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Gitlab

MicrosoftOfficialPublished by Microsoft

  • Skill
  • Tool integration
  • Software development
  • MIT
  • Low risk
  • Has scripts

From the author

Manage GitLab merge requests and pipelines with a Python CLI
— the description by Microsoft

AutoGineer summary

Written by AutoGineer from the skill’s own files, not by the author

The GitLab skill provides a repository-local Python interface for interacting with GitLab.com or self-managed GitLab instances. It enables users to perform common development tasks such as listing and updating merge requests, triggering pipelines, and inspecting job logs directly from the command line. The tool supports both OAuth and legacy personal access token authentication modes and includes optional audit logging for tracking API operations.

What it does

  • Authenticates via OAuth or legacy personal access tokens
  • Lists, creates, and updates merge requests
  • Retrieves merge request notes and comments
  • Triggers pipelines for specific branches or tags
  • Lists pipeline jobs and retrieves raw job logs
  • Provides structured audit logging for API requests

When to use it

  • When you need to automate GitLab interactions within a local development workflow
  • When you prefer a command-line interface for managing merge requests and pipelines
  • When you need to extract specific data fields from GitLab resources for reporting
  • When you require an auditable trail of API operations for internal tracking

Advantages

  • Supports concise output filtering using the --fields parameter
  • Integrates with existing git repositories via automatic project detection
  • Offers secure OAuth authentication with PKCE support
  • Provides a structured JSON Lines audit trail for operations

Usage examples

“List all open merge requests for the current project.”
The CLI outputs a list of open merge requests, displaying the IID, title, and author name for each.
“Get the job logs for pipeline 12345.”
The CLI retrieves and prints the raw log output for the specified pipeline job.
“Create a new merge request from a JSON payload.”
The CLI submits the provided JSON data to create a new merge request on the configured GitLab project.
“Add a comment to merge request 42.”
The CLI posts the provided text as a comment on the specified merge request.

Install

Documentation by Microsoft

GitLab Skill

Overview

Use this skill to inspect and update GitLab merge requests, notes, pipelines, and job logs against GitLab.com or self-managed GitLab instances.

This skill is the repository-local Python workflow for GitLab tasks. It is not the official GitLab MCP server integration surface.

This first hve-core implementation is Python-only. Run the CLI through python scripts/gitlab.py and prefer --fields for read operations to keep output concise.

Prerequisites

The skill requires Python 3.11 or later.

Set these environment variables before running any command:

VariableRequiredExamplePurpose
GITLAB_URLYeshttps://gitlab.comGitLab instance URL
GITLAB_AUTH_MODEOptionaloauthoauth or explicit legacy-token compatibility mode
GITLAB_OAUTH_CLIENT_IDOAuthApplication IDNon-confidential OAuth application ID; no client secret
GITLAB_TOKENLegacy modeglpat-...PAT accepted only with GITLAB_AUTH_MODE=legacy-token
GITLAB_PROFILENodefaultNamed OAuth profile
GITLAB_TOKEN_STORENopathOAuth store override; parent must be owner-only on POSIX
GITLAB_ALLOW_INSECURENo1Permit explicit loopback HTTP development endpoints only
XDG_DATA_HOMENopathPOSIX data root used for the default OAuth store
LOCALAPPDATANopathReserved Windows data root; OAuth persistence currently fails closed on Windows
GITLAB_PROJECTNogroup/projectProject path or numeric project ID

If GITLAB_PROJECT is not set, the script attempts to detect the project from git remote get-url origin. Set the variable explicitly when you are not in a git repository or when you want to target a different project.

Operational Variables
VariableRequiredPurpose
GITLAB_AUDIT_LOGNoPath to a JSON Lines audit log. When set, every request is audited (see Audit Logging).
GITLAB_AUDIT_ACTORNoOverrides the recorded actor identity (for example, a CI service principal).
GITLAB_DEBUGNoSet to 1 to print a redacted traceback on failure. Never disables redaction.
Audit Logging

When GITLAB_AUDIT_LOG is set, the script writes a structured JSON Lines audit trail for every REST API and OAuth form request. Auditing is fail-closed and write-ahead:

  • An attempt record is written before the request is sent. If the audit log cannot be written, the operation is aborted and nothing is sent to GitLab.

  • An outcome record (success or error, with HTTP status on failure) is written after the request completes.

REST records include a UTC timestamp, actor, auth mode, normalized origin, operation, HTTP method, and event. OAuth records use bounded operation and failure kinds without actor, origin, client, profile, code, body, or free-form error fields. Resource paths, queries, profile names, and profile contents are excluded. The optional audit sink is operationally sensitive because origins can identify tenants or internal hosts. Place it at an access-controlled path and retain it only as long as operations require. Tokens and authorization headers are never written. Audit failures after the request emit a warning without altering the result.

