Security Review
SentryOfficialPublished by Sentry
- Skill
- Review and audit
- Security
- CC-BY-SA-4.0
- Medium risk
AutoGineer summary
Written by AutoGineer from the skill’s own files, not by the author
The Security Review skill provides a structured approach to auditing code for security vulnerabilities. It emphasizes deep research into data flow and context to distinguish between theoretical risks and truly exploitable issues. By focusing on attacker-controlled inputs and framework-specific mitigations, it reduces false positives and ensures that reported findings are actionable and high-confidence.
What it does
- Performs systematic security audits on provided code snippets or files.
- Traces data flow to confirm if inputs are attacker-controlled or server-controlled.
- Evaluates code against common vulnerability patterns like injection, XSS, and authentication flaws.
- Filters out false positives by checking for framework-level protections and sanitization.
- Categorizes findings by severity and confidence levels.
- Provides a standardized reporting format for identified vulnerabilities.
When to use it
- When you need to audit code for potential security vulnerabilities.
- When performing an OWASP-based security review.
- When you need to verify if a specific code pattern is exploitable.
- When checking for common security issues like SQL injection, XSS, or insecure authentication.
Advantages
- Reduces noise by filtering out theoretical issues and server-controlled configurations.
- Ensures high-confidence reporting by requiring codebase research before flagging.
- Provides clear, actionable remediation advice for identified vulnerabilities.
- Standardizes the security review process across different codebases.
Usage examples
- “Perform a security review on this file: [code snippet]”
- The agent will analyze the code, trace the data flow of inputs, and provide a report of any high-confidence vulnerabilities found, or state that none were identified.
- “Check this API endpoint for potential injection vulnerabilities.”
- The agent will examine the endpoint's input handling and database queries to determine if user input is properly parameterized or sanitized.
- “Audit this authentication logic for security issues.”
- The agent will review the authentication implementation against best practices, such as password storage algorithms and brute-force protections.
Install
Download the skill as a ZIP:
https://mp-staging.autogineer.com/agent-skills/getsentry/security-review/downloadUnzip it into the cross-client skills folder of your project:
mkdir -p .agents/skills && unzip security-review.zip -d .agents/skills
Documentation by Sentry
<!-- Reference material based on OWASP Cheat Sheet Series (CC BY-SA 4.0) https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/ -->
Security Review Skill
Identify exploitable security vulnerabilities in code. Report only HIGH CONFIDENCE findings—clear vulnerable patterns with attacker-controlled input.
Scope: Research vs. Reporting
CRITICAL DISTINCTION:
Report on: Only the specific file, diff, or code provided by the user
Research: The ENTIRE codebase to build confidence before reporting
Before flagging any issue, you MUST research the codebase to understand:
Where does this input actually come from? (Trace data flow)
Is there validation/sanitization elsewhere?
How is this configured? (Check settings, config files, middleware)
What framework protections exist?
Do NOT report issues based solely on pattern matching. Investigate first, then report only what you're confident is exploitable.
Confidence Levels
| Level | Criteria | Action |
|---|---|---|
| HIGH | Vulnerable pattern + attacker-controlled input confirmed | Report with severity |
| MEDIUM | Vulnerable pattern, input source unclear | Note as "Needs verification" |
| LOW | Theoretical, best practice, defense-in-depth | Do not report |
Do Not Flag
General Rules
Test files (unless explicitly reviewing test security)
Dead code, commented code, documentation strings
Patterns using constants or server-controlled configuration
Code paths that require prior authentication to reach (note the auth requirement instead)
Server-Controlled Values (NOT Attacker-Controlled)
These are configured by operators, not controlled by attackers:
| Source | Example | Why It's Safe |
|---|---|---|
| Django settings | settings.API_URL, settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS | Set via config/env at deployment |
| Environment variables | os.environ.get('DATABASE_URL') | Deployment configuration |
| Config files | config.yaml, app.config['KEY'] | Server-side files |
| Framework constants | django.conf.settings.* | Not user-modifiable |
| Hardcoded values | BASE_URL = "https://api.internal" | Compile-time constants |
SSRF Example - NOT a vulnerability:
# SAFE: URL comes from Django settings (server-controlled)
response = requests.get(f"{settings.SEER_AUTOFIX_URL}{path}")SSRF Example - IS a vulnerability:
# VULNERABLE: URL comes from request (attacker-controlled)
response = requests.get(request.GET.get('url'))Framework-Mitigated Patterns
Check language guides before flagging. Common false positives:
| Pattern | Why It's Usually Safe |
|---|---|
Django {{ variable }} | Auto-escaped by default |
React {variable} | Auto-escaped by default |
Vue {{ variable }} | Auto-escaped by default |
User.objects.filter(id=input) | ORM parameterizes queries |
cursor.execute("...%s", (input,)) | Parameterized query |
innerHTML = "<b>Loading...</b>" | Constant string, no user input |
Only flag these when:
Django:
{{ var|safe }},{% autoescape off %},mark_safe(user_input)React:
dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{__html: userInput}}Vue:
v-html="userInput"ORM:
.raw(),.extra(),RawSQL()with string interpolation
Review Process
1. Detect Context
What type of code am I reviewing?
