Doca Aes Gcm

DOCA AES-GCM workflows

Where to start: The verbs run configure → build → modify → run → test → debug. Skip ahead only when the user is already past a verb. The ## test verb is an iterative loop (cap check → known-vector round-trip → small-bulk → full-bulk → loop back if the key size or buffer sizing changed), not a one-shot pass — see the eval-loop overlay in ## test below.

Read this file when the loader sent you here from SKILL.md. For the underlying capability surface, task types, key-size surface, capability-query rules, AEAD semantics, error taxonomy, observability, and safety / path-selection policy, see CAPABILITIES.md. For the cross-library DOCA patterns layered under everything below (the universal lifecycle, the cross-library DOCA_ERROR_* taxonomy, the modify-a-shipped- sample workflow), see doca-programming-guide/SKILL.md.

Each verb below describes the shape of the workflow, not a copy-paste recipe. The agent's job is to walk the user through the steps in order, verifying preconditions before recommending the next call.

configure

Goal: bring up a DOCA AES-GCM context on a host or BlueField and confirm the device's accelerator supports the task types and key sizes the user actually intends to use.

Steps the agent should walk the user through:

1. Confirm the installed DOCA version. Use the procedure in doca-version TASKS.md ## configure (doca-version/TASKS.md#configure). Quote the version observed (pkg-config --modversion doca-aes-gcm, then doca_caps --version); do not assume "latest".

2. Discover the device capability surface for AES-GCM. Run doca_caps --list-devs to see which devices have AES-GCM capability, then run the per-doca_devinfo doca_aes_gcm_cap_* queries against the candidate device. Record at minimum: doca_aes_gcm_cap_task_encrypt_is_supported(devinfo), doca_aes_gcm_cap_task_decrypt_is_supported(devinfo), and for each key type the user is considering (DOCA_AES_GCM_KEY_128 and/or DOCA_AES_GCM_KEY_256 — AES-192 is not in the enum and is not supported), doca_aes_gcm_cap_task_encrypt_is_key_type_supported(devinfo, key_type) and the matching _decrypt_is_key_type_supported. Also record doca_aes_gcm_cap_task_encrypt_get_max_buf_size(devinfo). The capability surface to compare against lives in CAPABILITIES.md ## Capabilities and modes.

3. Decide whether to offload at all. Per the path-selection bullets in CAPABILITIES.md ## Safety policy, doca-aes-gcm is the right answer only when the input is bulk, sustained, or already pinned in doca_mmap memory. For a tiny one-shot encryption, recommend CPU + AES-NI; for a non-GCM AES mode, recommend CPU + OpenSSL — do not invent a doca-aes-gcm use case the user did not ask for.

4. Pick the task types per side. Encrypt-only, decrypt-only, or both (the symmetric peer case). The pick decides the next-step code shape; the trade-off table lives in CAPABILITIES.md ## Capabilities and modes. Do not pick for the user when their intent is ambiguous — ask whether the program is a producer, a consumer, or both.

5. Surface the AEAD shape to the user. Before any code, the agent must surface the AEAD-input contract: encrypt takes key + IV + AAD (optional) + plaintext, produces ciphertext + auth tag; decrypt takes key + IV + AAD (optional) + ciphertext + expected tag, verifies the tag, produces plaintext. The user must know where each of these comes from (key from their KMS, IV per the protocol, AAD per the protocol, plaintext / ciphertext from the data flow) before any task config is meaningful.

6. Configure the AES-GCM instance. Mandatory before doca_ctx_start(): enable at least one task type (doca_aes_gcm_task_encrypt_set_conf and/or doca_aes_gcm_task_decrypt_set_conf); set source mmap permissions (doca_mmap_set_permissions to include DOCA_ACCESS_FLAG_LOCAL_READ_ONLY); set destination mmap permissions (DOCA_ACCESS_FLAG_LOCAL_READ_WRITE); size the per-submission plaintext to at most doca_aes_gcm_cap_task_encrypt_get_max_buf_size(devinfo). Per the matrix in CAPABILITIES.md ## Safety policy.

7. Sanity check before any task submission. Confirm with the user: which task type(s), which key size, source-buffer size, destination-buffer size, where the key + IV + AAD come from. Run a known-vector round-trip (a published AES-GCM test vector from NIST GCMVS or RFC 5288) and verify the ciphertext + tag match on encrypt and the plaintext recovers on decrypt before any user data flows. If any step fails with a DOCA_ERROR_*, route through the error taxonomy in CAPABILITIES.md ## Error taxonomy before retrying.

