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Security Review

SentryOfficialPublished by Sentry

  • Skill
  • Review and audit
  • Security
  • CC-BY-SA-4.0
  • Medium risk

From the author

Security code review for vulnerabilities. Use when asked to "security review", "find vulnerabilities", "check for security issues", "audit security", "OWASP review", or review code for injection, XSS, authentication, authorization, cryptography issues. Provides systematic review with confidence-based reporting.
— the description by Sentry

AutoGineer summary

Written by AutoGineer from the skill’s own files, not by the author

The Security Review skill provides a structured approach to auditing code for security vulnerabilities. It emphasizes deep research into data flow and context to distinguish between theoretical risks and truly exploitable issues. By focusing on attacker-controlled inputs and framework-specific mitigations, it reduces false positives and ensures that reported findings are actionable and high-confidence.

What it does

  • Performs systematic security audits on provided code snippets or files.
  • Traces data flow to confirm if inputs are attacker-controlled or server-controlled.
  • Evaluates code against common vulnerability patterns like injection, XSS, and authentication flaws.
  • Filters out false positives by checking for framework-level protections and sanitization.
  • Categorizes findings by severity and confidence levels.
  • Provides a standardized reporting format for identified vulnerabilities.

When to use it

  • When you need to audit code for potential security vulnerabilities.
  • When performing an OWASP-based security review.
  • When you need to verify if a specific code pattern is exploitable.
  • When checking for common security issues like SQL injection, XSS, or insecure authentication.

Advantages

  • Reduces noise by filtering out theoretical issues and server-controlled configurations.
  • Ensures high-confidence reporting by requiring codebase research before flagging.
  • Provides clear, actionable remediation advice for identified vulnerabilities.
  • Standardizes the security review process across different codebases.

Usage examples

“Perform a security review on this file: [code snippet]”
The agent will analyze the code, trace the data flow of inputs, and provide a report of any high-confidence vulnerabilities found, or state that none were identified.
“Check this API endpoint for potential injection vulnerabilities.”
The agent will examine the endpoint's input handling and database queries to determine if user input is properly parameterized or sanitized.
“Audit this authentication logic for security issues.”
The agent will review the authentication implementation against best practices, such as password storage algorithms and brute-force protections.

Install

  1. Download the skill as a ZIP:

    https://mp-staging.autogineer.com/agent-skills/getsentry/security-review/download
  2. Unzip it into the cross-client skills folder of your project:

    mkdir -p .agents/skills && unzip security-review.zip -d .agents/skills

Documentation by Sentry

<!-- Reference material based on OWASP Cheat Sheet Series (CC BY-SA 4.0) https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/ -->

Security Review Skill

Identify exploitable security vulnerabilities in code. Report only HIGH CONFIDENCE findings—clear vulnerable patterns with attacker-controlled input.

Scope: Research vs. Reporting

CRITICAL DISTINCTION:

  • Report on: Only the specific file, diff, or code provided by the user

  • Research: The ENTIRE codebase to build confidence before reporting

Before flagging any issue, you MUST research the codebase to understand:

  • Where does this input actually come from? (Trace data flow)

  • Is there validation/sanitization elsewhere?

  • How is this configured? (Check settings, config files, middleware)

  • What framework protections exist?

Do NOT report issues based solely on pattern matching. Investigate first, then report only what you're confident is exploitable.

Confidence Levels

LevelCriteriaAction
HIGHVulnerable pattern + attacker-controlled input confirmedReport with severity
MEDIUMVulnerable pattern, input source unclearNote as "Needs verification"
LOWTheoretical, best practice, defense-in-depthDo not report

Do Not Flag

General Rules
  • Test files (unless explicitly reviewing test security)

  • Dead code, commented code, documentation strings

  • Patterns using constants or server-controlled configuration

  • Code paths that require prior authentication to reach (note the auth requirement instead)

Server-Controlled Values (NOT Attacker-Controlled)

These are configured by operators, not controlled by attackers:

SourceExampleWhy It's Safe
Django settingssettings.API_URL, settings.ALLOWED_HOSTSSet via config/env at deployment
Environment variablesos.environ.get('DATABASE_URL')Deployment configuration
Config filesconfig.yaml, app.config['KEY']Server-side files
Framework constantsdjango.conf.settings.*Not user-modifiable
Hardcoded valuesBASE_URL = "https://api.internal"Compile-time constants

SSRF Example - NOT a vulnerability:

# SAFE: URL comes from Django settings (server-controlled)
response = requests.get(f"{settings.SEER_AUTOFIX_URL}{path}")

SSRF Example - IS a vulnerability:

# VULNERABLE: URL comes from request (attacker-controlled)
response = requests.get(request.GET.get('url'))
Framework-Mitigated Patterns

Check language guides before flagging. Common false positives:

PatternWhy It's Usually Safe
Django {{ variable }}Auto-escaped by default
React {variable}Auto-escaped by default
Vue {{ variable }}Auto-escaped by default
User.objects.filter(id=input)ORM parameterizes queries
cursor.execute("...%s", (input,))Parameterized query
innerHTML = "<b>Loading...</b>"Constant string, no user input

Only flag these when:

  • Django: {{ var|safe }}, {% autoescape off %}, mark_safe(user_input)

  • React: dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{__html: userInput}}

  • Vue: v-html="userInput"

  • ORM: .raw(), .extra(), RawSQL() with string interpolation

Review Process

1. Detect Context

What type of code am I reviewing?

Code TypeLoad These References
API endpoints, routesauthorization.md, authentication.md, injection.md
Django/DRF views, permission classes, object-level accessUse the django-access-review skill if available for access control; otherwise authorization.md
Frontend, templatesxss.md, csrf.md, modern-threats.md (DOM clobbering, prototype pollution)
File handling, uploadsfile-security.md
Crypto, secrets, tokenscryptography.md, data-protection.md
Data serializationdeserialization.md
External requestsssrf.md
Business workflowsbusiness-logic.md
GraphQL, REST designapi-security.md
Config, headers, CORSmisconfiguration.md
CI/CD, dependenciessupply-chain.md
Error handlingerror-handling.md
Audit, logginglogging.md
Object merging/cloning, __proto__, DOM id/name lookups, WebSocket handlers, LLM prompt constructionmodern-threats.md
2. Load Language Guide

Based on file extension or imports:

IndicatorsGuide
.py, django, flask, fastapilanguages/python.md
.js, .ts, express, react, vue, nextlanguages/javascript.md

For other languages there is no dedicated guide; rely on the references/ files and verify framework protections directly in the codebase.

3. Load Infrastructure Guide (if applicable)
File TypeGuide
Dockerfile, .dockerignoreinfrastructure/docker.md
GitHub Actions workflowsUse the gha-security-review skill if available; otherwise references/supply-chain.md
Other CI/CD pipelines, lockfiles, package manifestsreferences/supply-chain.md
4. Research Before Flagging

For each potential issue, research the codebase to build confidence:

  • Where does this value actually come from? Trace the data flow.

  • Is it configured at deployment (settings, env vars) or from user input?

  • Is there validation, sanitization, or allowlisting elsewhere?

  • What framework protections apply?

Only report issues where you have HIGH confidence after understanding the broader context.

5. Verify Exploitability

For each potential finding, confirm:

Is the input attacker-controlled?

Attacker-Controlled (Investigate)Server-Controlled (Usually Safe)
request.GET, request.POST, request.argssettings.X, app.config['X']
request.json, request.data, request.bodyos.environ.get('X')
request.headers (most headers)Hardcoded constants
request.cookies (unsigned)Internal service URLs from config
URL path segments: /users/<id>/Database content from admin/system
File uploads (content and names)Signed session data
Database content from other usersFramework settings
WebSocket messages

Does the framework mitigate this?

  • Check language guide for auto-escaping, parameterization

  • Check for middleware/decorators that sanitize

Is there validation upstream?

  • Input validation before this code

  • Sanitization libraries (DOMPurify, bleach, etc.)

6. Report HIGH Confidence Only

Skip theoretical issues. Report only what you've confirmed is exploitable after research.


Severity Classification

SeverityImpactExamples
CriticalDirect exploit, severe impact, no auth requiredRCE, SQL injection to data, auth bypass, hardcoded secrets
HighExploitable with conditions, significant impactStored XSS, SSRF to metadata, IDOR to sensitive data
MediumSpecific conditions required, moderate impactReflected XSS, CSRF on state-changing actions, path traversal
LowDefense-in-depth, minimal direct impactMissing headers, verbose errors, weak algorithms in non-critical context