| Code Type | Load These References |
|---|---|
| API endpoints, routes | authorization.md, authentication.md, injection.md |
| Django/DRF views, permission classes, object-level access | Use the django-access-review skill if available for access control; otherwise authorization.md |
| Frontend, templates | xss.md, csrf.md, modern-threats.md (DOM clobbering, prototype pollution) |
| File handling, uploads | file-security.md |
| Crypto, secrets, tokens | cryptography.md, data-protection.md |
| Data serialization | deserialization.md |
| External requests | ssrf.md |
| Business workflows | business-logic.md |
| GraphQL, REST design | api-security.md |
| Config, headers, CORS | misconfiguration.md |
| CI/CD, dependencies | supply-chain.md |
| Error handling | error-handling.md |
| Audit, logging | logging.md |
Object merging/cloning, __proto__, DOM id/name lookups, WebSocket handlers, LLM prompt construction | modern-threats.md |
2. Load Language Guide
Based on file extension or imports:
| Indicators | Guide |
|---|---|
.py, django, flask, fastapi | languages/python.md |
.js, .ts, express, react, vue, next | languages/javascript.md |
For other languages there is no dedicated guide; rely on the references/ files and verify framework protections directly in the codebase.
3. Load Infrastructure Guide (if applicable)
| File Type | Guide |
|---|---|
Dockerfile, .dockerignore | infrastructure/docker.md |
| GitHub Actions workflows | Use the gha-security-review skill if available; otherwise references/supply-chain.md |
| Other CI/CD pipelines, lockfiles, package manifests | references/supply-chain.md |
4. Research Before Flagging
For each potential issue, research the codebase to build confidence:
Where does this value actually come from? Trace the data flow.
Is it configured at deployment (settings, env vars) or from user input?
Is there validation, sanitization, or allowlisting elsewhere?
What framework protections apply?
Only report issues where you have HIGH confidence after understanding the broader context.
5. Verify Exploitability
For each potential finding, confirm:
Is the input attacker-controlled?
| Attacker-Controlled (Investigate) | Server-Controlled (Usually Safe) |
|---|---|
request.GET, request.POST, request.args | settings.X, app.config['X'] |
request.json, request.data, request.body | os.environ.get('X') |
request.headers (most headers) | Hardcoded constants |
request.cookies (unsigned) | Internal service URLs from config |
URL path segments: /users/<id>/ | Database content from admin/system |
| File uploads (content and names) | Signed session data |
| Database content from other users | Framework settings |
| WebSocket messages |
Does the framework mitigate this?
Check language guide for auto-escaping, parameterization
Check for middleware/decorators that sanitize
Is there validation upstream?
Input validation before this code
Sanitization libraries (DOMPurify, bleach, etc.)
6. Report HIGH Confidence Only
Skip theoretical issues. Report only what you've confirmed is exploitable after research.
Severity Classification
| Severity | Impact | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | Direct exploit, severe impact, no auth required | RCE, SQL injection to data, auth bypass, hardcoded secrets |
| High | Exploitable with conditions, significant impact | Stored XSS, SSRF to metadata, IDOR to sensitive data |
| Medium | Specific conditions required, moderate impact | Reflected XSS, CSRF on state-changing actions, path traversal |
| Low | Defense-in-depth, minimal direct impact | Missing headers, verbose errors, weak algorithms in non-critical context |
Quick Patterns Reference
Always Flag (Critical)
eval(user_input) # Any language
exec(user_input) # Any language
pickle.loads(user_data) # Python
yaml.load(user_data) # Python (not safe_load)
unserialize($user_data) # PHP
deserialize(user_data) # Java ObjectInputStream
shell=True + user_input # Python subprocess
child_process.exec(user) # Node.jsAlways Flag (High)
innerHTML = userInput # DOM XSS
dangerouslySetInnerHTML={user} # React XSS
v-html="userInput" # Vue XSS
f"SELECT * FROM x WHERE {user}" # SQL injection
`SELECT * FROM x WHERE ${user}` # SQL injection
os.system(f"cmd {user_input}") # Command injectionAlways Flag (Secrets)
password = "hardcoded"
api_key = "sk-..."