Credential Rotation

OAuth is the default. Register a non-confidential user-, group-, or self-managed instance-owned application with redirect URI http://127.0.0.1:8766/callback and the api scope. Set only GITLAB_URL and GITLAB_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID, then run auth login or the human-assisted auth device-login. Browser login requires a rotating refresh token; access tokens refresh before expiry and replacements are stored atomically. Device login can return an access-token-only profile and then requires another device login after expiry. A provider/local crash window can still require re-login.

The default store is $XDG_DATA_HOME/hve-core/gitlab/gitlab-token.json on POSIX, falling back to ~/.local/share/hve-core/gitlab/gitlab-token.json. POSIX store and lock files use mode 0600 inside a dedicated owner-only directory. OAuth profile persistence fails closed on Windows because Python 3.11 mode bits cannot enforce an owner-only DACL. Use explicit legacy-token mode on Windows until a protected OAuth backend is available.

PAT authentication remains available through GITLAB_AUTH_MODE=legacy-token. Device authorization requires user approval on a browser-capable device and is not unattended workload identity.

Quick Start

Export your environment variables, then run a read command with --fields.

export GITLAB_URL="https://gitlab.com"
export GITLAB_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID="your-application-id"
export GITLAB_PROJECT="group/project"

python scripts/gitlab.py auth login
python scripts/gitlab.py mr-list opened --fields iid,title,author.name

Read pipeline jobs for a known pipeline:

python scripts/gitlab.py pipeline-jobs 12345 --fields id,name,status,stage

Parameters Reference

Common Option
ParameterApplies ToExampleDescription
--fieldsmr-list, mr-get, mr-notes, pipeline-get, pipeline-jobs--fields iid,title,stateExtract specific fields with dot notation and print concise tabular or key-value output
Commands
CommandArgumentsDescription
auth loginNoneAuthenticate with Authorization Code and PKCE
auth device-loginNoneAuthenticate through human-assisted device authorization
auth statusNonePrint secret-free local profile status
auth logoutNoneDelete one local profile without revoking server authorization
mr-list[state] [max]List merge requests, defaulting to all states and 20 results
mr-get<mr-iid>Get one merge request by project-scoped IID
mr-create<json> or stdinCreate a merge request from a JSON payload
mr-update<mr-iid> <json> or stdinUpdate merge request fields from a JSON payload
mr-comment<mr-iid> <body> or stdinAdd a comment to a merge request
mr-notes<mr-iid> [max]List merge request notes, excluding system notes when using --fields
pipeline-get<pipeline-id>Get one pipeline by numeric ID
pipeline-run<branch-or-tag>Trigger a pipeline for a branch or tag
pipeline-jobs<pipeline-id>List jobs for a pipeline
job-log<job-id>Print raw log output for a job

Script Reference

List recent open merge requests:

python scripts/gitlab.py mr-list opened --fields iid,title,author.name,user_notes_count

Get one merge request:

python scripts/gitlab.py mr-get 42 --fields iid,title,state,source_branch,target_branch

Create a merge request from inline JSON:

python scripts/gitlab.py mr-create '{
  "source_branch": "feature/add-auth",
  "target_branch": "main",
  "title": "feat(auth): add OAuth login"
}'

Add a merge request comment from standard input:

echo "CI passed. Ready for review." | python scripts/gitlab.py mr-comment 42

Inspect a failed pipeline:

python scripts/gitlab.py pipeline-get 12345 --fields id,status,web_url
python scripts/gitlab.py pipeline-jobs 12345 --fields id,name,status,stage
python scripts/gitlab.py job-log 67890

