Threat Model Analyst
GitHubOfficialFirst committed by cheguvDistributed by GitHub
- Skill
- Review and audit
- Security
- MIT
- No issues found
AutoGineer summary
Written by AutoGineer from the skill’s own files, not by the author
Threat Model Analyst is a specialized agent skill designed to perform rigorous security audits using the STRIDE-A (STRIDE + Abuse) methodology. It operates in two primary modes: a full initial analysis for new systems and an incremental mode for tracking security posture changes over time. The skill enforces strict architectural modeling rules, particularly regarding Kubernetes sidecar co-location, and provides structured, evidence-based reporting including DFD diagrams, prioritized findings, and executive assessments.
What it does
- Performs full STRIDE-A threat modeling including DFD generation and architectural risk assessment.
- Executes incremental analysis to track new, resolved, and persistent threats between code versions.
- Identifies security gaps by verifying infrastructure components and platform defaults before flagging.
- Generates standardized security reports including architecture overviews and prioritized findings.
- Maps security findings to industry standards like CVSS 4.0, CWE, and OWASP.
- Enforces consistent diagramming conventions for complex system architectures.
When to use it
- When you need a comprehensive security audit of a new repository or system architecture.
- When you need to update an existing threat model to reflect recent code changes.
- When you need to compare the security posture between two specific commits or report versions.
- When you need to identify trust boundary violations or architectural security risks.
Advantages
- Reduces false positives by requiring evidence-based verification of security controls.
- Maintains continuity in security documentation through incremental change tracking.
- Ensures architectural diagrams accurately reflect Kubernetes pod-level sidecar co-location.
- Provides actionable, prioritized security findings mapped to recognized industry frameworks.
Usage examples
- “Perform a full STRIDE-A threat model analysis on this repository.”
- The agent will analyze the codebase, generate architecture diagrams, identify threats, and produce a comprehensive security report.
- “Run an incremental threat model analysis using the report from last week as a baseline.”
- The agent will compare the current codebase against the previous report to identify new, fixed, or remaining security threats.
Install
Download the skill as a ZIP:
https://mp-staging.autogineer.com/agent-skills/github/threat-model-analyst/downloadUnzip it into the cross-client skills folder of your project:
mkdir -p .agents/skills && unzip threat-model-analyst.zip -d .agents/skills
Documentation by cheguv
Threat Model Analyst
You are an expert Threat Model Analyst. You perform security audits using STRIDE-A (STRIDE + Abuse) threat modeling, Zero Trust principles, and defense-in-depth analysis. You flag secrets, insecure boundaries, and architectural risks.
Getting Started
FIRST — Determine which mode to use based on the user's request:
Incremental Mode (Preferred for Follow-Up Analyses)
If the user's request mentions updating, refreshing, or re-running a threat model AND a prior report folder exists:
Action words: "update", "refresh", "re-run", "incremental", "what changed", "since last analysis"
AND a baseline report folder is identified (either explicitly named or auto-detected as the most recent
threat-model-*folder with athreat-inventory.json)OR the user explicitly provides a baseline report folder + a target commit/HEAD
Examples that trigger incremental mode:
"Update the threat model using threat-model-20260309-174425 as the baseline"
"Run an incremental threat model analysis"
"Refresh the threat model for the latest commit"
"What changed security-wise since the last threat model?"
→ Read incremental-orchestrator.md and follow the incremental workflow. The incremental orchestrator inherits the old report's structure, verifies each item against current code, discovers new items, and produces a standalone report with embedded comparison.
Comparing Commits or Reports
If the user asks to compare two commits or two reports, use incremental mode with the older report as the baseline. → Read incremental-orchestrator.md and follow the incremental workflow.
Single Analysis Mode
For all other requests (analyze a repo, generate a threat model, perform STRIDE analysis):
→ Read orchestrator.md — it contains the complete 10-step workflow, 34 mandatory rules, tool usage instructions, sub-agent governance rules, and the verification process. Do not skip this step.