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY = "..."
private_key = "-----BEGIN"Check Context First (MUST Investigate Before Flagging)
# SSRF - ONLY if URL is from user input, NOT from settings/config
requests.get(request.GET['url']) # FLAG: User-controlled URL
requests.get(settings.API_URL) # SAFE: Server-controlled config
requests.get(f"{settings.BASE}/{x}") # CHECK: Is 'x' user input?
# Path traversal - ONLY if path is from user input
open(request.GET['file']) # FLAG: User-controlled path
open(settings.LOG_PATH) # SAFE: Server-controlled config
open(f"{BASE_DIR}/{filename}") # CHECK: Is 'filename' user input?
# Open redirect - ONLY if URL is from user input
redirect(request.GET['next']) # FLAG: User-controlled redirect
redirect(settings.LOGIN_URL) # SAFE: Server-controlled config
# Weak crypto - ONLY if used for security purposes
hashlib.md5(file_content) # SAFE: File checksums, caching
hashlib.md5(password) # FLAG: Password hashing
random.random() # SAFE: Non-security uses (UI, sampling)
random.random() for token # FLAG: Security tokens need secrets moduleOutput Format
## Security Review: [File/Component Name]
### Summary
- **Findings**: X (Y Critical, Z High, ...)
- **Risk Level**: Critical/High/Medium/Low
- **Confidence**: High/Mixed
### Findings
#### [VULN-001] [Vulnerability Type] (Severity)
- **Location**: `file.py:123`
- **Confidence**: High
- **Issue**: [What the vulnerability is]
- **Impact**: [What an attacker could do]
- **Evidence**:
```python
[Vulnerable code snippet]Fix: [How to remediate]
Needs Verification
[VERIFY-001] [Potential Issue]
Location:
file.py:456Question: [What needs to be verified]
If no vulnerabilities found, state: "No high-confidence vulnerabilities identified."
---
## Reference Files
### Core Vulnerabilities (`references/`)
| File | Covers |
|------|--------|
| `injection.md` | SQL, NoSQL, OS command, LDAP, template injection |
| `xss.md` | Reflected, stored, DOM-based XSS |
| `authorization.md` | Authorization, IDOR, privilege escalation |
| `authentication.md` | Sessions, credentials, password storage |
| `cryptography.md` | Algorithms, key management, randomness |
| `deserialization.md` | Pickle, YAML, Java, PHP deserialization |
| `file-security.md` | Path traversal, uploads, XXE |
| `ssrf.md` | Server-side request forgery |
| `csrf.md` | Cross-site request forgery |
| `data-protection.md` | Secrets exposure, PII, logging |
| `api-security.md` | REST, GraphQL, mass assignment |
| `business-logic.md` | Race conditions, workflow bypass |
| `modern-threats.md` | Prototype pollution, LLM injection, WebSocket |
| `misconfiguration.md` | Headers, CORS, debug mode, defaults |
| `error-handling.md` | Fail-open, information disclosure |
| `supply-chain.md` | Dependencies, build security |
| `logging.md` | Audit failures, log injection |
### Language Guides (`languages/`)
- `python.md` - Django, Flask, FastAPI patterns
- `javascript.md` - Node, Express, React, Vue, Next.js
### Infrastructure (`infrastructure/`)
- `docker.md` - Container securityFiles
- ATTRIBUTION.mdAdded by AutoGineer902 B
- LICENSE884 B
- SKILL.md11.5 KiB
- SPEC.md8.8 KiB
- infrastructure/docker.md9.2 KiB
- languages/javascript.md9.8 KiB
- languages/python.md9.3 KiB
- references/api-security.md12.4 KiB
- references/authentication.md8.9 KiB
- references/authorization.md9.8 KiB
- references/business-logic.md12.4 KiB
- references/cryptography.md8.5 KiB
- references/csrf.md9.7 KiB
- references/data-protection.md9.3 KiB
- references/deserialization.md10.0 KiB
- references/error-handling.md11.4 KiB
- references/file-security.md12.1 KiB
- references/injection.md6.7 KiB
- references/logging.md11.7 KiB
- references/misconfiguration.md10.1 KiB
- references/modern-threats.md13.0 KiB
- references/ssrf.md10.5 KiB
- references/supply-chain.md8.9 KiB
- references/xss.md7.4 KiB
references/api-security.md
API Security Reference
Overview
APIs expose application functionality and data, making them prime targets for attackers. This reference covers security for REST APIs, GraphQL, and general API patterns.