Quick Patterns Reference

Always Flag (Critical)
eval(user_input)           # Any language
exec(user_input)           # Any language
pickle.loads(user_data)    # Python
yaml.load(user_data)       # Python (not safe_load)
unserialize($user_data)    # PHP
deserialize(user_data)     # Java ObjectInputStream
shell=True + user_input    # Python subprocess
child_process.exec(user)   # Node.js
Always Flag (High)
innerHTML = userInput              # DOM XSS
dangerouslySetInnerHTML={user}     # React XSS
v-html="userInput"                 # Vue XSS
f"SELECT * FROM x WHERE {user}"    # SQL injection
`SELECT * FROM x WHERE ${user}`    # SQL injection
os.system(f"cmd {user_input}")     # Command injection
Always Flag (Secrets)
password = "hardcoded"
api_key = "sk-..."
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY = "..."
private_key = "-----BEGIN"
Check Context First (MUST Investigate Before Flagging)
# SSRF - ONLY if URL is from user input, NOT from settings/config
requests.get(request.GET['url'])     # FLAG: User-controlled URL
requests.get(settings.API_URL)       # SAFE: Server-controlled config
requests.get(f"{settings.BASE}/{x}") # CHECK: Is 'x' user input?

# Path traversal - ONLY if path is from user input
open(request.GET['file'])            # FLAG: User-controlled path
open(settings.LOG_PATH)              # SAFE: Server-controlled config
open(f"{BASE_DIR}/{filename}")       # CHECK: Is 'filename' user input?

# Open redirect - ONLY if URL is from user input
redirect(request.GET['next'])        # FLAG: User-controlled redirect
redirect(settings.LOGIN_URL)         # SAFE: Server-controlled config

# Weak crypto - ONLY if used for security purposes
hashlib.md5(file_content)            # SAFE: File checksums, caching
hashlib.md5(password)                # FLAG: Password hashing
random.random()                      # SAFE: Non-security uses (UI, sampling)
random.random() for token            # FLAG: Security tokens need secrets module

Output Format

## Security Review: [File/Component Name]

### Summary
- **Findings**: X (Y Critical, Z High, ...)
- **Risk Level**: Critical/High/Medium/Low
- **Confidence**: High/Mixed