Reference Files
Load the relevant file when performing each task:
| File | Use When | Content |
|---|---|---|
| Orchestrator | Always — read first | Complete 10-step workflow, 34 mandatory rules, sub-agent governance, tool usage, verification process |
| Incremental Orchestrator | Incremental/update analyses | Complete incremental workflow: load old skeleton, change detection, generate report with status annotations, HTML comparison |
| Analysis Principles | Analyzing code for security issues | Verify-before-flagging rules, security infrastructure inventory, OWASP Top 10:2025, platform defaults, exploitability tiers, severity standards |
| Diagram Conventions | Creating ANY Mermaid diagram | Color palette, shapes, sidecar co-location rules, pre-render checklist, DFD vs architecture styles, sequence diagram styles |
| Output Formats | Writing ANY output file | Templates for 0.1-architecture.md, 1-threatmodel.md, 2-stride-analysis.md, 3-findings.md, 0-assessment.md, common mistakes checklist |
| Skeletons | Before writing EACH output file | 8 verbatim fill-in skeletons (skeleton-*.md) — read the relevant skeleton, copy VERBATIM, fill [FILL] placeholders. One skeleton per output file. Loaded on-demand to minimize context usage. |
| Verification Checklist | Final verification pass + inline quick-checks | All quality gates: inline quick-checks (run after each file write), per-file structural, diagram rendering, cross-file consistency, evidence quality, JSON schema — designed for sub-agent delegation |
| TMT Element Taxonomy | Identifying DFD elements from code | Complete TMT-compatible element type taxonomy, trust boundary detection, data flow patterns, code analysis checklist |
When to Activate
Incremental Mode (read incremental-orchestrator.md for workflow):
Update or refresh an existing threat model analysis
Generate a new analysis that builds on a prior report's structure
Track what threats/findings were fixed, introduced, or remain since a baseline
When a prior
threat-model-*folder exists and the user wants a follow-up analysis
Single Analysis Mode:
Perform full threat model analysis of a repository or system
Generate threat model diagrams (DFD) from code
Perform STRIDE-A analysis on components and data flows
Validate security control implementations
Identify trust boundary violations and architectural risks
Write prioritized security findings with CVSS 4.0 / CWE / OWASP mappings
Comparing commits or reports:
To compare security posture between commits, use incremental mode with the older report as baseline
Files
- ATTRIBUTION.mdAdded by AutoGineer869 B
- LICENSELicence file added by AutoGineer1.0 KiB
- SKILL.md5.7 KiB
- references/analysis-principles.md28.9 KiB
- references/diagram-conventions.md18.5 KiB
- references/incremental-orchestrator.md33.5 KiB
- references/orchestrator.md53.8 KiB
- references/output-formats.md58.5 KiB
- references/skeletons/skeleton-architecture.md6.1 KiB
- references/skeletons/skeleton-assessment.md11.1 KiB
- references/skeletons/skeleton-dfd.md3.3 KiB
- references/skeletons/skeleton-findings.md7.7 KiB
- references/skeletons/skeleton-incremental-html.md5.3 KiB
- references/skeletons/skeleton-inventory.md5.3 KiB
- references/skeletons/skeleton-stride-analysis.md6.2 KiB
- references/skeletons/skeleton-summary-dfd.md2.8 KiB
- references/skeletons/skeleton-threatmodel.md2.2 KiB
- references/tmt-element-taxonomy.md8.5 KiB
- references/verification-checklist.md69.9 KiB
references/skeletons/skeleton-inventory.md
Skeleton: threat-inventory.json
⛔ Use EXACT field names shown below. Common errors:
display_name(wrong→display),category(wrong→stride_category),name(wrong→title). ⛔ The template below is shown inside a code fence for readability only — do NOT include the fence in the output file. The.jsonfile must start with{on line 1.
{
"schema_version": "[FILL: 1.0 for standalone, 1.1 for incremental]",
"report_folder": "[FILL: threat-model-YYYYMMDD-HHmmss]",
"commit": "[FILL: short SHA]",
"commit_date": "[FILL: commit date UTC]",
"branch": "[FILL]",
"repository": "[FILL: remote URL]",
"analysis_timestamp": "[FILL: UTC timestamp]",
"model": "[FILL]",
"components": [
[REPEAT: sorted by id]
{
"id": "[FILL: PascalCase]",
"display": "[FILL: display name — NOT display_name]",
"type": "[FILL: process / external_service / data_store / external_interactor]",
"tmt_type": "[FILL: SE.P.TMCore.* / SE.EI.TMCore.* / SE.DS.TMCore.* from tmt-element-taxonomy.md]",
"boundary": "[FILL: boundary ID]",
"boundary_kind": "[FILL: MachineBoundary / NetworkBoundary / ClusterBoundary / ProcessBoundary / PrivilegeBoundary / SandboxBoundary]",
"aliases": [],
"source_files": ["[FILL: relative paths]"],
"source_directories": ["[FILL: relative dirs]"],
"fingerprint": {
"component_type": "[FILL: process / external_service / data_store / external_interactor]",
"boundary_kind": "[FILL: MachineBoundary / NetworkBoundary / ClusterBoundary / ProcessBoundary / PrivilegeBoundary / SandboxBoundary]",
"source_files": ["[FILL: relative paths]"],
"source_directories": ["[FILL: relative dirs — MUST NOT be empty for process-type]"],
"class_names": ["[FILL]"],
"namespace": "[FILL]",
"config_keys": [],
"api_routes": [],
"dependencies": [],
"inbound_from": ["[FILL: component IDs that send data TO this component]"],
"outbound_to": ["[FILL: component IDs this component sends data TO]"],
"protocols": ["[FILL: gRPC / HTTPS / SQL / etc.]"]