For the canonical DOCA universal lifecycle that underlies steps 4-7, see doca-programming-guide TASKS.md ## configure (doca-programming-guide/TASKS.md#configure). This skill adds the AES-GCM overlay; do not re-explain the lifecycle here.

build

Goal: produce a binary that links DOCA AES-GCM against the user's installed DOCA, using the canonical cross-library build pattern.

The build pattern for any DOCA C/C++ consumer is identical across libraries — pkg-config for include + link flags, meson or CMake as the build system — and is fully documented in doca-programming-guide TASKS.md ## build (doca-programming-guide/TASKS.md#build). This skill carries only the AES-GCM-specific overlay:

For non-C consumers (Rust, Go, Python), the link surface is the same *.so files; the FFI wrapper layer is the language-specific binding and is out of scope for this skill — but the four slots above are still the load-bearing inputs the wrapper needs.

modify

Goal: take a shipped DOCA AES-GCM sample as the verified starting point and apply a minimum-diff modification to express the user's intent.

The universal modify-a-shipped-sample workflow lives in doca-programming-guide TASKS.md ## modify (doca-programming-guide/TASKS.md#modify). Use it as-is. The AES-GCM-specific overlay is the modify-from-sample schema fill — the five slots the agent must elicit from the user before recommending any code-level edit:

The agent emits an intent description + the five filled slots; the actual unified diff against the sample source is produced by the user (this bundle has no diff renderer). The agent must walk the user through the diff line-by-line against the sample source they read on disk, and have the user paste back the result for validation. Special hazard for AES-GCM modifications: the agent must explicitly flag if any proposed diff includes hard-coded key bytes — that diff is unsafe to commit regardless of whether it builds.

run

Goal: actually execute the built binary against the user's installed DOCA on a host or BlueField, with a real input.

Steps the agent should walk the user through:

1. Confirm the device is reachable. AES-GCM runs on a single side (no peer); the only env-side requirement is that the doca_dev the binary opens corresponds to a device whose accelerator the user expects. Mismatched doca_dev selection (opening a NIC without AES-GCM accelerator support) returns DOCA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED at task submit, not at open.

2. Run the known-vector round-trip first. A binary that encrypts

   • decrypts one short fixed input with a published key + IV + AAD and compares both directions against the published expected output is the cheapest correctness signal. Do not bulk-encrypt or bulk-decrypt before this passes.

3. Capture the structured log. Set DOCA_LOG_LEVEL=trace for the first run (see doca-debug CAPABILITIES.md ## Observability (doca-debug/CAPABILITIES.md#observability)). This is the cheapest way to make the lifecycle and task-submit transitions visible on first failure. Do not log the key bytes themselves — the trace flag is for the library, not the user's key buffer.

4. Capture the completion events on the PE. A run that produces no completion events but doesn't error is almost always a missed doca_pe_progress() call. Confirm the progress engine is being driven on the main thread. For decrypt completions specifically, inspect the per-completion result for the tag-verification status before reading the plaintext.

test

Goal: prove the configured AES-GCM context can actually produce correct ciphertexts (on encrypt) and verify + recover plaintexts (on decrypt) at the user's intended throughput, on the user's hardware, and that the key size and buffer sizing were right.

Performance harness routing. For throughput / latency measurement on the configured AES-GCM context (or for cross-library comparison against the other DOCA crypto primitives), route the user to doca-bench TASKS.md ## test (doca-bench/TASKS.md#test) — doca-bench is the cross-library performance harness with documented warm-up / steady-state / outlier semantics, and it explicitly supports AES-GCM. The iteration loop below stays the correctness harness; doca-bench is the performance harness. Hand-rolling a benchmark loop inside this skill's ## test would re-invent what doca-bench already does and would not be reviewable against published accelerator headroom.

This is a loop, not a one-shot pass. Each iteration narrows either the task type, the key size, the buffer sizing, the AAD shape, or the permission set. The loop terminates when either (a) the user's intended AES-GCM workload encrypts + decrypts correctly end-to-end with acceptable throughput, or (b) the agent has narrowed the failure cause to a layer outside DOCA AES-GCM itself (driver / firmware / device) and escalated to the matching skill.

Iteration shape:

1. Capability re-check. Re-run doca_aes_gcm_cap_task_encrypt_is_supported, _task_decrypt_is_supported, _task_encrypt_is_key_type_supported(devinfo, key_type) for each key type in use (DOCA_AES_GCM_KEY_128 / DOCA_AES_GCM_KEY_256), and _task_encrypt_get_max_buf_size against the active doca_devinfo. If any return false / unexpected → that's the answer; the user's device or DOCA version does not support the requested config. Update the intent or update the install.