Troubleshooting

SymptomCauseResolution
GITLAB_URL is not setRequired environment variable missingExport GITLAB_URL before running the script
GITLAB_TOKEN is not set for legacy-token modeExplicit legacy mode has no PATExport a PAT only with GITLAB_AUTH_MODE=legacy-token
GITLAB_TOKEN must not be set in oauth modeLegacy PAT leaked into the OAuth configurationRemove GITLAB_TOKEN or explicitly select legacy-token mode
OAuth persistence is unavailable on WindowsNo protected Windows profile-store backendUse explicit legacy-token mode or run OAuth from POSIX
GITLAB_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID is not setOAuth application is not configuredSet the public client ID, then run auth login
Callback listener cannot bindPort 8766 is unavailable or not forwardedFree the port or use auth device-login
timed out waiting for the GitLab OAuth token store lockAnother process holds the profile-store lockWait for the other command to finish, then retry
GitLab device response has invalid verification_uriThe verification URI is unsafe to display or does not match GITLAB_URLConfirm GITLAB_URL matches the instance that serves device verification
cannot parse git remote URLProject autodetection failedSet GITLAB_PROJECT explicitly
HTTP 401 or HTTP 403Credential is invalid or lacks accessRe-login for OAuth; rotate the PAT in explicit legacy mode
HTTP 404Wrong project, MR IID, pipeline ID, or job IDVerify GITLAB_PROJECT and confirm the numeric identifiers
expected numeric IDNon-numeric value passed to an ID argumentUse project MR IID values and numeric pipeline or job IDs
python3 is required or syntax errors on launchUnsupported interpreterRun the script with Python 3.11 or later

GitLab uses MR IIDs such as !42 inside a project. This skill expects the numeric IID, not the global merge request ID.

Files

tests/test_gitlab_helpers.py

# Copyright (c) 2026 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
# SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
"""Helper-oriented unit tests for gitlab.py."""

from __future__ import annotations

import ast
import dataclasses
import json
import logging
import pathlib

import gitlab
import pytest
from pytest_mock import MockerFixture
from test_constants import TEST_API_URL

SOURCE = pathlib.Path(gitlab.__file__).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
SOURCE_TREE = ast.parse(SOURCE)
SCRIPTS_ROOT = pathlib.Path(gitlab.__file__).parent
SECRET = "s3cr3t-Value_123"
EXPECTED_REDACT_KEYS = (
    "access_token",
    "refresh_token",
    "code_verifier",
    "client_secret",
    "id_token",
    "assertion",
    "client_assertion",
    "device_code",
    "password",
    "private_token",
    "oauth_token",
    "deploy_token",
    "job_token",
)


class _NetworkInvocationVisitor(ast.NodeVisitor):
    """Collect credentialed network invocations with their owning function."""

    def __init__(self, module: str) -> None:
        self.module = module
        self.function = "<module>"
        self.invocations: list[tuple[str, str, str]] = []

    def visit_FunctionDef(self, node: ast.FunctionDef) -> None:
        previous = self.function
        self.function = node.name
        self.generic_visit(node)
        self.function = previous

    visit_AsyncFunctionDef = visit_FunctionDef

    def visit_Call(self, node: ast.Call) -> None:
        function = node.func
        if (
            isinstance(function, ast.Attribute)
            and function.attr == "open"
            and isinstance(function.value, ast.Name)
            and function.value.id == "_OPENER"
        ):
            self.invocations.append((self.module, self.function, "_OPENER.open"))
        elif isinstance(function, ast.Name) and function.id == "opener":
            self.invocations.append((self.module, self.function, "opener"))
        elif (
            isinstance(function, ast.Attribute)
            and function.attr == "urlopen"
            and isinstance(function.value, ast.Attribute)
            and isinstance(function.value.value, ast.Name)
            and function.value.value.id == "urllib"
            and function.value.attr == "request"
        ):
            self.invocations.append(
                (self.module, self.function, "urllib.request.urlopen")
            )
        self.generic_visit(node)


def _network_invocations(source: str, module: str) -> list[tuple[str, str, str]]:
    visitor = _NetworkInvocationVisitor(module)
    visitor.visit(ast.parse(source))
    return visitor.invocations


def _is_main_guard(node: ast.AST) -> bool:
    """Report whether a node is the ``if __name__ == "__main__":`` guard."""
    if not isinstance(node, ast.If) or not isinstance(node.test, ast.Compare):
        return False
    left = node.test.left
    operators = node.test.ops
    comparators = node.test.comparators
    return (
        isinstance(left, ast.Name)
        and left.id == "__name__"
        and len(operators) == 1
        and isinstance(operators[0], ast.Eq)
        and len(comparators) == 1
        and isinstance(comparators[0], ast.Constant)
        and comparators[0].value == "__main__"
    )


class _ExitMechanismVisitor(ast.NodeVisitor):
    """Collect process-exit violations using lexical import bindings."""

