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Cosmos Vulnerability Scanner

Trail of BitsOfficialPublished by Trail of Bits

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  • Security
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From the author

Scans Cosmos SDK blockchain modules and CosmWasm contracts for consensus-critical vulnerabilities — chain halts, fund loss, state divergence. 25 core + 16 IBC + 10 EVM + 3 CosmWasm patterns. Use when auditing custom x/ modules, reviewing IBC integrations, or assessing pre-launch chain security. Updated for SDK v0.53.x.
— the description by Trail of Bits

AutoGineer summary

Written by AutoGineer from the skill’s own files, not by the author

The Cosmos Vulnerability Scanner is an automated security auditing tool designed for Cosmos SDK-based blockchains. It performs a multi-phase analysis of custom modules and smart contracts to identify vulnerabilities that could lead to chain halts, state divergence, or loss of funds. The skill orchestrates parallel scanning agents that evaluate code against specific patterns related to core SDK logic, IBC integrations, EVM compatibility, and CosmWasm contracts. It emphasizes consensus-critical execution paths, ensuring that findings are relevant to the blockchain's stability and security.

What it does

  • Generates a technical inventory and threat model via a discovery phase.
  • Spawns parallel scanning agents to analyze code against predefined vulnerability patterns.
  • Filters findings to focus exclusively on consensus-critical execution paths.
  • Supports specialized scanning for IBC, EVM, and CosmWasm components.
  • Writes detailed vulnerability reports as individual markdown files.
  • Verifies that all required security patterns have been assessed.

When to use it

  • Auditing custom Cosmos SDK modules.
  • Reviewing CosmWasm smart contracts for security flaws.
  • Conducting pre-launch security assessments for Cosmos-based chains.
  • Investigating potential causes of chain halt incidents.

Advantages

  • Reduces manual audit time through parallelized scanning.
  • Focuses on high-impact consensus-critical bugs.
  • Provides structured, actionable findings for remediation.
  • Adapts to specific Cosmos SDK version requirements.

Usage examples

“Run a security scan on the current directory.”
The agent performs a discovery phase, identifies the platform and SDK version, executes parallel scans, and generates a report in the .bughunt_cosmos/ directory.
“Audit my custom x/ modules and save findings to /tmp/audit_results.”
The agent scans the codebase for consensus-critical vulnerabilities and outputs individual markdown files containing findings to the specified directory.

Install

  1. Download the skill as a ZIP:

    https://mp-staging.autogineer.com/agent-skills/trailofbits/cosmos-vulnerability-scanner/download
  2. Unzip it into the cross-client skills folder of your project:

    mkdir -p .agents/skills && unzip cosmos-vulnerability-scanner.zip -d .agents/skills

Documentation by Trail of Bits

Cosmos Vulnerability Scanner

Purpose

Scan Cosmos SDK modules and CosmWasm contracts for vulnerabilities that cause chain halts, consensus failures, or fund loss. Spawns parallel scanning agents — each specializing in a vulnerability category — that return findings to the main skill, which then writes them as individual markdown files to an output directory.

Output directory: defaults to .bughunt_cosmos/. If the user specifies a different directory in their prompt, use that instead.

When to Use

  • Auditing Cosmos SDK modules (custom x/ modules)

  • Reviewing CosmWasm smart contracts

  • Pre-launch security assessment of Cosmos chains

  • Investigating chain halt incidents

When NOT to Use

  • Pure Solidity/EVM audits without Cosmos SDK — use Solidity-specific tools

  • CometBFT consensus engine internals — this covers SDK modules, not the consensus layer itself

  • General Go code review with no blockchain context

  • Cosmos SDK application logic that is not consensus-critical (e.g., CLI commands, REST endpoints)

  • CosmWasm contract-only audits on chains without custom SDK modules — use the CosmWasm checklist items alone

Essential Principles

  1. Consensus path is king — A bug only matters for chain halt/fund loss if it's on the consensus-critical execution path (BeginBlock, EndBlock, FinalizeBlock, msg_server handlers, AnteHandler). Always verify a finding is reachable from consensus before reporting it.

  2. State divergence = chain halt — Any non-determinism that causes validators to compute different state roots will halt the chain. This is the highest-severity class because it affects all validators simultaneously.