Authentication
Token-Based Authentication
# JWT Best Practices
# 1. Use strong signing algorithms
# VULNERABLE: None algorithm
jwt.decode(token, algorithms=['none'])
# SAFE: Explicit algorithm
jwt.decode(token, secret_key, algorithms=['HS256'])
# 2. Validate standard claims
def validate_jwt(token):
payload = jwt.decode(token, SECRET_KEY, algorithms=['HS256'])
# Validate issuer
if payload.get('iss') != EXPECTED_ISSUER:
raise ValueError("Invalid issuer")
# Validate audience
if payload.get('aud') != EXPECTED_AUDIENCE:
raise ValueError("Invalid audience")
# Validate expiration (jwt library does this automatically)
# Validate not-before (jwt library does this automatically)
return payloadAPI Key Security
# VULNERABLE: API key in URL (logged, cached, visible)
GET /api/users?api_key=secret123
# SAFE: API key in header
GET /api/users
Authorization: Bearer api_key_here
# Or
X-API-Key: api_key_here
# Server-side validation
def require_api_key(f):
@wraps(f)
def decorated(*args, **kwargs):
api_key = request.headers.get('X-API-Key')
if not api_key or not validate_api_key(api_key):
return jsonify({'error': 'Invalid API key'}), 401
# Rate limit by API key
if is_rate_limited(api_key):
return jsonify({'error': 'Rate limit exceeded'}), 429
return f(*args, **kwargs)
return decoratedAuthorization
Endpoint-Level Authorization
# VULNERABLE: No authorization check
@app.route('/api/users/<user_id>', methods=['GET'])
def get_user(user_id):
return User.query.get(user_id).to_dict()
# SAFE: Authorization check
@app.route('/api/users/<user_id>', methods=['GET'])
@require_auth
def get_user(user_id):
if not current_user.can_access_user(user_id):
return jsonify({'error': 'Forbidden'}), 403
return User.query.get(user_id).to_dict()Field-Level Authorization
# VULNERABLE: All fields returned
@app.route('/api/users/<user_id>')
def get_user(user_id):
user = User.query.get(user_id)
return jsonify({
'id': user.id,
'email': user.email,
'ssn': user.ssn, # Sensitive!
'is_admin': user.is_admin, # Internal!
'password_hash': user.password_hash # NEVER expose!
})
# SAFE: Filtered response based on permissions
@app.route('/api/users/<user_id>')
@require_auth
def get_user(user_id):
user = User.query.get(user_id)
response = {
'id': user.id,
'name': user.name,
}
# Add fields based on permissions
if current_user.id == user_id or current_user.is_admin:
response['email'] = user.email
if current_user.is_admin:
response['is_admin'] = user.is_admin
return jsonify(response)Input Validation
Request Validation
from pydantic import BaseModel, validator, Field
from typing import Optional
class CreateUserRequest(BaseModel):
name: str = Field(..., min_length=1, max_length=100)
email: str = Field(..., regex=r'^[\w\.-]+@[\w\.-]+\.\w+$')
age: Optional[int] = Field(None, ge=0, le=150)
@validator('name')
def name_must_not_be_empty(cls, v):
if not v.strip():
raise ValueError('Name cannot be empty')
return v.strip()
@app.route('/api/users', methods=['POST'])
def create_user():
try:
data = CreateUserRequest(**request.json)
except ValidationError as e:
return jsonify({'error': e.errors()}), 400
# Process validated data
return create_user_from_data(data)Content-Type Validation
# VULNERABLE: Accept any content type
@app.route('/api/data', methods=['POST'])
def process_data():
data = request.get_json() # May fail silently
# SAFE: Validate content type
@app.route('/api/data', methods=['POST'])
def process_data():