### Findings

#### [VULN-001] [Vulnerability Type] (Severity)
- **Location**: `file.py:123`
- **Confidence**: High
- **Issue**: [What the vulnerability is]
- **Impact**: [What an attacker could do]
- **Evidence**:
  ```python
  [Vulnerable code snippet]
  • Fix: [How to remediate]

Needs Verification
[VERIFY-001] [Potential Issue]
  • Location: file.py:456

  • Question: [What needs to be verified]


If no vulnerabilities found, state: "No high-confidence vulnerabilities identified."

---

## Reference Files

### Core Vulnerabilities (`references/`)
| File | Covers |
|------|--------|
| `injection.md` | SQL, NoSQL, OS command, LDAP, template injection |
| `xss.md` | Reflected, stored, DOM-based XSS |
| `authorization.md` | Authorization, IDOR, privilege escalation |
| `authentication.md` | Sessions, credentials, password storage |
| `cryptography.md` | Algorithms, key management, randomness |
| `deserialization.md` | Pickle, YAML, Java, PHP deserialization |
| `file-security.md` | Path traversal, uploads, XXE |
| `ssrf.md` | Server-side request forgery |
| `csrf.md` | Cross-site request forgery |
| `data-protection.md` | Secrets exposure, PII, logging |
| `api-security.md` | REST, GraphQL, mass assignment |
| `business-logic.md` | Race conditions, workflow bypass |
| `modern-threats.md` | Prototype pollution, LLM injection, WebSocket |
| `misconfiguration.md` | Headers, CORS, debug mode, defaults |
| `error-handling.md` | Fail-open, information disclosure |
| `supply-chain.md` | Dependencies, build security |
| `logging.md` | Audit failures, log injection |

### Language Guides (`languages/`)
- `python.md` - Django, Flask, FastAPI patterns
- `javascript.md` - Node, Express, React, Vue, Next.js

### Infrastructure (`infrastructure/`)
- `docker.md` - Container security

Files

references/api-security.md

API Security Reference

Overview

APIs expose application functionality and data, making them prime targets for attackers. This reference covers security for REST APIs, GraphQL, and general API patterns.

Authentication

Token-Based Authentication
# JWT Best Practices
# 1. Use strong signing algorithms
# VULNERABLE: None algorithm
jwt.decode(token, algorithms=['none'])

# SAFE: Explicit algorithm
jwt.decode(token, secret_key, algorithms=['HS256'])

# 2. Validate standard claims
def validate_jwt(token):
    payload = jwt.decode(token, SECRET_KEY, algorithms=['HS256'])

    # Validate issuer
    if payload.get('iss') != EXPECTED_ISSUER:
        raise ValueError("Invalid issuer")

    # Validate audience
    if payload.get('aud') != EXPECTED_AUDIENCE:
        raise ValueError("Invalid audience")

    # Validate expiration (jwt library does this automatically)
    # Validate not-before (jwt library does this automatically)

    return payload
API Key Security
# VULNERABLE: API key in URL (logged, cached, visible)
GET /api/users?api_key=secret123

# SAFE: API key in header
GET /api/users
Authorization: Bearer api_key_here
# Or
X-API-Key: api_key_here

# Server-side validation
def require_api_key(f):
    @wraps(f)
    def decorated(*args, **kwargs):
        api_key = request.headers.get('X-API-Key')
        if not api_key or not validate_api_key(api_key):
            return jsonify({'error': 'Invalid API key'}), 401

        # Rate limit by API key
        if is_rate_limited(api_key):
            return jsonify({'error': 'Rate limit exceeded'}), 429

        return f(*args, **kwargs)
    return decorated

Authorization

Endpoint-Level Authorization
# VULNERABLE: No authorization check
@app.route('/api/users/<user_id>', methods=['GET'])
def get_user(user_id):
    return User.query.get(user_id).to_dict()

# SAFE: Authorization check
@app.route('/api/users/<user_id>', methods=['GET'])
@require_auth
def get_user(user_id):
    if not current_user.can_access_user(user_id):
        return jsonify({'error': 'Forbidden'}), 403
    return User.query.get(user_id).to_dict()
Field-Level Authorization
# VULNERABLE: All fields returned
@app.route('/api/users/<user_id>')
def get_user(user_id):
    user = User.query.get(user_id)
    return jsonify({
        'id': user.id,
        'email': user.email,
        'ssn': user.ssn,  # Sensitive!
        'is_admin': user.is_admin,  # Internal!
        'password_hash': user.password_hash  # NEVER expose!
    })

# SAFE: Filtered response based on permissions
@app.route('/api/users/<user_id>')
@require_auth
def get_user(user_id):
    user = User.query.get(user_id)

    response = {
        'id': user.id,
        'name': user.name,
    }

    # Add fields based on permissions
    if current_user.id == user_id or current_user.is_admin:
        response['email'] = user.email

    if current_user.is_admin:
        response['is_admin'] = user.is_admin

    return jsonify(response)

Input Validation

Request Validation
from pydantic import BaseModel, validator, Field
from typing import Optional

class CreateUserRequest(BaseModel):
    name: str = Field(..., min_length=1, max_length=100)
