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Token Integration Analyzer

Trail of BitsOfficialPublished by Trail of Bits

  • Skill
  • Review and audit
  • Security
  • CC-BY-SA-4.0
  • No issues found

From the author

Token integration and implementation analyzer based on Trail of Bits' token integration checklist. Analyzes token implementations for ERC20/ERC721 conformity, checks for 20+ weird token patterns, assesses contract composition and owner privileges, performs on-chain scarcity analysis, and evaluates how protocols handle non-standard tokens. Use when integrating or accepting arbitrary ERC20/ERC721 tokens, auditing a token implementation for standards conformity, or assessing risk from weird tokens such as fee-on-transfer, rebasing, missing return values, or blocklists.
— the description by Trail of Bits

AutoGineer summary

Written by AutoGineer from the skill’s own files, not by the author

The Token Integration Analyzer provides a systematic security review for smart contract tokens and protocols that interact with them. It leverages the Trail of Bits token integration checklist to evaluate codebases for ERC20/ERC721 standard conformity, identify risks from over 20 non-standard 'weird' token patterns, and assess contract composition, owner privileges, and integration safety. The tool supports both static analysis of Solidity code and on-chain analysis of deployed contracts to ensure robust handling of external token interactions.

What it does

  • Performs automated ERC20/ERC721 conformity checks using static analysis tools.
  • Identifies risks from 20+ known weird token patterns like fee-on-transfer or missing return values.
  • Evaluates contract composition, complexity, and owner privilege centralization.
  • Analyzes on-chain data for token scarcity, holder concentration, and configuration.
  • Provides a structured security report with prioritized remediation recommendations.
  • Validates integration safety patterns for protocols interacting with external tokens.

When to use it

  • When developing or auditing a new ERC20 or ERC721 token implementation.
  • Before integrating external tokens into a DeFi protocol or smart contract system.
  • When assessing the risk profile of arbitrary tokens accepted by a platform.
  • To verify that a protocol correctly handles non-standard token behaviors.

Advantages

  • Reduces risks associated with non-standard token behaviors in smart contract integrations.
  • Provides a comprehensive, standardized checklist based on industry-recognized security practices.
  • Combines static code analysis with on-chain data for a holistic security view.
  • Helps developers identify and fix critical vulnerabilities before mainnet deployment.

Usage examples

“Analyze my ERC20 token implementation for potential security risks and standard conformity.”
The agent will review the provided Solidity code, run conformity checks, identify any non-standard patterns, and provide a report on potential vulnerabilities.
“I am integrating USDT into my vault. What should I check for?”
The agent will analyze the integration code, specifically checking for missing return value handling and other known USDT-specific quirks.
“Assess the risks of this deployed token contract at address 0x123...”
The agent will perform an on-chain analysis of the contract, checking for holder concentration, owner privileges, and configuration risks.

Install

  1. Download the skill as a ZIP:

    https://mp-staging.autogineer.com/agent-skills/trailofbits/token-integration-analyzer/download
  2. Unzip it into the cross-client skills folder of your project:

    mkdir -p .agents/skills && unzip token-integration-analyzer.zip -d .agents/skills

Documentation by Trail of Bits

Token Integration Analyzer

Purpose

Systematically analyzes the codebase for token-related security concerns using Trail of Bits' token integration checklist:

  1. Token Implementations: Analyze if your token follows ERC20/ERC721 standards or has non-standard behavior

  2. Token Integrations: Analyze how your protocol handles arbitrary tokens, including weird/non-standard tokens

  3. On-chain Analysis: Query deployed contracts for scarcity, distribution, and configuration

  4. Security Assessment: Identify risks from 20+ known weird token patterns

Framework: Building Secure Contracts - Token Integration Checklist + Weird ERC20 Database


How This Works

Phase 1: Context Discovery

Determines analysis context:

  • Token implementation: Are you building a token contract?

  • Token integration: Does your protocol interact with external tokens?

  • Platform: Ethereum, other EVM chains, or different platform?

  • Token types: ERC20, ERC721, or both?