    _IMPLICIT_BINDINGS = {
        "SystemExit": "builtins.SystemExit",
        "sys": "sys",
    }

    def __init__(self, guarded: set[int]) -> None:
        self.guarded = guarded
        self.scope_stack: list[tuple[dict[str, str], dict[str, str]]] = []
        self.violations: list[str] = []

    def visit(self, node: ast.AST) -> object:
        if id(node) in self.guarded:
            return None
        return super().visit(node)

    def visit_Module(self, node: ast.Module) -> None:
        self._visit_scope(node.body, self._IMPLICIT_BINDINGS, is_class=False)

    def visit_FunctionDef(self, node: ast.FunctionDef) -> None:
        if node.name == "die":
            self.violations.append("def die")
        self._visit_function(node)

    def visit_AsyncFunctionDef(self, node: ast.AsyncFunctionDef) -> None:
        if node.name == "die":
            self.violations.append("def die")
        self._visit_function(node)

    def visit_ClassDef(self, node: ast.ClassDef) -> None:
        for decorator in node.decorator_list:
            self.visit(decorator)
        for base in node.bases:
            self.visit(base)
        for keyword in node.keywords:
            self.visit(keyword)
        self._visit_scope(node.body, self._child_bindings(), is_class=True)

    def visit_Raise(self, node: ast.Raise) -> None:
        raised = node.exc.func if isinstance(node.exc, ast.Call) else node.exc
        if self._resolve_target(raised) == "builtins.SystemExit":
            self.violations.append("raise SystemExit")
        self.generic_visit(node)

    def visit_Call(self, node: ast.Call) -> None:
        if self._resolve_target(node.func) == "sys.exit":
            self.violations.append("sys.exit")
        self.generic_visit(node)

    def _visit_function(self, node: ast.FunctionDef | ast.AsyncFunctionDef) -> None:
        for decorator in node.decorator_list:
            self.visit(decorator)
        self.visit(node.args)
        if node.returns is not None:
            self.visit(node.returns)
        self._visit_scope(node.body, self._child_bindings(), is_class=False)

    def _visit_scope(
        self,
        body: list[ast.stmt],
        inherited: dict[str, str],
        *,
        is_class: bool,
    ) -> None:
        bindings = inherited.copy()
        for statement in body:
            self._collect_import_bindings(statement, bindings)
        child_bindings = inherited if is_class else bindings
        self.scope_stack.append((bindings, child_bindings))
        for statement in body:
            self.visit(statement)
        self.scope_stack.pop()

    def _collect_import_bindings(self, node: ast.AST, bindings: dict[str, str]) -> None:
        if id(node) in self.guarded or isinstance(
            node,
            (ast.FunctionDef, ast.AsyncFunctionDef, ast.ClassDef, ast.Lambda),
        ):
            return
        if isinstance(node, ast.Import):
            for alias in node.names:
                bound_name = alias.asname or alias.name.partition(".")[0]
                bindings[bound_name] = alias.name if alias.asname else bound_name
            return
        if isinstance(node, ast.ImportFrom) and node.module is not None:
            for alias in node.names:
                if alias.name != "*":
                    bindings[alias.asname or alias.name] = f"{node.module}.{alias.name}"
            return
        for child in ast.iter_child_nodes(node):
            self._collect_import_bindings(child, bindings)

    def _child_bindings(self) -> dict[str, str]:
        return self.scope_stack[-1][1]

    def _resolve_target(self, node: ast.AST | None) -> str | None:
        if isinstance(node, ast.Name):
            return self.scope_stack[-1][0].get(node.id)
        if isinstance(node, ast.Attribute):
            parent = self._resolve_target(node.value)
            if parent is not None:
                return f"{parent}.{node.attr}"
        return None


def _exit_mechanism_violations(source: str) -> list[str]:
    """Return violations of the single-failure-mechanism contract.

    ``GitLabError`` is the module's only failure mechanism. Process exit belongs
    to the ``__main__`` guard alone, so a ``raise SystemExit`` or ``sys.exit``
    anywhere else, or any ``die`` definition, reintroduces the second mechanism
    this contract exists to prevent.
    """
    tree = ast.parse(source)
    guarded: set[int] = set()
    for node in ast.walk(tree):
        if _is_main_guard(node):
            for statement in node.body:
                for child in ast.walk(statement):
                    guarded.add(id(child))

    visitor = _ExitMechanismVisitor(guarded)
    visitor.visit(tree)
    return visitor.violations


class TestRedact:
    """Tests for _redact."""