    email: str = Field(..., regex=r'^[\w\.-]+@[\w\.-]+\.\w+$')
    age: Optional[int] = Field(None, ge=0, le=150)

    @validator('name')
    def name_must_not_be_empty(cls, v):
        if not v.strip():
            raise ValueError('Name cannot be empty')
        return v.strip()

@app.route('/api/users', methods=['POST'])
def create_user():
    try:
        data = CreateUserRequest(**request.json)
    except ValidationError as e:
        return jsonify({'error': e.errors()}), 400

    # Process validated data
    return create_user_from_data(data)
Content-Type Validation
# VULNERABLE: Accept any content type
@app.route('/api/data', methods=['POST'])
def process_data():
    data = request.get_json()  # May fail silently

# SAFE: Validate content type
@app.route('/api/data', methods=['POST'])
def process_data():
    if request.content_type != 'application/json':
        return jsonify({'error': 'Content-Type must be application/json'}), 415

    data = request.get_json()
    if data is None:
        return jsonify({'error': 'Invalid JSON'}), 400

    return process(data)
Request Size Limits
# Flask
app.config['MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH'] = 16 * 1024 * 1024  # 16MB max

# Express
app.use(express.json({ limit: '10mb' }))

# Handle large request errors
@app.errorhandler(413)
def request_too_large(e):
    return jsonify({'error': 'Request too large'}), 413

Rate Limiting

Implementation
from flask_limiter import Limiter
from flask_limiter.util import get_remote_address

limiter = Limiter(
    app,
    key_func=get_remote_address,
    default_limits=["200 per day", "50 per hour"]
)

# Endpoint-specific limits
@app.route('/api/login', methods=['POST'])
@limiter.limit("5 per minute")  # Prevent brute force
def login():
    pass

@app.route('/api/password-reset', methods=['POST'])
@limiter.limit("3 per hour")  # Prevent enumeration
def password_reset():
    pass

# Return proper headers
# X-RateLimit-Limit: 50
# X-RateLimit-Remaining: 45
# X-RateLimit-Reset: 1623456789
# Retry-After: 3600  (when limited)
Rate Limit by API Key
def get_rate_limit_key():
    # Prefer API key over IP for authenticated requests
    api_key = request.headers.get('X-API-Key')
    if api_key:
        return f"api_key:{api_key}"
    return f"ip:{get_remote_address()}"

limiter = Limiter(key_func=get_rate_limit_key)

Mass Assignment Prevention

# VULNERABLE: Accepting all fields
@app.route('/api/users/<id>', methods=['PATCH'])
def update_user(id):
    user = User.query.get(id)
    user.update(**request.json)  # Attacker sets is_admin=True
    return user.to_dict()

# SAFE: Allowlist of fields
ALLOWED_USER_FIELDS = {'name', 'email', 'bio'}

@app.route('/api/users/<id>', methods=['PATCH'])
def update_user(id):
    user = User.query.get(id)
    data = {k: v for k, v in request.json.items() if k in ALLOWED_USER_FIELDS}
    user.update(**data)
    return user.to_dict()

# BETTER: Use DTOs
class UserUpdateDTO(BaseModel):
    name: Optional[str]
    email: Optional[str]
    bio: Optional[str]
    # is_admin NOT included - can't be set

@app.route('/api/users/<id>', methods=['PATCH'])
def update_user(id):
    dto = UserUpdateDTO(**request.json)
    user = User.query.get(id)
    user.update(**dto.dict(exclude_unset=True))
    return user.to_dict()

GraphQL Security

Query Depth Limiting
# VULNERABLE: Unbounded depth
# query { user { friends { friends { friends { ... } } } } }

# SAFE: Limit query depth
from graphql import validate
from graphql_core import depth_limit_validator

schema = build_schema(...)

def execute_query(query):
    errors = validate(
        schema,
        parse(query),
        [depth_limit_validator(max_depth=5)]
    )
    if errors:
        return {'errors': [str(e) for e in errors]}
    return graphql_sync(schema, query)
Query Cost Analysis
# Assign costs to fields and limit total cost
from graphene import ObjectType, Field, Int

class Query(ObjectType):
    user = Field(User, cost=1)
    users = Field(List(User), cost=lambda info, **args: args.get('limit', 10))
    expensive_query = Field(Report, cost=100)

# Reject queries exceeding cost threshold
MAX_QUERY_COST = 1000
Disable Introspection in Production
# VULNERABLE: Introspection enabled
# Attackers can discover entire schema

# SAFE: Disable introspection
from graphql import GraphQLSchema

class NoIntrospectionMiddleware:
    def resolve(self, next, root, info, **args):
        if info.field_name in ('__schema', '__type'):
            return None
        return next(root, info, **args)

# Or in configuration
app.config['GRAPHQL_INTROSPECTION'] = False
Batching Attack Prevention
# VULNERABLE: Allows unlimited batched mutations
# [
#   { "query": "mutation { login(user: 'a', pass: 'a') }" },
#   { "query": "mutation { login(user: 'a', pass: 'b') }" },
#   ...
# ]

# SAFE: Limit batch size
MAX_BATCH_SIZE = 10

@app.route('/graphql', methods=['POST'])
def graphql_endpoint():
    data = request.json

    if isinstance(data, list):
        if len(data) > MAX_BATCH_SIZE:
            return jsonify({'error': 'Batch size exceeded'}), 400

Error Handling

Generic Error Responses
# VULNERABLE: Detailed errors
@app.errorhandler(Exception)
def handle_error(e):
    return jsonify({
        'error': str(e),
        'traceback': traceback.format_exc(),
        'query': last_query
    }), 500

# SAFE: Generic errors
@app.errorhandler(Exception)
def handle_error(e):
    # Log full details server-side
    app.logger.error(f"Error: {e}", exc_info=True)

    # Return generic message
    return jsonify({'error': 'An unexpected error occurred'}), 500

# Use RFC 7807 Problem Details
@app.errorhandler(404)
def not_found(e):
    return jsonify({
        'type': 'https://example.com/problems/not-found',
        'title': 'Resource Not Found',
        'status': 404,
        'detail': 'The requested resource was not found'
    }), 404

Security Headers

@app.after_request
def add_security_headers(response):
    # Prevent caching of sensitive data
    if request.endpoint in SENSITIVE_ENDPOINTS:
        response.headers['Cache-Control'] = 'no-store'

    response.headers['X-Content-Type-Options'] = 'nosniff'
    response.headers['X-Frame-Options'] = 'DENY'
    response.headers['Content-Security-Policy'] = "default-src 'none'"

    return response

CORS Configuration

# VULNERABLE: Allow all origins
CORS(app, origins='*')

# VULNERABLE: Reflect origin header
@app.after_request
def add_cors(response):
    response.headers['Access-Control-Allow-Origin'] = request.headers.get('Origin')
    return response

# SAFE: Explicit allowlist
CORS(app, origins=[
    'https://app.example.com',
    'https://admin.example.com'
], supports_credentials=True)

# SAFE: Dynamic with validation
ALLOWED_ORIGINS = {'https://app.example.com', 'https://admin.example.com'}

@app.after_request
def add_cors(response):
    origin = request.headers.get('Origin')
    if origin in ALLOWED_ORIGINS:
        response.headers['Access-Control-Allow-Origin'] = origin
        response.headers['Access-Control-Allow-Credentials'] = 'true'
    return response

HTTP Methods

# VULNERABLE: Method not enforced
@app.route('/api/users', methods=['GET', 'POST', 'PUT', 'DELETE'])
def users():
    pass

# SAFE: Explicit method handling
@app.route('/api/users', methods=['GET'])
def list_users():
    pass

@app.route('/api/users', methods=['POST'])
@require_auth
def create_user():
    pass

# Return 405 for unsupported methods
@app.errorhandler(405)
def method_not_allowed(e):
    return jsonify({'error': 'Method not allowed'}), 405

Grep Patterns for Detection

# Missing authentication
grep -rn "@app\.route\|@router\." --include="*.py" | grep -v "@require_auth\|@login_required"

# Returning all fields
grep -rn "to_dict()\|__dict__\|serialize" --include="*.py"

# Mass assignment
grep -rn "\*\*request\.\|update(\*\*\|create(\*\*" --include="*.py"

# Missing rate limiting
grep -rn "login\|password\|reset" --include="*.py" | grep "route" | grep -v "limiter\|rate"

# GraphQL introspection
grep -rn "__schema\|introspection" --include="*.py"

# CORS wildcards
grep -rn "origins.*\*\|Access-Control-Allow-Origin.*\*" --include="*.py"

Testing Checklist

  • [ ] All endpoints require authentication (except public ones)

  • [ ] Authorization checked for every request

  • [ ] Input validation on all parameters

  • [ ] Response filtering (no sensitive data exposure)

  • [ ] Rate limiting on authentication endpoints

  • [ ] Rate limiting on resource-intensive endpoints

  • [ ] Mass assignment prevented (field allowlists)

  • [ ] Proper error handling (no information leakage)

  • [ ] Security headers configured

  • [ ] CORS properly configured

  • [ ] HTTP methods restricted

  • [ ] GraphQL depth/cost limiting (if applicable)

  • [ ] GraphQL introspection disabled in production


References

Requirements and compatibility

Works with: Claude Code, Claude apps, OpenAI Codex, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, Gemini CLI, Kiro, OpenCode, Goose, Amp, Roo Code, JetBrains Junie, Factory Droid, Devin (ex-Windsurf), Mistral Vibe, OpenHands, Letta

“Works with” means the tool reads the open Agent Skills format; a skill written for one tool may use features others lack.

Needs: Declares allowed tools, Needs an API key, Needs Python

Security

What our scanner noticed· Medium risk

  • References to credential files
  • Instructions that use the network
  • Encoded commands that are executed
  • Downloads piped into a shell

A static scan is not a guarantee. Skills are third-party content: review a skill before you let an agent use it.

Attribution and licence

Published by
Sentry
Publisher
Sentry (Official)
Source
getsentry/skills · skills/security-review · commit e94f222
Licence
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (redistribution allowed)
  • ATTRIBUTION.md (written by AutoGineer)
Synced

AutoGineer is not affiliated with or endorsed by Sentry.

Download ZIP

The ZIP holds the skill’s files, its licence files and an ATTRIBUTION.md. Download security-review.zip