Phase 2: Slither Analysis (if Solidity)

For Solidity projects, I'll help run:

  • slither-check-erc - ERC conformity checks

  • slither --print human-summary - Complexity and upgrade analysis

  • slither --print contract-summary - Function analysis

  • slither-prop - Property generation for testing

Phase 3: Code Analysis

Analyzes:

  • Contract composition and complexity

  • Owner privileges and centralization risks

  • ERC20/ERC721 conformity

  • Known weird token patterns

  • Integration safety patterns

Phase 4: On-chain Analysis (if deployed)

If you provide a contract address, I'll query:

  • Token scarcity and distribution

  • Total supply and holder concentration

  • Exchange listings

  • On-chain configuration

Phase 5: Risk Assessment

Provides:

  • Identified vulnerabilities

  • Non-standard behaviors

  • Integration risks

  • Prioritized recommendations


Assessment Categories

I check 10 comprehensive categories covering all aspects of token security. For detailed criteria, patterns, and checklists, see ASSESSMENT_CATEGORIES.md.

Quick Reference:
  1. General Considerations - Security reviews, team transparency, security contacts

  2. Contract Composition - Complexity analysis, SafeMath usage, function count, entry points

  3. Owner Privileges - Upgradeability, minting, pausability, blacklisting, team accountability

  4. ERC20 Conformity - Return values, metadata, decimals, race conditions, Slither checks

  5. ERC20 Extension Risks - External calls/hooks, transfer fees, rebasing/yield-bearing tokens

  6. Token Scarcity Analysis - Supply distribution, holder concentration, exchange distribution, flash loan/mint risks

  7. Weird ERC20 Patterns (24 patterns including):

    • Reentrant calls (ERC777 hooks)

    • Missing return values (USDT, BNB, OMG)

    • Fee on transfer (STA, PAXG)

    • Balance modifications outside transfers (Ampleforth, Compound)

    • Upgradable tokens (USDC, USDT)

    • Flash mintable (DAI)

    • Blocklists (USDC, USDT)

    • Pausable tokens (BNB, ZIL)

    • Approval race protections (USDT, KNC)

    • Revert on approval/transfer to zero address

    • Revert on zero value approvals/transfers

    • Multiple token addresses

    • Low decimals (USDC: 6, Gemini: 2)

    • High decimals (YAM-V2: 24)

    • transferFrom with src == msg.sender

    • Non-string metadata (MKR)

    • No revert on failure (ZRX, EURS)

    • Revert on large approvals (UNI, COMP)

    • Code injection via token name

    • Unusual permit function (DAI, RAI, GLM)

    • Transfer less than amount (cUSDCv3)

    • ERC-20 native currency representation (Celo, Polygon, zkSync)

    • And more...

  8. Token Integration Safety - Safe transfer patterns, balance verification, allowlists, wrappers, defensive patterns

  9. ERC721 Conformity - Transfer to 0x0, safeTransferFrom, metadata, ownerOf, approval clearing, token ID immutability

  10. ERC721 Common Risks - onERC721Received reentrancy, safe minting, burning approval clearing


Example Output

When analysis is complete, you'll receive a comprehensive report structured as follows:

=== TOKEN INTEGRATION ANALYSIS REPORT ===

Project: MultiToken DEX
Token Analyzed: Custom Reward Token + Integration Safety
Platform: Solidity 0.8.20
Analysis Date: March 15, 2024

---

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Token Type: ERC20 Implementation + Protocol Integrating External Tokens
Overall Risk Level: MEDIUM
Critical Issues: 2
High Issues: 3
Medium Issues: 4

**Top Concerns:**
⚠ Fee-on-transfer tokens not handled correctly
⚠ No validation for missing return values (USDT compatibility)
⚠ Owner can mint unlimited tokens without cap

**Recommendation:** Address critical/high issues before mainnet launch.

---

## 1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

✓ Contract audited by CertiK (June 2023)
✓ Team contactable via [email protected]
✗ No security mailing list for critical announcements

**Risk:** Users won't be notified of critical issues
**Action:** Set up [email protected] mailing list

---

## 2. CONTRACT COMPOSITION

### Complexity Analysis

**Slither human-summary Results:**
- 456 lines of code
- Cyclomatic complexity: Average 6, Max 14 (transferWithFee())
- 12 functions, 8 state variables
- Inheritance depth: 3 (moderate)