    def test_masks_header_and_query_string_secrets(self) -> None:
        payload = (
            "PRIVATE-TOKEN: secret123\n"
            "X-API-Key: api-key-456\n"
            "Cookie: session=xyz\n"
            "https://example.com/?private_token=abc&access_token=def&token=ghi"
            "&api_key=789&password=secret&secret=hidden"
        )

        redacted = gitlab._redact(payload)

        assert "PRIVATE-TOKEN=[REDACTED]" in redacted
        assert "X-API-Key=[REDACTED]" in redacted
        assert "Cookie=[REDACTED]" in redacted
        assert "private_token=[REDACTED]" in redacted
        assert "access_token=[REDACTED]" in redacted
        assert "token=[REDACTED]" in redacted
        assert "api_key=[REDACTED]" in redacted
        assert "password=[REDACTED]" in redacted
        assert "secret=[REDACTED]" in redacted
        assert "secret123" not in redacted
        assert "abc" not in redacted

    def test_masks_oauth_secrets_in_escaped_and_encoded_forms(self) -> None:
        payload = (
            '{"Access_Token":"mixed-secret"} '
            r"{\"refresh_token\":\"escaped-secret\"} "
            "access_token%3Dencoded-secret"
        )

        redacted = gitlab._redact(payload)

        assert "mixed-secret" not in redacted
        assert "escaped-secret" not in redacted
        assert "encoded-secret" not in redacted

    @pytest.mark.parametrize("key", EXPECTED_REDACT_KEYS)
    def test_masks_all_pinned_json_and_form_keys(self, key: str) -> None:
        payload = f'{{"{key}": "{SECRET}"}} {key}={SECRET}'

        redacted = gitlab._redact(payload)

        assert SECRET not in redacted
        assert "[REDACTED]" in redacted

    def test_masks_azure_sas_query_string(self) -> None:
        """SAS tokens ride in the query string, so drop everything after the ?."""
        url = f"https://acct.blob.core.windows.net/c/b?sig={SECRET}&se=2026"

        redacted = gitlab._redact(url)

        assert redacted == "https://acct.blob.core.windows.net/c/b?[REDACTED]"

    def test_masks_basic_authorization_header(self) -> None:
        """Basic credentials are base64(user:token) and must not survive."""
        encoded = "dXNlckBleGFtcGxlLmNvbTp0b2tlbg=="

        redacted = gitlab._redact(f"Authorization: Basic {encoded}")

        assert encoded not in redacted

    def test_masks_every_secret_in_a_multi_secret_line(self) -> None:
        payload = f"a access_token={SECRET}1 b private_token={SECRET}2 c"

        redacted = gitlab._redact(payload)

        assert f"{SECRET}1" not in redacted
        assert f"{SECRET}2" not in redacted

    def test_is_idempotent(self) -> None:
        """Re-redacting already-redacted text must not corrupt the marker."""
        once = gitlab._redact(f"access_token={SECRET}")

        assert gitlab._redact(once) == once

    @pytest.mark.parametrize("payload", ["", "   "])
    def test_handles_empty_payloads(self, payload: str) -> None:
        assert gitlab._redact(payload).strip() == ""

    def test_preserves_unicode_around_masked_secrets(self) -> None:
        redacted = gitlab._redact(f"\u65e5\u672c\u8a9e access_token={SECRET} \u2713")

        assert SECRET not in redacted
        assert "\u65e5\u672c\u8a9e" in redacted
        assert "\u2713" in redacted

    def test_pinned_keyset_excludes_public_pkce_challenge(self) -> None:
        assert gitlab._REDACT_KEYS == EXPECTED_REDACT_KEYS
        assert "code_challenge" not in gitlab._REDACT_KEYS


class TestCredentialExposureContracts:
    """Tests for credential-safe objects, errors, and output sinks."""

    def test_credential_is_not_a_module_level_global(self) -> None:
        """The PAT lives only on AuthContext, never in mutable module state."""
        assert not hasattr(gitlab, "gitlab_token")
        assert "gitlab_token" not in SOURCE

    def test_auth_context_is_immutable_and_secret_free(self) -> None:
        context = gitlab.AuthContext(
            mode="legacy-token",
            issuer="https://gitlab.example.com",
            token=SECRET,
        )

        assert SECRET not in repr(context)
        with pytest.raises(dataclasses.FrozenInstanceError):
            context.token = "replacement"  # type: ignore[misc]

    def test_api_error_excludes_message_from_repr_and_redacts_str(self) -> None:
        error = gitlab.GitLabAPIError(
            status=403,
            method="GET",
            resource=f"{TEST_API_URL}/projects/1",
            message=f"private_token={SECRET}",
        )

        assert SECRET not in str(error)
        assert SECRET not in repr(error)

    def test_emit_and_debug_traceback_redact(
        self,
        monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
        capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str],
        caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture,
    ) -> None:
        monkeypatch.setenv("GITLAB_DEBUG", "1")
        error = gitlab.GitLabAPIError(message=f"private_token={SECRET}")
        with caplog.at_level(logging.ERROR, logger="gitlab"):
            gitlab._emit(f"private_token={SECRET}")
        gitlab._emit_debug_traceback(error)

        captured = capsys.readouterr()
        assert SECRET not in captured.err
        assert SECRET not in caplog.text


class TestSourceContracts:
    """Structural guards for redacted output and hardened transport ownership."""