  3. Check the version — Cosmos SDK has breaking changes across major versions (v0.47 removed GetSigners, v0.50 added ABCI 2.0, v0.53 deprecated ValidateBasic). Always check go.mod versions before applying patterns.

  4. False positives waste audit time — A map iteration in a CLI command is not a consensus bug. A panic in a query handler does not halt the chain. Verify the execution context before flagging.

  5. Cross-module interactions are where bugs hide — The most severe findings (IBC reentrancy, EVM/Cosmos state desync, authz escalation) involve interactions between modules, not bugs within a single module.

Scanning Workflow

Phase 1: Discovery (synchronous)

Entry: Target codebase path provided by user. Codebase contains Go source (e.g., x/ modules, go.mod) or Rust contracts with cosmwasm_std.

Run a synchronous subagent (Agent tool) with the full contents of DISCOVERY.md as its prompt. The agent must:

  1. Follow the Discovery workflow to explore the target codebase

  2. Return the full CLAUDE.md content (the technical inventory and threat model) in its response

  3. Return a structured summary with exactly these fields:

PLATFORM: pure-cosmos | evm | wasm        (pick one; if multiple, comma-separated)
IBC_ENABLED: true | false
SDK_VERSION: <version from go.mod>
IBC_GO_VERSION: <version from go.mod, or "n/a">
CUSTOM_MODULES: <comma-separated list of x/* modules>

After the subagent returns, you (the main skill) Write the CLAUDE.md to the target repo root. Save its path and the discovery values — these feed into Phase 2.

Exit: CLAUDE.md written by main skill. PLATFORM, IBC_ENABLED, SDK_VERSION, IBC_GO_VERSION, and CUSTOM_MODULES captured.

Phase 2: Parallel Vulnerability Scan

Spawn scanning agents in a single message for maximum parallelism. Use the Agent Prompt Template below, filling in the reference file for each agent. Subagents only need read access (Grep, Glob, Read) — they return findings in their response and the main skill writes the files.

Always spawn these 3 agents:

Agent NameReference FileScope
core-scannerVULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md§1-9: non-determinism, ABCI, signers, validation, handlers, ante security
state-scannerSTATE_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md§11-23: bookkeeping, bank, pagination, events, tx replay, governance, arithmetic, encoding, deprecated modules
advanced-scannerADVANCED_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md§24-27: storage keys, consensus validation, circuit breaker, crypto

Spawn conditionally (in the same parallel message):

Agent NameConditionReference File
evm-scannerPLATFORM includes evmEVM_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md
ibc-scannerIBC_ENABLED is trueIBC_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md
cosmwasm-scannerPLATFORM includes wasmCOSMWASM_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md
Agent Prompt Template

Construct each agent's prompt by replacing {REFERENCE_FILE_PATH} with the full path to the reference file (under {baseDir}/resources/) and {CLAUDE_MD_PATH} with the path to the CLAUDE.md written in Phase 1:

Perform a very thorough security scan of a Cosmos SDK codebase for specific vulnerability patterns.

CONTEXT:
Read {CLAUDE_MD_PATH} for codebase context (SDK version, modules, threat model, key files).

PATTERNS:
Read {REFERENCE_FILE_PATH} — it contains numbered vulnerability patterns. For EACH pattern:
1. Read the detection patterns and "What to Check" items
2. Use Grep and Glob to search the target codebase for each pattern
3. When a match is found, Read surrounding code to verify it's on a consensus-critical path (BeginBlock, EndBlock, FinalizeBlock, msg_server handlers, AnteHandler)
4. Classify severity per the guidelines below

RULES:
- Consensus path only: Only flag code reachable from consensus-critical execution. CLI/query/test code is NOT a finding.
- Check SDK version in go.mod before applying patterns (v0.47 removed GetSigners, v0.50 added ABCI 2.0, v0.53 deprecated ValidateBasic).
- Always use the Grep tool for searches, not bash grep. The reference file contains search patterns — use them directly with the Grep tool.
- Ignore cross-references to other resource files (e.g., links to IBC or COSMWASM patterns). Those patterns are covered by other scanning agents.
- Reject these rationalizations:
  - "ValidateBasic catches this" — deprecated and facultative since SDK v0.53
  - "Behind governance, so safe" — governance proposals can be malicious
  - "IBC counterparty is trusted" — any chain can open a channel
  - "Panic can't happen, input is validated" — trace the full call chain
  - "Rounding error is only a few tokens" — compounds over time, can be looped
  - "EVM precompile handles rollback" — many have incomplete rollback