✓ Contract complexity is reasonable
⚠ transferWithFee() complexity high (14) - consider splitting

### SafeMath Usage

✓ Using Solidity 0.8.20 (built-in overflow protection)
✓ No unchecked blocks found
✓ All arithmetic operations protected

### Non-Token Functions

**Functions Beyond ERC20:**
- setFeeCollector() - Admin function ✓
- setTransferFee() - Admin function ✓
- withdrawFees() - Admin function ✓
- pause()/unpause() - Emergency functions ✓

⚠ 4 non-token functions (acceptable but adds complexity)

### Address Entry Points

✓ Single contract address
✓ No proxy with multiple entry points
✓ No token migration creating address confusion

**Status:** PASS

---

## 3. OWNER PRIVILEGES

### Upgradeability

⚠ Contract uses TransparentUpgradeableProxy
**Risk:** Owner can change contract logic at any time

**Current Implementation:**
- ProxyAdmin: 0x1234... (2/3 multisig) ✓
- Timelock: None ✗

**Recommendation:** Add 48-hour timelock to all upgrades

### Minting Capabilities

❌ CRITICAL: Unlimited minting
File: contracts/RewardToken.sol:89
```solidity
function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external onlyOwner {
    _mint(to, amount);  // No cap!
}

Risk: Owner can inflate supply arbitrarily Fix: Add maximum supply cap or rate-limited minting

Pausability

✓ Pausable pattern implemented (OpenZeppelin) ✓ Only owner can pause ⚠ Paused state affects all transfers (including existing holders)

Risk: Owner can trap all user funds Mitigation: Use multi-sig for pause function (already implemented ✓)

Blacklisting

✗ No blacklist functionality Assessment: Good - no centralized censorship risk

Team Transparency

✓ Team members public (team.md) ✓ Company registered in Switzerland ✓ Accountable and contactable

Status: ACCEPTABLE


4. ERC20 CONFORMITY

Slither-check-erc Results

Command: slither-check-erc . RewardToken --erc erc20

✓ transfer returns bool ✓ transferFrom returns bool ✓ name, decimals, symbol present ✓ decimals returns uint8 (value: 18) ✓ Race condition mitigated (increaseAllowance/decreaseAllowance)

Status: FULLY COMPLIANT

slither-prop Test Results

Command: slither-prop . --contract RewardToken

Generated 12 properties, all passed: ✓ Transfer doesn't change total supply ✓ Allowance correctly updates ✓ Balance updates match transfer amounts ✓ No balance manipulation possible [... 8 more properties ...]

Echidna fuzzing: 50,000 runs, no violations ✓

Status: EXCELLENT


5. WEIRD TOKEN PATTERN ANALYSIS

Integration Safety Check

Your Protocol Integrates 5 External Tokens:

  1. USDT (0xdac17f9...)

  2. USDC (0xa0b86991...)

  3. DAI (0x6b175474...)

  4. WETH (0xc02aaa39...)

  5. UNI (0x1f9840a8...)

Critical Issues Found

❌ Pattern 7.2: Missing Return Values Found in: USDT integration File: contracts/Vault.sol:156

IERC20(usdt).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
// No return value check! USDT doesn't return bool

Risk: Silent failures on USDT transfers Exploit: User appears to deposit, but no tokens moved Fix: Use OpenZeppelin SafeERC20 wrapper


❌ Pattern 7.3: Fee on Transfer Risk for: Any token with transfer fees File: contracts/Vault.sol:170

uint256 balanceBefore = IERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this));
token.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
shares = amount * exchangeRate;  // WRONG! Should use actual received amount

Risk: Accounting mismatch if token takes fees Exploit: User credited more shares than tokens deposited Fix: Calculate shares from balanceAfter - balanceBefore


Known Non-Standard Token Handling

✓ USDC: Properly handled (SafeERC20, 6 decimals accounted for) ⚠ DAI: permit() function not used (opportunity for gas savings) ✗ USDT: Missing return value not handled (CRITICAL) ✓ WETH: Standard wrapper, properly handled ⚠ UNI: Large approval handling not checked (reverts >= 2^96)


[... Additional sections for remaining analysis categories ...]


For complete report template and deliverables format, see [REPORT_TEMPLATES.md](resources/REPORT_TEMPLATES.md).

---

## Rationalizations (Do Not Skip)

| Rationalization | Why It's Wrong | Required Action |