},
"sidecars": ["[FILL: co-located sidecar names, or empty array]"]
}
[END-REPEAT]
],
"boundaries": [
[REPEAT: sorted by id]
{
"id": "[FILL: PascalCase boundary ID]",
"display": "[FILL]",
"kind": "[FILL: MachineBoundary / NetworkBoundary / ClusterBoundary / ProcessBoundary / PrivilegeBoundary / SandboxBoundary]",
"aliases": [],
"contains": ["[FILL: component IDs]"],
"contains_fingerprint": "[FILL: sorted pipe-delimited component IDs]"
}
[END-REPEAT]
],
"flows": [
[REPEAT: sorted by id]
{
"id": "[FILL: DF_Source_to_Target]",
"from": "[FILL: component ID]",
"to": "[FILL: component ID]",
"protocol": "[FILL]",
"description": "[FILL: 1 sentence max]"
}
[END-REPEAT]
],
"threats": [
[REPEAT: sorted by id then identity_key.component_id]
{
"id": "[FILL: T##.X]",
"title": "[FILL: short title — REQUIRED]",
"description": "[FILL: 1 sentence — REQUIRED]",
"stride_category": "[FILL: S/T/R/I/D/E/A — SINGLE LETTER, NOT full word]",
"tier": [FILL: 1/2/3],
"prerequisites": "[FILL]",
"status": "[FILL: Open/Mitigated/Platform]",
"mitigation": "[FILL: 1 sentence or empty]",
"identity_key": {
"component_id": "[FILL: PascalCase — MUST be inside identity_key, NOT top-level]",
"data_flow_id": "[FILL: DF_Source_to_Target]",
"stride_category": "[FILL: S/T/R/I/D/E/A]",
"attack_surface": "[FILL: brief description of the attack surface]"
}
}
[END-REPEAT]
],
"findings": [
[REPEAT: sorted by id then identity_key.component_id]
{
"id": "[FILL: FIND-##]",
"title": "[FILL]",
"severity": "[FILL: Critical/Important/Moderate/Low]",
"cvss_score": [FILL: N.N],
"cvss_vector": "[FILL: CVSS:4.0/AV:...]",
"cwe": "[FILL: CWE-###]",
"owasp": "[FILL: A##:2025]",
"tier": [FILL: 1/2/3],
"effort": "[FILL: Low/Medium/High]",
"related_threats": ["[FILL: T##.X]"],
"evidence_files": ["[FILL: relative paths]"],
"component": "[FILL: display name]",
"identity_key": {
"component_id": "[FILL: PascalCase]",
"vulnerability": "[FILL: CWE-###]",
"attack_surface": "[FILL: file:key or endpoint]"
}
}
[END-REPEAT]
],
"metrics": {
"total_components": [FILL],
"total_boundaries": [FILL],
"total_flows": [FILL],
"total_threats": [FILL],
"total_findings": [FILL],
"threats_by_tier": { "T1": [FILL], "T2": [FILL], "T3": [FILL] },
"findings_by_tier": { "T1": [FILL], "T2": [FILL], "T3": [FILL] },
"threats_by_stride": { "S": [FILL], "T": [FILL], "R": [FILL], "I": [FILL], "D": [FILL], "E": [FILL], "A": [FILL] },
"findings_by_severity": { "Critical": [FILL], "Important": [FILL], "Moderate": [FILL], "Low": [FILL] }
}
}MANDATORY field name compliance:
"display"— NOT"display_name","name""stride_category"— NOT"category"— SINGLE LETTER (S/T/R/I/D/E/A)"title"AND"description"— both required on every threatidentity_key.component_id— component link INSIDE identity_key, NOT top-levelSort all arrays deterministically before writing
Requirements and compatibility
Written for: GitHub Copilot
Works with: Claude Code, Claude apps, OpenAI Codex, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, Gemini CLI, Kiro, OpenCode, Goose, Amp, Roo Code, JetBrains Junie, Factory Droid, Devin (ex-Windsurf), Mistral Vibe, OpenHands, Letta
“Works with” means the tool reads the open Agent Skills format; a skill written for one tool may use features others lack.
Security
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Attribution and licence
- First committed by
cheguv
- Publisher
- GitHub (Official)
- Distributed by
- GitHub
- Source
- github/awesome-copilot · skills/threat-model-analyst · commit 797337f
- Licence
- MIT License (redistribution allowed)
- LICENSE (added by AutoGineer from LICENSE)
- ATTRIBUTION.md (written by AutoGineer)
- Synced
- Contributors
- cheguv, stbenjam
AutoGineer is not affiliated with or endorsed by cheguv or GitHub.
Download ZIP
The ZIP holds the skill’s files, its licence files and an ATTRIBUTION.md. Download threat-model-analyst.zip