2. Permission cross-check. Compare the configured source + destination mmap permissions against the matrix in CAPABILITIES.md ## Safety policy. Mismatches surface as DOCA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED on the first task submission, not at configure time.

3. Known-vector round-trip. Encrypt one short fixed plaintext with a published key + IV + AAD and compare the accelerator's ciphertext + tag against the published expected ciphertext + tag byte-for-byte. Then decrypt the published ciphertext + tag with the same key + IV + AAD and verify the plaintext recovers byte-for-byte. If either direction differs, the configuration is wrong — do not proceed to bulk input.

4. Completion drain. Confirm completion events arrive on the PE for every submitted task. Submitted but no completion is the most expensive class of bug to discover late; confirm it on the known-vector round-trip before bulk submissions.

5. Bulk encrypt test. If the user intends bulk encryption, submit a series of encrypt tasks (small inputs first, then sizes approaching _task_encrypt_get_max_buf_size) and verify the ciphertexts + tags against a CPU AES-GCM reference (OpenSSL EVP_aes_*_gcm). Throughput numbers come from this step; correctness comes from step 3.

6. Bulk decrypt test (with tampering negative). If the user intends bulk decryption, submit the matching ciphertexts + tags and verify the plaintexts recover. Then submit ONE deliberately tampered ciphertext (flip a single bit) and verify the completion reports a tag-verification failure. This validates that the agent's tag-check observability is wired up correctly — silently accepting a tampered ciphertext is the worst failure mode this library exposes.

7. Negative test for unsupported config. Once the positive path works, use a key type that the step-1 capability query explicitly reports unsupported and confirm DOCA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED. If the device supports both public key types, skip this key-type negative test with that reason; do not invent an enum value. An alternative negative is allowed only when another capability query explicitly declares the selected configuration unsupported.

Eval-loop overlay — why this is a loop, not a one-shot pass:

Loop termination: an iteration kind is one row of the table above: capability re-check, permission fix, sizing fix, known-vector/AAD fix, completion drain, or queue-pressure fix. After each single-variable fix, re-capture that row's observable result. Stop after two consecutive iterations of the same kind leave both the relevant configuration or capability output and the observed symptom unchanged — that means the cause is below DOCA AES-GCM. Escalate to doca-debug TASKS.md ## debug (doca-debug/TASKS.md#debug) with the captured cap-query snapshot + known-vector diff as evidence.

debug

Goal: when a DOCA AES-GCM call returns a DOCA_ERROR_* (or the program produces no completion event, or a decrypt completion reports a tag-verification failure), narrow the cause to a specific layer and act on it.

The cross-library debug ladder lives in doca-debug TASKS.md ## debug (doca-debug/TASKS.md#debug). Walk through it in order — install → version → build → link → runtime → program → driver — before recommending AES-GCM-specific fixes. This skill's overlay names the AES-GCM-specific manifestation at layers 5 (runtime) and 6 (program):

Layer 5 (runtime) — AES-GCM overlay.

• Walk the lifecycle: was the context started? Was the task enabled before start (doca_aes_gcm_task_*_set_conf before doca_ctx_start())? Submitting before the task is enabled returns DOCA_ERROR_BAD_STATE, not a clear symptom.

• Confirm the PE is being progressed. No completion events is almost always a missing doca_pe_progress() in the user's main loop.

• Confirm both the source mmap and the destination mmap are still alive at submit time. Destroying either before doca_ctx_destroy is a use-after-free that surfaces as DOCA_ERROR_BAD_STATE from subsequent calls.

Layer 6 (program) — AES-GCM overlay.

• Key-type discipline: a _set_conf or submit call that quotes a key type the cap query returns false for returns DOCA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED. Re-run the cap query against the active doca_devinfo; do not assume from prior installs. The key buffer length in bytes (16 / 32) MUST match the declared key type (128-bit DOCA_AES_GCM_KEY_128 or 256-bit DOCA_AES_GCM_KEY_256; AES-192 is not in the enum).

• Buffer-sizing matrix: the most common AES-GCM program-layer bug is a plaintext larger than doca_aes_gcm_cap_task_encrypt_get_max_buf_size(devinfo) — surfaces as DOCA_ERROR_INVALID_VALUE at submit. The fix is to fragment at the application layer; this library does not auto-fragment.

• AAD-binding mismatch (decrypt-only symptom): if encrypt + decrypt round-trips fail on the user's own data but pass on a published vector, the AAD bytes the user passes to decrypt do not match the AAD bytes used at encrypt. AAD mismatches are silent at configure time and only surface as tag-verification failure on decrypt completion. Walk the user's AAD construction on both sides byte-for-byte.

