Zeroize Audit
Trail of BitsOfficialPublished by Trail of Bits
- Skill
- Review and audit
- Security
- CC-BY-SA-4.0
- Low risk
- Has scripts
AutoGineer summary
Written by AutoGineer from the skill’s own files, not by the author
zeroize-audit is a specialized security analysis tool designed to verify that sensitive data—such as cryptographic keys, passwords, and tokens—is properly wiped from memory. It goes beyond simple source-level scanning by performing assembly-level analysis and control-flow verification to detect instances where compiler optimizations, such as dead-store elimination, inadvertently remove security-critical zeroization operations. The tool produces a structured report and generates proof-of-concept programs to validate findings, providing a rigorous audit path for security-sensitive software.
What it does
- Detects missing zeroization of sensitive data in source code.
- Identifies zeroization operations removed by compiler optimizations using IR and assembly diffing.
- Performs control-flow graph analysis to verify cleanup on all execution paths.
- Generates and validates proof-of-concept programs for identified vulnerabilities.
- Provides assembly-level analysis to detect stack retention and register spills of secrets.
- Supports C, C++, and Rust codebases with language-specific analysis pipelines.
When to use it
- Auditing cryptographic implementations and key management systems.
- Reviewing authentication systems handling passwords or session tokens.
- Analyzing codebases that process PII or sensitive credentials.
- Verifying secure memory cleanup in security-critical software.
- Investigating memory safety and data leakage risks in compiled binaries.
Advantages
- Reduces false negatives by accounting for compiler-level optimization behaviors.
- Provides actionable evidence through generated proof-of-concept programs.
- Supports complex analysis including control-flow and assembly-level verification.
- Automates the tedious process of manual security code review for memory wiping.
- Integrates with existing build systems via compile_commands.json or Cargo manifests.
Usage examples
- “Audit this C library for secrets left in memory.”
- The agent will analyze the provided compile_commands.json, perform source and compiler-level analysis, and generate a report detailing any missing or optimized-away zeroization.
- “Check that this Rust crate actually wipes its keys.”
- The agent will use the Cargo manifest to perform MIR and LLVM IR analysis, identifying if sensitive data is properly cleared or if compiler optimizations have weakened the security.
Install
Download the skill as a ZIP:
https://mp-staging.autogineer.com/agent-skills/trailofbits/zeroize-audit/downloadUnzip it into the cross-client skills folder of your project:
mkdir -p .agents/skills && unzip zeroize-audit.zip -d .agents/skills
Documentation by Trail of Bits
zeroize-audit
When to Use
Auditing cryptographic implementations (keys, seeds, nonces, secrets)
Reviewing authentication systems (passwords, tokens, session data)
Analyzing code that handles PII or sensitive credentials
Verifying secure cleanup in security-critical codebases
Investigating memory safety of sensitive data handling
When NOT to Use
General code review without security focus
Performance optimization (unless related to secure wiping)
Refactoring tasks not related to sensitive data
Code without identifiable secrets or sensitive values
Execution Contract
Use the agent environment's available tools for file access, shell commands, worker execution, and user input. The allowed-tools entry and role-file frontmatter are legacy host metadata; they do not define another environment's tool names or grant permissions there.
Resolve resources. Set
baseDirto the absolute directory containing thisSKILL.md. Confirm the linked input schema and orchestrator prompt exist there.{baseDir},{workdir}, and{{input}}are notation for values the orchestrator must substitute, not environment variables or automatic host expansion. Resolve relative Markdown links against the directory of the file containing them; resolve{baseDir}/…paths against the skill directory. Pass resolved paths to workers and shell commands.Launch a role. Read the role prompt linked in the Agent Architecture table. When the environment has a registered worker for the role, use its
zeroize-audit:<role-name>identifier (for example,zeroize-audit:0-preflight); otherwise create an independent worker with the Markdown body of that prompt, the current phase's instructions, and its parameter values. Always include the resolvedbaseDirand, once created,workdir, even when a phase table does not repeat them. Resolve resource references using the rules above before delegation. Worker file/search/shell actions use the environment's actual tool schemas and permissions. The role's name identifies its instructions, not a required dispatch API or model.Wait for results. Retain each worker's handle and wait through the environment's completion mechanism. A launch acknowledgement is not completion. Read the phase's required artifacts before updating its completion state or starting a dependent phase. On worker failure or unavailable dispatch, apply only that phase's documented fallback; otherwise record the failure in the existing run state and report the affected phase as blocked.