    def test_print_calls_remain_in_emit_helpers(self) -> None:
        owners: list[str] = []
        for node in ast.walk(SOURCE_TREE):
            if not isinstance(node, (ast.FunctionDef, ast.AsyncFunctionDef)):
                continue
            if any(
                isinstance(child, ast.Call)
                and isinstance(child.func, ast.Name)
                and child.func.id == "print"
                for child in ast.walk(node)
            ):
                owners.append(node.name)

        assert set(owners) <= {
            "_emit",
            "_emit_stdout",
            "_emit_structured_stdout",
            "_emit_debug_traceback",
        }
        assert "LOGGER.exception(" not in SOURCE

    def test_credentialed_egress_has_exactly_two_owners(self) -> None:
        invocations: list[tuple[str, str, str]] = []
        for path in SCRIPTS_ROOT.rglob("*.py"):
            if "__pycache__" in path.parts:
                continue
            invocations.extend(
                _network_invocations(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"), path.name)
            )

        assert set(invocations) == {
            ("_gitlab_oauth.py", "post_form", "opener"),
            ("gitlab.py", "_request_bytes", "_OPENER.open"),
        }

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        ("source", "expected"),
        [
            (
                "def bypass():\n    return urllib.request.urlopen('https://x')\n",
                "bypass",
            ),
            ("def other():\n    return _OPENER.open('https://x')\n", "other"),
            ("def other(opener):\n    return opener('https://x')\n", "other"),
        ],
    )
    def test_source_contract_detects_non_owner_invocations(
        self, source: str, expected: str
    ) -> None:
        invocations = _network_invocations(source, "unexpected.py")
        assert invocations
        assert invocations[0][1] == expected

    def test_gitlab_error_is_the_only_failure_mechanism(self) -> None:
        assert _exit_mechanism_violations(SOURCE) == []
        assert not hasattr(gitlab, "die")

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        ("source", "expected"),
        [
            ("def bypass():\n    raise SystemExit(2)\n", "raise SystemExit"),
            ("def bypass():\n    sys.exit(2)\n", "sys.exit"),
            ("def die(message):\n    return message\n", "def die"),
            (
                "import builtins\n\ndef bypass():\n    raise builtins.SystemExit(2)\n",
                "raise SystemExit",
            ),
            (
                "def owner():\n    import builtins as bi\n"
                "    raise bi.SystemExit(2)\n\n"
                "def sibling():\n    raise bi.SystemExit(2)\n",
                "raise SystemExit",
            ),
            (
                "class Owner:\n"
                "    from builtins import SystemExit as Stop\n"
                "    raise Stop(2)\n\n"
                "    def method(self):\n        raise Stop(2)\n",
                "raise SystemExit",
            ),
            (
                "def outer():\n    import sys as system\n\n"
                "    def inner():\n        system.exit(2)\n",
                "sys.exit",
            ),
            (
                "from sys import exit\n\ndef bypass():\n    exit(2)\n",
                "sys.exit",
            ),
            (
                "def bypass():\n    from sys import exit as stop\n    stop(2)\n",
                "sys.exit",
            ),
        ],
    )
    def test_source_contract_detects_second_failure_mechanism(
        self, source: str, expected: str
    ) -> None:
        assert _exit_mechanism_violations(source) == [expected]

    def test_source_contract_allows_guarded_process_exit(self) -> None:
        guarded = 'if __name__ == "__main__":\n    sys.exit(main())\n'

        assert _exit_mechanism_violations(guarded) == []

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        "source",
        [
            (
                "class Owner:\n    from sys import exit\n\n"
                "    def method(self):\n"
                "        def exit(code):\n            return code\n\n"
                "        exit(2)\n"
            ),
            (
                "def owner():\n    import sys as target\n\n"
                "def sibling(target):\n    target.exit(2)\n"
            ),
        ],
    )
    def test_source_contract_allows_unrelated_exit_forms(self, source: str) -> None:
        assert _exit_mechanism_violations(source) == []