SEVERITY:
- Critical (fund loss): signer mismatch, broken bookkeeping, AnteHandler bypass, bank keeper misuse, IBC token inflation, EVM/Cosmos desync, Merkle proof forgery, arithmetic overflow
- High (chain halt): non-determinism, ABCI panics, slow ABCI, non-deterministic IBC acks, consensus gaps, CacheContext event leak
- Medium (DoS): unbounded pagination, tx replay, missing validation, governance spam, rate limiting, circuit breaker bypass, storage key collisions
- Low (logic): rounding errors, stub handlers, event override, module ordering

OUTPUT — RETURN FORMAT:
Do NOT write any files. Return ALL findings and the summary in your response.

For each pattern, return one of:
  §NUM PATTERN_NAME: Not applicable — [one-line reason]
  §NUM PATTERN_NAME: FINDING (followed by the finding block below)

For each finding, include the full content using this template:

FINDING_FILE: {SEVERITY}-s{SECTION_NUM}-{kebab-description}.md
## [SEVERITY] Title
**Location**: `file:line`
**Description**: What the bug is and why it matters
**Vulnerable Code**: [snippet]
**Attack Scenario**: [numbered steps]
**Recommendation**: How to fix
**References**: [links to relevant advisories or building-secure-contracts]

You MUST report on ALL patterns in the reference file — do not skip any.

Exit: All scanning agents returned. Each reported on every pattern in their reference file.

Phase 3: Write Findings

After all scanning agents return, write finding files to the output directory (default .bughunt_cosmos/):

  1. Parse each agent's response for FINDING_FILE: blocks

  2. For each finding, Write the content to {OUTPUT_DIR}/{filename} using the filename from FINDING_FILE:

  3. Create the output directory first if it doesn't exist

Phase 4: Verify Completeness

After writing all findings, verify every pattern was assessed:

  1. Collect the summary lines (§NUM entries) returned by each agent

  2. Check pattern counts against expected totals:

    • core-scanner: 8 patterns (§1-9, excluding §8 legacy-only)

    • state-scanner: 13 patterns (§11-23)

    • advanced-scanner: 4 patterns (§24-27)

    • evm-scanner (if spawned): 10 patterns (§1-10)

    • ibc-scanner (if spawned): 16 patterns (§1-16)

    • cosmwasm-scanner (if spawned): 3 patterns (§1-3)

  3. If any pattern is missing from a summary, flag it and re-prompt that agent

  4. List all finding files written to the output directory with a Glob for *.md

Exit: All patterns accounted for. Finding files listed for the user.


Success Criteria

  • [ ] Discovery CLAUDE.md written with complete technical inventory and threat model

  • [ ] All scanning agents completed and reported on every pattern in their reference file

  • [ ] Pattern counts verified against expected totals (no patterns skipped)

  • [ ] All findings written to output directory as individual markdown files

  • [ ] Each finding file includes: severity, location, vulnerable code, attack scenario, recommendation


Resources

Files

CHANGELOG.md

Cosmos Vulnerability Scanner — Update Log

Third Update (2026-03-18) — 8 Missing Bug Classes Added

Summary

Added 8 missing vulnerability classes identified from real-world Cosmos findings catalog. Skill now covers 28 VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS + 16 IBC patterns. No existing patterns were duplicated.