Concurrency. Respect available concurrency and phase barriers. Run workers sequentially when parallel execution is unavailable. Per-TU compiler workers write to separate directories and may run concurrently.
Collect decisions. Use the environment's user-input facility or ask in the conversation. When a phase requires an answer, wait for it; do not substitute a default or elapsed time for the user's decision. Preserve the validation and verification outcomes when recording any accepted or rejected PoC result.
How to Run
On a request like "audit this crate for secrets left in memory" or "check that this C library actually wipes its keys":
Collect inputs. Map the request onto the Inputs table below (full schema: schemas/input.json).
pathis required, plus at least one ofcompile_db(C/C++) orcargo_manifest(Rust); if neither is given or derivable from the repo, ask the user, because preflight stops the run without one. Leave all other fields at their defaults unless the user says otherwise.Read the orchestrator prompt, substituting the collected inputs for its
{{placeholder}}values. You act as the orchestrator it describes: it defines state recovery, the phase loop, early termination, and error handling. Read the shared instructions alongside it for the shared working-directory layout and the agent error protocol every phase depends on.Execute its phase loop. Run Phases 0-7 sequentially. Before each phase, read that phase's workflow file from
{baseDir}/workflows/phase-{N}-{name}.mdand follow its Preconditions, Instructions, State Update, and Error Handling sections. Each workflow specifies the role prompt and parameters to use under the Execution Contract above. Honor the per-phase skip conditions and the early-termination rules in task.md.Return the report (Phase 8, inline): read
{workdir}/report/final-report.mdand return its contents as the skill output.
To resume an interrupted run: if a workdir is known from prior context, read {workdir}/orchestrator-state.json and continue from its current_phase instead of starting at Phase 0 (see the Recovery section of task.md).
Purpose
Detect missing zeroization of sensitive data in source code and identify zeroization that is removed or weakened by compiler optimizations (e.g., dead-store elimination), with mandatory LLVM IR/asm evidence. Capabilities include:
Assembly-level analysis for register spills and stack retention
Data-flow tracking for secret copies
Heap allocator security warnings
Semantic IR analysis for loop unrolling and SSA form
Control-flow graph analysis for path coverage verification
Runtime validation test generation
Scope
Read-only against the target codebase (does not modify audited code; writes analysis artifacts to a temporary working directory).
Produces a structured report (JSON).
Requires valid build context (
compile_commands.json) and compilable translation units."Optimized away" findings only allowed with compiler evidence (IR/asm diff).