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        "source",
        [
            'if __name__ != "__main__":\n    sys.exit(2)\n',
            ('if __name__ == "__main__":\n    main()\nelse:\n    sys.exit(2)\n'),
        ],
    )
    def test_source_contract_rejects_exit_outside_canonical_guard_body(
        self, source: str
    ) -> None:
        assert _exit_mechanism_violations(source) == ["sys.exit"]

    def test_job_log_output_is_redacted(
        self,
        configured_gitlab: object,
        capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str],
        mocker: MockerFixture,
    ) -> None:
        del configured_gitlab
        mocker.patch("gitlab.project", return_value="group%2Fproject")
        mocker.patch(
            "gitlab._request_bytes",
            return_value=f"access_token={SECRET}".encode(),
        )

        gitlab.cmd_job_log(["7"])

        assert SECRET not in capsys.readouterr().out


class TestStripGitSuffix:
    """Tests for strip_git_suffix."""

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        ("value", "expected"),
        [
            ("group/project.git", "group/project"),
            ("group/project", "group/project"),
            (".git", ""),
            ("project.git.git", "project.git"),
        ],
    )
    def test_strips_expected_suffix(self, value: str, expected: str) -> None:
        assert gitlab.strip_git_suffix(value) == expected


class TestValidateNumericId:
    """Tests for validate_numeric_id."""

    @pytest.mark.parametrize("value", ["7", "123456"])
    def test_accepts_numeric_strings(self, value: str) -> None:
        gitlab.validate_numeric_id(value)

    @pytest.mark.parametrize("value", ["", "abc", "12a", "-1", "1.2", " 5 "])
    def test_rejects_non_numeric_values(self, value: str) -> None:
        with pytest.raises(gitlab.GitLabError) as exc_info:
            gitlab.validate_numeric_id(value)

        assert exc_info.value.exit_code == gitlab.EXIT_USAGE
        assert f"expected numeric ID, got: {value}" in str(exc_info.value)


class TestValidatePositiveInt:
    """Tests for validate_positive_int."""

    @pytest.mark.parametrize("value", ["1", "50", "100"])
    def test_accepts_digit_strings(self, value: str) -> None:
        gitlab.validate_positive_int(value, "max_results")

    @pytest.mark.parametrize("value", ["", "ten", "5x", "-2", "3.14"])
    def test_rejects_invalid_values(self, value: str) -> None:
        with pytest.raises(gitlab.GitLabError) as exc_info:
            gitlab.validate_positive_int(value, "max_results")

        assert exc_info.value.exit_code == gitlab.EXIT_USAGE
        assert f"max_results must be a positive integer, got: {value}" in str(
            exc_info.value
        )


class TestParseFields:
    """Tests for parse_fields."""

    def test_returns_arguments_without_fields(self) -> None:
        arguments = ["mr-list", "opened", "20"]

        cleaned = gitlab.parse_fields(arguments)

        assert cleaned == arguments
        assert gitlab.selected_fields is None

    def test_extracts_fields_and_strips_option(self) -> None:
        cleaned = gitlab.parse_fields(
            ["mr-list", "opened", "--fields", "iid,title,author.name"]
        )

        assert cleaned == ["mr-list", "opened"]
        assert gitlab.selected_fields == ["iid", "title", "author.name"]

    def test_fields_can_appear_before_command_arguments(self) -> None:
        cleaned = gitlab.parse_fields(["--fields", "iid,title", "mr-get", "7"])

        assert cleaned == ["mr-get", "7"]
        assert gitlab.selected_fields == ["iid", "title"]

    def test_requires_value_after_fields(self) -> None:
        with pytest.raises(gitlab.GitLabError) as exc_info:
            gitlab.parse_fields(["mr-list", "--fields"])

        assert exc_info.value.exit_code == gitlab.EXIT_USAGE
        assert "usage: --fields requires a comma-separated value list" in str(
            exc_info.value
        )


class TestExtractField:
    """Tests for extract_field."""

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        ("payload", "path", "expected"),
        [
            ({"iid": 7}, "iid", "7"),
            ({"author": {"name": "Ada"}}, "author.name", "Ada"),
            ({"labels": ["bug", "urgent"]}, "labels", "bug, urgent"),
            ({"author": None}, "author.name", ""),
            ({"author": {"name": None}}, "author.name", ""),
            ({"author": {"name": "Ada"}}, "author.email", ""),
            ({"nested": {"deep": {"value": 9}}}, "nested.deep.value", "9"),
        ],
    )
    def test_extracts_supported_values(
        self, payload: object, path: str, expected: str
    ) -> None:
        assert gitlab.extract_field(payload, path) == expected

    def test_returns_empty_for_non_mapping_intermediate_value(self) -> None:
        assert gitlab.extract_field({"author": "Ada"}, "author.name") == ""


class TestPrintFields:
    """Tests for print_fields."""