|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|
| "Token looks standard, ERC20 checks pass" | 20+ weird token patterns exist beyond ERC20 compliance | Check ALL weird token patterns from database (missing return, revert on zero, hooks, etc.) |
| "Slither shows no issues, integration is safe" | Slither detects some patterns, misses integration logic | Complete manual analysis of all 5 token integration criteria |
| "No fee-on-transfer detected, skip that check" | Fee-on-transfer can be owner-controlled or conditional | Test all transfer scenarios, check for conditional fee logic |
| "Balance checks exist, handling is safe" | Balance checks alone don't protect against all weird tokens | Verify safe transfer wrappers, revert handling, approval patterns |
| "Token is deployed by reputable team, assume standard" | Reputation doesn't guarantee standard behavior | Analyze actual code and on-chain behavior, don't trust assumptions |
| "Integration uses OpenZeppelin, must be safe" | OpenZeppelin libraries don't protect against weird external tokens | Verify defensive patterns around all external token calls |
| "Can't run Slither, skipping automated analysis" | Slither provides critical ERC conformance checks | Manually verify all slither-check-erc criteria or document why blocked |
| "This pattern seems fine" | Intuition misses subtle token integration bugs | Systematically check all 20+ weird token patterns with code evidence |

---

## Deliverables

When analysis is complete, I'll provide:

1. **Compliance Checklist** - Checkboxes for all assessment categories
2. **Weird Token Pattern Analysis** - Presence/absence of all 24 patterns with risk levels and evidence
3. **On-chain Analysis Report** (if applicable) - Holder distribution, exchange listings, configuration
4. **Integration Safety Assessment** (if applicable) - Safe transfer usage, defensive patterns, weird token handling
5. **Prioritized Recommendations** - CRITICAL/HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW issues with specific fixes

Complete deliverable templates available in [REPORT_TEMPLATES.md](resources/REPORT_TEMPLATES.md).

---

## Ready to Begin

**What I'll need**:
- Your codebase
- Context: Token implementation or integration?
- Token type: ERC20, ERC721, or both?
- Contract address (if deployed and want on-chain analysis)
- RPC endpoint (if querying on-chain)

Let's analyze your token implementation or integration for security risks!

Files

resources/ASSESSMENT_CATEGORIES.md

Assessment Categories Reference

This document contains detailed assessment criteria for token analysis. Each category includes what to check, analysis methods, and verification checklists.


1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

What I'll check:

  • Security review history

  • Team contacts and transparency

  • Security mailing list existence

I'll ask you:

  • Has this token been audited?

  • Is the team contactable?

  • Is there a security mailing list?

Best practices:

  • Interact only with reviewed tokens

  • Maintain contact with token teams

  • Subscribe to security announcements


2. CONTRACT COMPOSITION

What I'll analyze:

Complexity:

  • Overall contract complexity

  • Lines of code

  • Inheritance depth

  • Function count

  • Use Slither's human-summary printer

SafeMath Usage (pre-0.8 Solidity):

  • Arithmetic operations protection

  • Unchecked blocks justification

Non-token Functions:

  • Functions beyond standard ERC interface

  • Unnecessary complexity

  • Use Slither's contract-summary printer

Single Address Entry Point:

  • Multiple addresses pointing to same token

  • Proxy patterns that create multiple entry points

Checks:

  • [ ] Contract avoids unnecessary complexity

  • [ ] Contract uses SafeMath or Solidity 0.8+ (for Solidity)

  • [ ] Contract has only a few non-token-related functions

  • [ ] Token has only one address entry point


3. OWNER PRIVILEGES

What I'll check:

Upgradeability:

  • Proxy patterns (UUPS, Transparent, Beacon)

  • Implementation change mechanisms