• IV / nonce discipline: AES-GCM tag verification depends on the exact same IV being passed to encrypt and decrypt. An IV mismatch between the two sides surfaces as a tag-verification failure, identical to a tampered ciphertext. Walk the user's IV source on both sides (per-record counter, random per record, …) to disambiguate.

• Tag-verification failure on real data — security-critical path. When a decrypt completion reports the tag-verification-failure status on data the user expected to be good, the agent's response must be: (a) treat the plaintext output as poisoned — do not consume it; (b) treat the input ciphertext as untrusted — log a security event with the IV, AAD, and the upstream source the ciphertext came from (NOT the key); (c) do NOT silently retry — retrying the same ciphertext + key + IV + AAD will fail the same way and hides the security signal; (d) route the user to their application-layer policy for tampered input (rotate keys? drop the connection? quarantine the storage object?).

• Known-vector mismatch: if a published-vector encrypt produces a wrong ciphertext, the key bytes, IV bytes, or AAD bytes the program is passing do not match the vector. If the tag is the wrong length, the user has misconfigured the tag-length field.

Once the layer is identified, route to the matching debug verb on the matching skill: install / build / link / driver to doca-setup ## debug (doca-setup/TASKS.md#debug); version to doca-version ## debug (doca-version/TASKS.md#debug); cross-cutting runtime to doca-debug ## debug (doca-debug/TASKS.md#debug); program-layer Core-context patterns to doca-programming-guide TASKS.md ## debug (doca-programming-guide/TASKS.md#debug).

Deferred task verbs

The following verbs are out of scope for this skill but are commonly asked in the same conversations. Route them as follows so the agent does not invent guidance:

• install. Installing DOCA, choosing packages, post-install verification, pkg-config wiring — defer to doca-setup/SKILL.md and to the install-tree layout in doca-public-knowledge-map ## Layout of an installed DOCA package (doca-public-knowledge-map/SKILL.md#layout-of-an-installed-doca-package). This skill assumes DOCA is already installed.

• deploy. Deploying AES-GCM-using applications at scale (TLS-record encryption workers across many hosts, encrypted storage daemons, Kubernetes operator workflows) — out of scope for this skill. For single-host first-run testing, the right verb in this skill is ## run; do not invent a "deploy" workflow.

• rollback. Coordinated rollback of AES-GCM-using applications across many hosts — out of scope. For a single in-session AES-GCM configuration rollback, the right verb in this skill is destroying the context (doca_ctx_stop → doca_ctx_destroy) and re-running ## configure with corrected parameters.

• key management. Key generation, rotation, escrow, KMS / HSM integration — outside this skill. The skill's only key-handling contribution is the operational discipline in CAPABILITIES.md ## Safety policy (do not log keys, do not commit keys, zero key buffers before free). The actual key-management substance belongs to the user's KMS or HSM documentation.

• kernel-level driver install / firmware burn. AES-GCM depends on the underlying ConnectX firmware and BlueField BFB; if the debug ladder lands on a driver-layer issue, the fix is via mlxconfig / mlxfwreset / re-imaging the BFB, all of which belong to doca-setup ## debug (doca-setup/TASKS.md#debug) layer 5.

Command appendix

Every command below is cross-cutting on DOCA AES-GCM — it answers a recurring class of question that comes up in the verbs above. The agent should treat the class as load-bearing; the worked example is a single instance. Run-as user is the unprivileged user unless noted. Sudo is called out per row.

Infra-aware preamble (every row below). Per the bundle's detect → prefer → fall back → report contract documented in doca-structured-tools-contract ## The agent behavior contract (doca-structured-tools-contract/SKILL.md#the-agent-behavior-contract), the agent should:

1. Probe for the matching structured helper FIRST (doca-env --json for version + devices + libraries + drivers + hugepages in one shot; doca-capability-snapshot for per-device capability flags; version-matrix.json for “available since” lookups).

2. If the probe succeeds, the structured tool's output is the authoritative answer and the agent SHOULD NOT also run the manual command in the row below. Report “using structured <tool>”.

3. If the probe fails, fall back to the manual command in the row. Report “falling back to manual chain”.

4. The schemas the structured tools emit are defined in doca-structured-tools-contract ## Schemas (doca-structured-tools-contract/SKILL.md#schemas); the version-handling semantics (four-way match, NGC, headers-win) are owned by doca-version/SKILL.md.

For commands shared across libraries (pkg-config --modversion, doca_caps, cat /opt/mellanox/doca/applications/VERSION, DOCA_LOG_LEVEL) the cross-library overlay is in doca-debug TASKS.md ## Command appendix (doca-debug/TASKS.md#command-appendix); this table adds the AES-GCM-specific rows on top.