New Patterns in VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md
  • §20 expanded: ROUNDING ERRORS → ARITHMETIC ERRORS. Added wrapping overflow (CWA-2024-002), wrong operand (Osmosis $5M), negative value validation (Barberry vesting poisoning)

  • §22 expanded: Added CacheContext event leak pattern (Huckleberry — events persist after state rollback, enables bridge spoofing)

  • §24 expanded: EVMOS/ETHERMINT-SPECIFIC → EVM/COSMOS STATE DESYNC. Full precompile atomicity section with 6 detection patterns from 7 findings ($7M+ real losses)

  • §25 new: STORAGE KEY DESIGN FLAWS — string concatenation collisions, prefix iterator malleability, redelegation bypass

  • §26 new: CONSENSUS VALIDATION GAPS — vote extension forgery (SEDA), block timestamp manipulation (CometBFT Tachyon), vesting on blocked addresses

  • §27 new: CIRCUIT BREAKER AUTHZ BYPASS — x/circuit scope escalation

  • §28 new: MERKLE PROOF / CRYPTOGRAPHIC VERIFICATION FLAWS — ICS-23 proof forgery (Dragonberry), IAVL RangeProof (Dragonfruit/$566M), ECDSA malleability (Gravity Bridge)

New Pattern in IBC_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md
  • §16 new: IBC REENTRANCY / CEI VIOLATIONS — OnTimeoutPacket reentrancy (ASA-2024-007, $150M+ at risk), Terra IBC hooks ($6.4M stolen)

SKILL.md Updates
  • Updated description, Step 2 checklist, IBC reference count, and Priority Guidelines


Second Update (2026-03-06) — v0.53.x Re-validation + 4 New Patterns

Summary

Re-validated all 9 existing patterns against cosmos-sdk v0.53.x (commit 82fcb05ceb, CometBFT v0.38.21, cosmossdk.io/math v1.5.3, cosmossdk.io/collections v1.3.1). Added 4 new vulnerability patterns discovered during verification. Skill now covers 13 patterns.

Existing Pattern Corrections

Pattern 4.4 (Slow ABCI Methods):

  • Added HasABCIEndBlock (returns []abci.ValidatorUpdate, error) as a second EndBlock interface alongside HasEndBlocker (returns error). Used by x/staking. The skill previously only mentioned one variant.

  • Added HasPrecommit and HasPrepareCheckState as additional lifecycle hooks (confirmed in core/appmodule/module.go:42-53). These run after EndBlock and are potential DoS surfaces.

Pattern 4.5 (ABCI Panics):

  • Added note about ValidateBasic() deprecation (types/tx_msg.go:102: "deprecated and now facultative"). This increases the likelihood of invalid inputs reaching panic-prone code in ABCI methods.

New Patterns Added

4.10 Unbounded Pagination / Query DoS (HIGH):

  • types/query/pagination.go DefaultLimit=100 only applies when Limit==0. Any non-zero client-supplied limit is accepted without cap.

  • Recent fix d9d77304fd partially addressed this in x/auth/tx and x/bank/keeper/genesis.go, but core pagination still lacks a hard maximum.

4.11 Event Override / Suppression (MEDIUM):

  • New EventManager.OverrideEvents() method added in commit 2ddb9ac0a9 (types/events.go:63). Replaces all previously emitted events.

  • If called in module code, can silently suppress events from auth, bank, IBC — breaking indexers and relayers.

4.12 Unordered Transaction Replay (HIGH):

  • SDK v0.53 supports TxBody.Unordered=true with timestamp-based replay protection.

  • Configurable via WithMaxUnorderedTxTimeoutDuration (default 10min) and WithUnorderedTxGasCost (default 2240).

  • x/auth PreBlocker handles RemoveExpiredUnorderedNonces cleanup.

  • Risks: insufficient timeout, nonce flooding DoS, ordering assumptions in app logic.

4.13 Missing msg_server Validation (HIGH):

  • ValidateBasic() is now deprecated and facultative (types/tx_msg.go:102).

  • Modules migrating away from ValidateBasic may forget to add equivalent validation in msg_server.go handlers.

  • Authority/signer checks must be in the handler, not just in the removed ValidateBasic.

Verification Notes

All patterns confirmed against the live codebase:

  • sdk.Msg = proto.Message (types/tx_msg.go:19) — confirmed

  • 0 GetSigners() []AccAddress methods in x/ — confirmed (only LegacyMsg interface defines it)

  • 74 cosmos.msg.v1.signer annotations across 22 proto files — confirmed

  • appmodule.HasBeginBlocker, HasEndBlocker, HasPreBlocker in core/appmodule/module.go:65-89 — confirmed

  • module.HasABCIEndBlock in types/module/module.go:237-241 — confirmed (different return type!)