  • Use Slither's human-summary printer

Minting Capabilities:

  • Unlimited vs limited minting

  • Minting access controls

  • Total supply caps

Pausability:

  • Pause mechanisms

  • Who can pause

  • Impact on existing holders

Blacklisting:

  • Blocklist functionality

  • Admin controls

  • USDC/USDT-style blocklists

Team Transparency:

  • Known team members

  • Legal jurisdiction

  • Accountability

Checks:

  • [ ] Token is not upgradeable (or upgrade risks understood)

  • [ ] Owner has limited minting capabilities

  • [ ] Token is not pausable (or pause risks understood)

  • [ ] Owner cannot blacklist addresses (or risks understood)

  • [ ] Team is known and accountable


4. ERC20 CONFORMITY CHECKS

What I'll analyze:

Return Values:

  • transfer returns bool

  • transferFrom returns bool

  • Missing returns (USDT, BNB, OMG pattern)

  • False returns (Tether Gold pattern)

Function Presence:

  • name, decimals, symbol existence

  • Optional functions handling

Decimals Type:

  • Returns uint8

  • Value below 255

  • Low decimals (USDC: 6, Gemini USD: 2)

  • High decimals (YAM-V2: 24)

Race Condition Mitigation:

  • ERC20 approve race condition

  • Increase/decrease allowance pattern

  • USDT/KNC approval protection

Slither Tools:

  • Run slither-check-erc for automated checks

  • Run slither-prop to generate properties

Checks:

  • [ ] transfer and transferFrom return boolean

  • [ ] name, decimals, symbol present if used

  • [ ] decimals returns uint8 with value < 255

  • [ ] Token mitigates ERC20 race condition

  • [ ] Contract passes slither-check-erc tests

  • [ ] Contract passes slither-prop generated tests


5. ERC20 EXTENSION RISKS

What I'll check:

External Calls in Transfers:

  • ERC777 hooks

  • Reentrancy risks

  • tokensReceived callbacks

  • Check for: Amp (AMP), imBTC patterns

Transfer Fees:

  • Deflationary tokens

  • Fee-on-transfer (STA, PAXG)

  • Future fee risks (USDT, USDC can add fees)

  • Balance checks after transfer

Interest/Yield Bearing:

  • Rebasing tokens (Ampleforth)

  • Airdropped governance tokens

  • Compound-style interest

  • Cached balance issues

Checks:

  • [ ] Token is not ERC777 or has no external calls in transfer

  • [ ] transfer/transferFrom do not take fees

  • [ ] Interest earned from token is accounted for


6. TOKEN SCARCITY ANALYSIS

What I'll do:

For deployed tokens, I'll query on-chain data using web3/ethers:

Supply Distribution:

// Query holder distribution
// Check top 10 holders percentage
// Identify concentration risk

Total Supply:

// Query totalSupply
// Check if sufficient for manipulation resistance
// Identify low supply risk

Exchange Distribution:

// Query balance on major DEXs/CEXs
// Check if tokens concentrated in one exchange
// Identify single point of failure

Flash Loan Risk:

  • Large fund attack potential

  • Flash loan availability for this token

Flash Minting:

  • Flash mint functions (DAI-style)

  • Maximum mintable amount

  • Overflow risks

Checks:

  • [ ] Supply owned by more than a few users

  • [ ] Total supply is sufficient

  • [ ] Tokens located in more than a few exchanges

  • [ ] Flash loan/large fund risks understood

  • [ ] Token does not allow flash minting (or risks understood)

Note: I'll only perform on-chain analysis if you provide a contract address. Won't hallucinate if not applicable.


7. WEIRD ERC20 PATTERNS

I'll check for all 20+ known weird token patterns:

7.1 Reentrant Calls
  • ERC777 tokens with hooks

  • Transfer callbacks

  • Historical exploits: imBTC Uniswap, lendf.me

Tokens: Amp (AMP), imBTC

7.2 Missing Return Values
  • No bool return on transfer/transferFrom

  • Some methods return, others don't

  • False returns on success (Tether Gold)

Tokens: USDT, BNB, OMG, Tether Gold

7.3 Fee on Transfer
  • Transfer fees (STA, PAXG)

  • Future fee capability (USDT, USDC)

  • Deflationary mechanics

Exploit: Balancer STA hack ($500k)

7.4 Balance Modifications Outside Transfers
  • Rebasing tokens (Ampleforth)

  • Governance airdrops (Compound)

