reviewers

  • Wait timers

  • Branch restrictions

  • Deployment protection rules


Severity Guidelines

PatternSeverityRationale
write-all on pull_request_targetCriticalMaximum permissions + fork code execution
No permissions: block (inherits repo default)MediumMay have write access depending on repo settings
contents: write on PR-triggered workflowHighAllows pushing commits if combined with other vulns
Secrets in pull_request_target with fork checkoutCriticalAll secrets exposed to attacker code
OIDC with wildcard subject claimHighAny workflow can assume cloud role
Secrets written to files/artifactsHighPersistent exposure beyond workflow run

References

Requirements and compatibility

Works with: Claude Code, Claude apps, OpenAI Codex, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, Gemini CLI, Kiro, OpenCode, Goose, Amp, Roo Code, JetBrains Junie, Factory Droid, Devin (ex-Windsurf), Mistral Vibe, OpenHands, Letta

“Works with” means the tool reads the open Agent Skills format; a skill written for one tool may use features others lack.

Needs: Declares allowed tools

Security

What our scanner noticed· Medium risk

  • References to credential files
  • Instructions that use the network
  • Downloads piped into a shell

A static scan is not a guarantee. Skills are third-party content: review a skill before you let an agent use it.

Attribution and licence

Published by
Sentry
Publisher
Sentry (Official)
Source
getsentry/skills · skills/gha-security-review · commit e94f222
Licence
Apache License 2.0 (redistribution allowed)
  • LICENSE (added by AutoGineer from LICENSE)
  • ATTRIBUTION.md (written by AutoGineer)
Synced

AutoGineer is not affiliated with or endorsed by Sentry.

Download ZIP

The ZIP holds the skill’s files, its licence files and an ATTRIBUTION.md. Download gha-security-review.zip