  • appmodule.HasPrecommit, HasPrepareCheckState in core/appmodule/module.go:42-53 — confirmed

  • x/auth/module.go and x/upgrade/module.go implement PreBlock — confirmed

  • time.Now() only in test files under x/, not consensus code — confirmed

  • go func only in generated pb.gw.go files under x/ — confirmed

  • blockedAddrs mechanism in x/bank/keeper/keeper.go — confirmed

  • QuoTruncate/QuoRoundUp on math.LegacyDec in math/legacy_dec.go — confirmed

  • No handler.go files for legacy SDK handler pattern under x/ — confirmed

  • 22 modules under x/ (no x/accounts in this version) — confirmed

  • collections framework used extensively (81+ occurrences in keeper.go files) — confirmed


First Update (2026-03-06)

Context

The skill's vulnerability patterns were written for Cosmos SDK ~v0.46 and had not been updated for the breaking changes in v0.47–v0.53. The current cosmos-sdk codebase (v0.53.x, Go 1.23, cosmossdk.io/math v1.5.3) was used as the reference for validation.


1. Mismatched Pattern Summary in SKILL.md

Problem: SKILL.md:98–109 Section 5 listed 9 CosmWasm-specific patterns (Missing Denom Validation, Reentrancy via Submessages, etc.) that did not correspond to the actual 9 Cosmos SDK patterns defined in VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md. The summary and the resource file described completely different vulnerability classes.

Fix: Replaced the summary to accurately reflect the 9 patterns in the resource file.


2. Pattern 4.1 — GetSigners: Rewritten for Proto Annotations

Problem: The pattern described GetSigners() []sdk.AccAddress as a method on message types. This interface was removed in SDK v0.47. In the current codebase:

Fix: Rewrote pattern to describe the modern vulnerability: mismatch between cosmos.msg.v1.signer proto annotation and the field actually used for authorization in msg_server.go. Added detection patterns for wrong field annotation and proto vs handler mismatch.


3. Pattern 4.2 — Non-Determinism: Math Type References Updated

Problem: Pattern referenced sdk.Int, sdk.Dec, sdk.NewDec() which are removed/deprecated. The codebase uses:

  • math.Int / math.NewInt() from cosmossdk.io/math — 186+ occurrences across x/ modules

  • math.LegacyDec / math.LegacyNewDec() — 83+ occurrences across x/ modules

  • Zero occurrences of sdk.NewInt() or sdk.NewDec() in x/ Go source (only in legacy tests via type aliases)

Fix: Updated all type references: sdk.Int → math.Int, sdk.Dec → math.LegacyDec.


4. Pattern 4.3 — Message Priority: Updated for ABCI 2.0

Problem: Pattern only discussed CheckTx priority. SDK v0.50 introduced ABCI 2.0 with PrepareProposal and ProcessProposal (267 occurrences in baseapp/), which give the block proposer direct control over transaction ordering.

Fix: Added PrepareProposal/ProcessProposal as the primary mechanism for transaction priority. Updated code examples.

Evidence: baseapp/abci.go — FinalizeBlock, PrepareProposal, ProcessProposal are the ABCI 2.0 entry points. DeliverTx still exists internally but is called within FinalizeBlock.


5. Pattern 4.4 — Slow ABCI Methods: Updated Interfaces

Problem: Pattern used standalone BeginBlocker(ctx sdk.Context, k keeper.Keeper) function signatures. In SDK v0.50+, modules implement interfaces:

  • appmodule.HasBeginBlocker — method BeginBlock(context.Context) error

  • appmodule.HasEndBlocker — method EndBlock(context.Context) error

  • Module manager calls these via types/module/module.go:776–825

  • PreBlocker is new (40 occurrences in codebase)

Evidence:

x/mint/module.go:     _ appmodule.HasBeginBlocker = AppModule{}
x/staking/module.go:  _ appmodule.HasBeginBlocker = AppModule{}
x/gov/module.go:      _ appmodule.HasEndBlocker   = AppModule{}
x/feegrant/module.go: _ appmodule.HasEndBlocker   = AppModule{}

Fix: Updated all code examples to use func (am AppModule) BeginBlock(ctx context.Context) error and EndBlock signatures. Added PreBlock as a new attack surface. Updated checklist.