  • Mintable/burnable by admin

  • Cached balance risks

7.5 Upgradable Tokens
  • USDC, USDT upgradeability

  • Logic change risks

  • Freeze integration on upgrade

7.6 Flash Mintable
  • DAI flash mint module

  • type(uint256).max supply risk

  • One-transaction minting

7.7 Blocklists
  • USDC, USDT blocklists

  • Admin-controlled blocking

  • Contract trap risk

  • Regulatory/extortion risk

7.8 Pausable Tokens
  • BNB, ZIL pause functionality

  • Admin pause risk

  • User fund trap

7.9 Approval Race Protections
  • USDT, KNC approval restrictions

  • Cannot approve M > 0 when N > 0 approved

  • Integration issues

7.10 Revert on Approval to Zero Address
  • OpenZeppelin pattern

  • approve(address(0), amt) reverts

  • Special case handling needed

7.11 Revert on Zero Value Approvals
  • BNB pattern

  • approve(address, 0) reverts

  • Approval reset issues

7.12 Revert on Zero Value Transfers
  • LEND pattern

  • Zero amount transfers fail

  • Edge case handling

7.13 Multiple Token Addresses
  • Proxied tokens with multiple addresses

  • Address-based tracking broken

  • Rescue function exploits

7.14 Low Decimals
  • USDC: 6 decimals

  • Gemini USD: 2 decimals

  • Precision loss amplified

7.15 High Decimals
  • YAM-V2: 24 decimals

  • Overflow risks

  • Liveness issues

7.16 transferFrom with src == msg.sender
  • DSToken: no allowance decrease

  • OpenZeppelin: always decrease

  • Different semantics

7.17 Non-string Metadata
  • MKR: bytes32 name/symbol

  • Metadata consumption issues

  • Type casting needed

7.18 Revert on Transfer to Zero Address
  • OpenZeppelin pattern

  • Burn mechanism broken

  • Zero address handling

7.19 No Revert on Failure
  • ZRX, EURS pattern

  • Returns false instead of reverting

  • Forgotten require wrapping

7.20 Revert on Large Approvals
  • UNI, COMP: max uint96

  • uint256(-1) special case

  • Allowance mapping mismatch

7.21 Code Injection via Token Name
  • Malicious JavaScript in name

  • Frontend exploits

  • Etherdelta hack pattern

7.22 Unusual Permit Function
  • DAI, RAI, GLM non-EIP2612 permit

  • No revert on unsupported permit

  • Phantom function execution

7.23 Transfer Less Than Amount
  • cUSDCv3 type(uint256).max handling

  • Only balance transferred

  • Vault accounting broken

7.24 ERC-20 Native Currency Representation
  • Celo: CELO token

  • Polygon: POL token

  • zkSync Era: ETH token

  • Double spending risks

Exploit: Uniswap V4 critical vulnerability

For each pattern I'll:

  • Search for implementation

  • Assess risk level

  • Check integration safety

  • Provide mitigation strategies


8. TOKEN INTEGRATION SAFETY

If analyzing a protocol that integrates tokens:

What I'll check:

Safe Transfer Pattern:

// Check for proper transfer handling
// Verify return value checking
// Look for SafeERC20 usage

Balance Verification:

// Check balance before and after
// Don't assume transfer amount = actual amount
// Fee-on-transfer protection

Allowlist Pattern:

// Contract-level allowlist
// Known good tokens
// UI-level filtering

Wrapper Contracts:

// Edge wrappers for external tokens
// Consistent internal semantics
// Isolation of weird behavior

Defensive Patterns:

  • Reentrancy guards on token interactions

  • Balance caching strategies

  • Upgrade detection mechanisms

  • Zero value handling

  • Return value verification


9. ERC721 CONFORMITY CHECKS

What I'll analyze:

Transfer to 0x0:

  • Should revert per standard

  • Burning mechanism

  • Token loss prevention

safeTransferFrom Implementation:

  • Correct signature

  • onERC721Received callback

  • NFT loss to contracts

Metadata Functions:

  • name, symbol presence

  • Can return empty string

  • decimals returns uint8(0) if present

ownerOf Behavior:

  • Reverts for invalid tokenId

  • Reverts for burned tokens

  • Never returns 0x0

Transfer Clears Approvals:

  • Per standard requirement

  • Approval state management

Token ID Immutability:

  • ID cannot change during lifetime

  • Per standard requirement