    def test_does_nothing_when_no_fields_selected(
        self, capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str]
    ) -> None:
        gitlab.print_fields({"iid": 7})

        assert capsys.readouterr().out == ""

    def test_prints_tabular_output_for_lists(
        self, capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str]
    ) -> None:
        gitlab.selected_fields = ["iid", "title"]

        gitlab.print_fields(
            [
                {"iid": 1, "title": "First"},
                {"iid": 2, "title": "Second"},
            ]
        )

        assert capsys.readouterr().out.splitlines() == [
            "iid\ttitle",
            "1\tFirst",
            "2\tSecond",
        ]

    def test_prints_key_value_output_for_single_object(
        self, capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str]
    ) -> None:
        gitlab.selected_fields = ["iid", "author.name"]

        gitlab.print_fields({"iid": 9, "author": {"name": "Grace"}})

        assert capsys.readouterr().out.splitlines() == [
            "iid: 9",
            "author.name: Grace",
        ]

    def test_preserves_tsv_arity_and_ordinary_credential_words(
        self, capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str]
    ) -> None:
        gitlab.selected_fields = ["first", "title", "last"]

        gitlab.print_fields(
            [{"first": "", "title": "fix secret token password", "last": ""}]
        )

        lines = capsys.readouterr().out.splitlines()
        assert lines[1].split("\t") == ["", "fix secret token password", ""]


def test_sanitize_structured_preserves_containers_and_redacts_descendants() -> None:
    payload = {
        "title": "fix secret",
        "access_token": {"value": SECRET, "nested": [SECRET, {"x": SECRET}]},
        "items": [{"password": [SECRET]}, "unchanged"],
    }

    sanitized = gitlab._sanitize_structured(payload)

    assert sanitized == {
        "title": "fix secret",
        "access_token": {
            "value": "[REDACTED]",
            "nested": ["[REDACTED]", {"x": "[REDACTED]"}],
        },
        "items": [{"password": ["[REDACTED]"]}, "unchanged"],
    }
    assert json.loads(json.dumps(sanitized)) == sanitized


class TestLoadJsonPayload:
    """Tests for load_json_payload."""

    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
        ("raw_payload", "expected"),
        [
            ('{"title": "MR"}', {"title": "MR"}),
            ("[1, 2, 3]", [1, 2, 3]),
            ("true", True),
        ],
    )
    def test_parses_valid_json(self, raw_payload: str, expected: object) -> None:
        assert gitlab.load_json_payload(raw_payload, "usage: gitlab") == expected

    def test_raises_usage_error_for_invalid_json(self) -> None:
        with pytest.raises(gitlab.GitLabError) as exc_info:
            gitlab.load_json_payload("{bad json}", "usage: gitlab mr-create <json>")

        assert exc_info.value.exit_code == gitlab.EXIT_USAGE
        assert "invalid JSON payload" in str(exc_info.value)


def test_emit_writes_exactly_one_stderr_line() -> None:
    """_emit prints once; logging's lastResort must not echo the record.

    _emit both logs at ERROR and prints to stderr. A logger with no handler
    falls back to logging.lastResort, which writes WARNING-or-above records to
    stderr as well, so every CLI error would appear twice.
    """
    assert any(isinstance(h, logging.NullHandler) for h in gitlab.LOGGER.handlers)


def test_emit_is_not_duplicated_by_last_resort(
    capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str],
) -> None:
    gitlab._emit("single line")

    lines = [line for line in capsys.readouterr().err.splitlines() if line.strip()]

    assert lines == ["single line"]

Requirements and compatibility

Written for: GitHub Copilot

Works with: Claude Code, Claude apps, OpenAI Codex, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, Gemini CLI, Kiro, OpenCode, Goose, Amp, Roo Code, JetBrains Junie, Factory Droid, Devin (ex-Windsurf), Mistral Vibe, OpenHands, Letta

“Works with” means the tool reads the open Agent Skills format; a skill written for one tool may use features others lack.

Needs: Needs an MCP server, Needs a command-line tool, Needs Python

The author says: Requires Python 3.11+. GitLab OAuth public-client credentials or explicit legacy-token mode.

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Attribution and licence

Published by
Microsoft
Publisher
Microsoft (Official)
Source
microsoft/hve-core · .github/skills/project-planning/gitlab · commit f425e94
Licence
MIT License (redistribution allowed)
  • LICENSE (added by AutoGineer from LICENSE)
  • ATTRIBUTION.md (written by AutoGineer)
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