6. Pattern 4.5 — ABCI Panics: Updated Types and Deprecated Params

Problem: Two sub-issues:

  1. Math types: Pattern used sdk.NewDec(), sdk.NewInt(). Current SDK uses math.NewInt(), math.LegacyNewDecFromStr(), and panic-prone Must* variants like math.LegacyMustNewDecFromStr().

  2. SetParamSet: Pattern described SetParamSet panics. The entire x/params module is deprecated:

    • x/params/module.go:61: "Deprecated: the params module is deprecated and will be removed in the next Cosmos SDK major release."

    • x/params/keeper/keeper.go:15: keeper also deprecated

    • Modern modules store params directly in keeper state via collections

Fix: Updated math type references. Replaced SetParamSet panic pattern with direct keeper param storage pattern. Added Must* variant warning as a new detection pattern.


7. Pattern 4.7 — Rounding Errors: Updated Types

Problem: All references used sdk.Dec, sdk.NewDec(), sdk.ZeroDec(). These are gone.

Evidence: QuoTruncate and QuoRoundUp still exist on math.LegacyDec — math/legacy_dec.go (5 occurrences of QuoTruncate/QuoCeil in codebase). The vulnerability pattern itself is still valid.

Fix: Updated all type references to math.LegacyDec, math.LegacyNewDec(), math.LegacyZeroDec().


8. Pattern 4.8 — Unregistered Handler: Marked Legacy Only

Problem: Pattern described NewHandler / sdk.Handler switch-case pattern. This is completely gone from the SDK:

  • Zero handler.go files exist under x/

  • Zero matches for NewHandler or sdk.Handler in Go files under x/

  • All 16 modules use msg_server.go with protobuf service registration:

    x/auth/keeper/msg_server.go
    x/bank/keeper/msg_server.go
    x/gov/keeper/msg_server.go
    x/staking/keeper/msg_server.go
    ... (16 total)

Fix: Marked pattern as legacy-only (pre-v0.47). Added modern equivalent: stub/no-op msg_server.go implementations where a proto RPC method is technically implemented but does nothing. The Go compiler catches missing methods (unlike the old switch-case), but stub implementations are still a risk.


9. Scanning Workflow: Updated Throughout

Changes in SKILL.md Section 6:

OldNew
handler.go — Message handlers (legacy)keeper/msg_server.go — Message handlers (protobuf service)
abci.go — BeginBlocker/EndBlockermodule.go — appmodule interface implementations
types/msgs.go, GetSigners()proto/.../tx.proto with cosmos.msg.v1.signer annotations
DeliverTxFinalizeBlock
CheckTx priority onlyPrepareProposal / ProcessProposal / CheckTx
sdk.Dec / sdk.Intmath.LegacyDec / math.Int

Quick Reference Checklist updated similarly — signer check now references proto annotations, ABCI check includes PreBlock, testing uses FinalizeBlock.


Files Modified

Validation Method

Each pattern was validated against the cosmos-sdk codebase against cosmos-sdk (v0.53.x, commit 82fcb05ceb) using grep/glob searches to confirm:

  • Which interfaces/types still exist

  • Which have been removed or deprecated

  • What replaced them

  • Occurrence counts to verify patterns are real

Requirements and compatibility

Works with: Claude Code, Claude apps, OpenAI Codex, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, Gemini CLI, Kiro, OpenCode, Goose, Amp, Roo Code, JetBrains Junie, Factory Droid, Devin (ex-Windsurf), Mistral Vibe, OpenHands, Letta

“Works with” means the tool reads the open Agent Skills format; a skill written for one tool may use features others lack.

Security

No issues found by our static scan· No issues found

A static scan is not a guarantee. Skills are third-party content: review a skill before you let an agent use it.

Attribution and licence

Published by
Trail of Bits
Publisher
Trail of Bits (Official)
Source
trailofbits/skills · plugins/building-secure-contracts/skills/cosmos-vulnerability-scanner · commit e4dd0bb
Licence
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (redistribution allowed)
  • LICENSE (added by AutoGineer from LICENSE)
  • ATTRIBUTION.md (written by AutoGineer)
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