Checks:

  • [ ] Transfers to 0x0 revert

  • [ ] safeTransferFrom implemented correctly

  • [ ] name, symbol present if used

  • [ ] decimals returns uint8(0) if present

  • [ ] ownerOf reverts for invalid/burned tokens

  • [ ] Transfers clear approvals

  • [ ] Token IDs immutable during lifetime


10. ERC721 COMMON RISKS

What I'll check:

onERC721Received Callback:

  • Reentrancy via callback

  • safeMint risks

  • External call ordering

Safe Minting to Contracts:

  • Minting functions behave like safeTransferFrom

  • Prevent NFT loss to contracts

  • Handle contract recipients

Burning Clears Approvals:

  • Burn function existence

  • Approval clearing

  • Approval state after burn

Checks:

  • [ ] onERC721Received callback reentrancy protected

  • [ ] NFTs safely minted to smart contracts

  • [ ] Burning tokens clears approvals


Slither Integration

Commands I'll Help Run

ERC Conformity Check:

# For ERC20
slither-check-erc [address-or-path] TokenName --erc erc20

# For ERC721
slither-check-erc [address-or-path] TokenName --erc erc721

Contract Analysis:

# Human-readable summary (complexity, upgrades, etc.)
slither [target] --print human-summary

# Function and modifier summary
slither [target] --print contract-summary

Property Generation:

# Generate test properties for Echidna/Manticore
slither-prop . --contract TokenName

Note: I'll adapt based on whether tools are available. I can work without Slither but recommend using it for Solidity projects.


On-chain Analysis Integration

Querying Deployed Contracts

If you provide a contract address, I can query on-chain data:

Setup:

// I'll use web3.js or ethers.js
const Web3 = require('web3');
const web3 = new Web3('RPC_URL');

Token Information:

// Query basic info
const name = await token.methods.name().call();
const symbol = await token.methods.symbol().call();
const decimals = await token.methods.decimals().call();
const totalSupply = await token.methods.totalSupply().call();

Holder Analysis:

// Query top holders
// Calculate concentration
// Identify whale risk

Exchange Analysis:

// Query balances on Uniswap, Curve, etc.
// Check centralization in single exchange

Configuration:

// Query owner/admin
// Check pause status
// Verify upgrade configuration

Note: I'll only perform on-chain queries if you provide an address and RPC endpoint. Won't hallucinate if not applicable.


Known Non-Standard Tokens Database

I have comprehensive knowledge of known non-standard tokens:

Missing Revert
  • Basic Attention Token (BAT)

  • Huobi Token (HT)

  • Compound USD Coin (cUSDC)

  • 0x Protocol Token (ZRX)

Transfer Hooks (Reentrant)
  • Amp (AMP)

  • The Tokenized Bitcoin (imBTC)

Missing Return Data
  • Binance Coin (BNB) - only on transfer

  • OMGToken (OMG)

  • Tether USD (USDT)

Permit No-op
  • Wrapped Ether (WETH)

Additional Non-Standard
  • USDC: upgradeable, 6 decimals

  • DAI: non-standard permit, flash mintable

  • UNI, COMP: revert on large approvals (>= 2^96)

I'll check if your codebase interacts with any of these and verify proper handling.

Requirements and compatibility

Works with: Claude Code, Claude apps, OpenAI Codex, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, Gemini CLI, Kiro, OpenCode, Goose, Amp, Roo Code, JetBrains Junie, Factory Droid, Devin (ex-Windsurf), Mistral Vibe, OpenHands, Letta

“Works with” means the tool reads the open Agent Skills format; a skill written for one tool may use features others lack.

Security

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Attribution and licence

Published by
Trail of Bits
Publisher
Trail of Bits (Official)
Source
trailofbits/skills · plugins/building-secure-contracts/skills/token-integration-analyzer · commit e4dd0bb
Licence
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (redistribution allowed)
  • LICENSE (added by AutoGineer from LICENSE)
  • ATTRIBUTION.md (written by AutoGineer)
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The ZIP holds the skill’s files, its licence files and an ATTRIBUTION.md. Download token-integration-analyzer.zip