if request.content_type != 'application/json':
return jsonify({'error': 'Content-Type must be application/json'}), 415
data = request.get_json()
if data is None:
return jsonify({'error': 'Invalid JSON'}), 400
return process(data)Request Size Limits
# Flask
app.config['MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH'] = 16 * 1024 * 1024 # 16MB max
# Express
app.use(express.json({ limit: '10mb' }))
# Handle large request errors
@app.errorhandler(413)
def request_too_large(e):
return jsonify({'error': 'Request too large'}), 413Rate Limiting
Implementation
from flask_limiter import Limiter
from flask_limiter.util import get_remote_address
limiter = Limiter(
app,
key_func=get_remote_address,
default_limits=["200 per day", "50 per hour"]
)
# Endpoint-specific limits
@app.route('/api/login', methods=['POST'])
@limiter.limit("5 per minute") # Prevent brute force
def login():
pass
@app.route('/api/password-reset', methods=['POST'])
@limiter.limit("3 per hour") # Prevent enumeration
def password_reset():
pass
# Return proper headers
# X-RateLimit-Limit: 50
# X-RateLimit-Remaining: 45
# X-RateLimit-Reset: 1623456789
# Retry-After: 3600 (when limited)Rate Limit by API Key
def get_rate_limit_key():
# Prefer API key over IP for authenticated requests
api_key = request.headers.get('X-API-Key')
if api_key:
return f"api_key:{api_key}"
return f"ip:{get_remote_address()}"
limiter = Limiter(key_func=get_rate_limit_key)Mass Assignment Prevention
# VULNERABLE: Accepting all fields
@app.route('/api/users/<id>', methods=['PATCH'])
def update_user(id):
user = User.query.get(id)
user.update(**request.json) # Attacker sets is_admin=True
return user.to_dict()
# SAFE: Allowlist of fields
ALLOWED_USER_FIELDS = {'name', 'email', 'bio'}
@app.route('/api/users/<id>', methods=['PATCH'])
def update_user(id):
user = User.query.get(id)
data = {k: v for k, v in request.json.items() if k in ALLOWED_USER_FIELDS}
user.update(**data)
return user.to_dict()
# BETTER: Use DTOs
class UserUpdateDTO(BaseModel):
name: Optional[str]
email: Optional[str]
bio: Optional[str]
# is_admin NOT included - can't be set
@app.route('/api/users/<id>', methods=['PATCH'])
def update_user(id):
dto = UserUpdateDTO(**request.json)
user = User.query.get(id)
user.update(**dto.dict(exclude_unset=True))
return user.to_dict()GraphQL Security
Query Depth Limiting
# VULNERABLE: Unbounded depth
# query { user { friends { friends { friends { ... } } } } }
# SAFE: Limit query depth
from graphql import validate
from graphql_core import depth_limit_validator
schema = build_schema(...)
def execute_query(query):
errors = validate(
schema,
parse(query),
[depth_limit_validator(max_depth=5)]
)
if errors:
return {'errors': [str(e) for e in errors]}
return graphql_sync(schema, query)Query Cost Analysis
# Assign costs to fields and limit total cost
from graphene import ObjectType, Field, Int
class Query(ObjectType):
user = Field(User, cost=1)
users = Field(List(User), cost=lambda info, **args: args.get('limit', 10))
expensive_query = Field(Report, cost=100)
# Reject queries exceeding cost threshold
MAX_QUERY_COST = 1000Disable Introspection in Production
# VULNERABLE: Introspection enabled
# Attackers can discover entire schema
# SAFE: Disable introspection
from graphql import GraphQLSchema
class NoIntrospectionMiddleware:
def resolve(self, next, root, info, **args):
if info.field_name in ('__schema', '__type'):
return None
return next(root, info, **args)
# Or in configuration
app.config['GRAPHQL_INTROSPECTION'] = FalseBatching Attack Prevention
# VULNERABLE: Allows unlimited batched mutations
# [
# { "query": "mutation { login(user: 'a', pass: 'a') }" },
# { "query": "mutation { login(user: 'a', pass: 'b') }" },
# ...
# ]
# SAFE: Limit batch size
MAX_BATCH_SIZE = 10
@app.route('/graphql', methods=['POST'])
def graphql_endpoint():
data = request.json
if isinstance(data, list):
if len(data) > MAX_BATCH_SIZE:
return jsonify({'error': 'Batch size exceeded'}), 400Error Handling
Generic Error Responses
# VULNERABLE: Detailed errors
@app.errorhandler(Exception)
def handle_error(e):
return jsonify({
'error': str(e),
'traceback': traceback.format_exc(),
'query': last_query
}), 500
# SAFE: Generic errors
@app.errorhandler(Exception)
def handle_error(e):
# Log full details server-side
app.logger.error(f"Error: {e}", exc_info=True)
# Return generic message
return jsonify({'error': 'An unexpected error occurred'}), 500
# Use RFC 7807 Problem Details
@app.errorhandler(404)
def not_found(e):
return jsonify({
'type': 'https://example.com/problems/not-found',
'title': 'Resource Not Found',
'status': 404,
'detail': 'The requested resource was not found'
}), 404Security Headers
@app.after_request
def add_security_headers(response):
# Prevent caching of sensitive data
if request.endpoint in SENSITIVE_ENDPOINTS:
response.headers['Cache-Control'] = 'no-store'
response.headers['X-Content-Type-Options'] = 'nosniff'
response.headers['X-Frame-Options'] = 'DENY'
response.headers['Content-Security-Policy'] = "default-src 'none'"
return responseCORS Configuration
# VULNERABLE: Allow all origins
CORS(app, origins='*')
# VULNERABLE: Reflect origin header
@app.after_request
def add_cors(response):
response.headers['Access-Control-Allow-Origin'] = request.headers.get('Origin')
return response
# SAFE: Explicit allowlist
CORS(app, origins=[
'https://app.example.com',
'https://admin.example.com'
], supports_credentials=True)
# SAFE: Dynamic with validation
ALLOWED_ORIGINS = {'https://app.example.com', 'https://admin.example.com'}
@app.after_request
def add_cors(response):
origin = request.headers.get('Origin')
if origin in ALLOWED_ORIGINS:
response.headers['Access-Control-Allow-Origin'] = origin
response.headers['Access-Control-Allow-Credentials'] = 'true'
return responseHTTP Methods
# VULNERABLE: Method not enforced
@app.route('/api/users', methods=['GET', 'POST', 'PUT', 'DELETE'])
def users():
pass
# SAFE: Explicit method handling
@app.route('/api/users', methods=['GET'])
def list_users():
pass
@app.route('/api/users', methods=['POST'])
@require_auth
def create_user():
pass
# Return 405 for unsupported methods
@app.errorhandler(405)
def method_not_allowed(e):
return jsonify({'error': 'Method not allowed'}), 405Grep Patterns for Detection
# Missing authentication
grep -rn "@app\.route\|@router\." --include="*.py" | grep -v "@require_auth\|@login_required"
# Returning all fields
grep -rn "to_dict()\|__dict__\|serialize" --include="*.py"
# Mass assignment
grep -rn "\*\*request\.\|update(\*\*\|create(\*\*" --include="*.py"
# Missing rate limiting
grep -rn "login\|password\|reset" --include="*.py" | grep "route" | grep -v "limiter\|rate"
# GraphQL introspection
grep -rn "__schema\|introspection" --include="*.py"
# CORS wildcards
grep -rn "origins.*\*\|Access-Control-Allow-Origin.*\*" --include="*.py"Testing Checklist
[ ] All endpoints require authentication (except public ones)
[ ] Authorization checked for every request
[ ] Input validation on all parameters
[ ] Response filtering (no sensitive data exposure)
[ ] Rate limiting on authentication endpoints
[ ] Rate limiting on resource-intensive endpoints
[ ] Mass assignment prevented (field allowlists)
[ ] Proper error handling (no information leakage)
[ ] Security headers configured
[ ] CORS properly configured
[ ] HTTP methods restricted
[ ] GraphQL depth/cost limiting (if applicable)
[ ] GraphQL introspection disabled in production
References
Requirements and compatibility
Works with: Claude Code, Claude apps, OpenAI Codex, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, Gemini CLI, Kiro, OpenCode, Goose, Amp, Roo Code, JetBrains Junie, Factory Droid, Devin (ex-Windsurf), Mistral Vibe, OpenHands, Letta
“Works with” means the tool reads the open Agent Skills format; a skill written for one tool may use features others lack.
Needs: Declares allowed tools, Needs an API key, Needs Python
Security
What our scanner noticed· Medium risk
- References to credential files
- Instructions that use the network
- Encoded commands that are executed
- Downloads piped into a shell
A static scan is not a guarantee. Skills are third-party content: review a skill before you let an agent use it.
Attribution and licence
- Published by
- Sentry
- Publisher
- Sentry (Official)
- Source
- getsentry/skills · skills/security-review · commit e94f222
- Licence
- Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (redistribution allowed)
- ATTRIBUTION.md (written by AutoGineer)
- Synced
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The ZIP holds the skill’s files, its licence files and an ATTRIBUTION.md. Download security-review.zip