Inputs
See schemas/input.json for the full schema. Key fields:
| Field | Required | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
path | yes | — | Repo root |
compile_db | no | null | Path to compile_commands.json for C/C++ analysis. Required if cargo_manifest is not set. |
cargo_manifest | no | null | Path to Cargo.toml for Rust crate analysis. Required if compile_db is not set. |
config | no | — | YAML defining heuristics and approved wipes |
opt_levels | no | ["O0","O1","O2"] | Optimization levels for IR comparison. O1 is the diagnostic level: if a wipe disappears at O1 it is simple DSE; O2 catches more aggressive eliminations. |
languages | no | ["c","cpp","rust"] | Languages to analyze |
max_tus | no | 50 | Limit on translation units processed from compile DB |
mcp_mode | no | prefer | off, prefer, or require — controls Serena MCP usage |
mcp_required_for_advanced | no | true | Downgrade SECRET_COPY, MISSING_ON_ERROR_PATH, and NOT_DOMINATING_EXITS to needs_review when MCP is unavailable |
mcp_timeout_ms | no | 10000 | Timeout budget for MCP semantic queries |
poc_categories | no | all 11 exploitable | Finding categories for which to generate PoCs. C/C++ findings: all 11 categories supported. Rust findings: only MISSING_SOURCE_ZEROIZE, SECRET_COPY, and PARTIAL_WIPE are supported; other Rust categories are marked poc_supported=false. |
poc_output_dir | no | generated_pocs/ | Output directory for generated PoCs |
enable_asm | no | true | Enable assembly emission and analysis (Step 8); produces STACK_RETENTION, REGISTER_SPILL. Auto-disabled if emit_asm.sh is missing. |
enable_semantic_ir | no | false | Enable semantic LLVM IR analysis (Step 9); produces LOOP_UNROLLED_INCOMPLETE |
enable_cfg | no | false | Enable control-flow graph analysis (Step 10); produces MISSING_ON_ERROR_PATH, NOT_DOMINATING_EXITS |
enable_runtime_tests | no | false | Enable runtime test harness generation (Step 11) |
Prerequisites
Before running, verify the following. Each has a defined failure mode.
C/C++ prerequisites:
| Prerequisite | Failure mode if missing |
|---|---|
compile_commands.json at compile_db path | Fail fast — do not proceed |
clang on PATH | Fail fast — IR/ASM analysis impossible |
uvx on PATH (for Serena) | If mcp_mode=require: fail. If mcp_mode=prefer: continue without MCP; downgrade affected findings per Confidence Gating rules. |
{baseDir}/tools/extract_compile_flags.py | Fail fast — cannot extract per-TU flags |
{baseDir}/tools/emit_ir.sh | Fail fast — IR analysis impossible |
{baseDir}/tools/emit_asm.sh | Warn and skip assembly findings (STACK_RETENTION, REGISTER_SPILL) |
{baseDir}/tools/mcp/check_mcp.sh | Warn and treat as MCP unavailable |
{baseDir}/tools/mcp/normalize_mcp_evidence.py | Warn and use raw MCP output |
Rust prerequisites:
| Prerequisite | Failure mode if missing |
|---|---|
Cargo.toml at cargo_manifest path | Fail fast — do not proceed |
cargo check passes | Fail fast — crate must be buildable |
cargo +nightly on PATH | Fail fast — nightly required for MIR and LLVM IR emission |
uv on PATH | Fail fast — required to run Python analysis scripts |
{baseDir}/tools/validate_rust_toolchain.sh | Warn — run preflight manually. Checks all tools, scripts, nightly, and optionally cargo check. Use --json for machine-readable output, --manifest to also validate the crate builds. |
{baseDir}/tools/emit_rust_mir.sh | Fail fast — MIR analysis impossible (--opt, --crate, --bin/--lib supported; --out can be file or directory) |
{baseDir}/tools/emit_rust_ir.sh | Fail fast — LLVM IR analysis impossible (--opt required; --crate, --bin/--lib supported; --out must be .ll) |
{baseDir}/tools/emit_rust_asm.sh | Warn and skip assembly findings (STACK_RETENTION, REGISTER_SPILL). Supports --opt, --crate, --bin/--lib, --target, --intel-syntax; --out can be .s file or directory. |
{baseDir}/tools/diff_rust_mir.sh | Warn and skip MIR-level optimization comparison. Accepts 2+ MIR files, normalizes, diffs pairwise, and reports first opt level where zeroize/drop-glue patterns disappear. |
{baseDir}/tools/scripts/semantic_audit.py | Warn and skip semantic source analysis |
{baseDir}/tools/scripts/find_dangerous_apis.py | Warn and skip dangerous API scan |
{baseDir}/tools/scripts/check_mir_patterns.py | Warn and skip MIR analysis |
{baseDir}/tools/scripts/check_llvm_patterns.py | Warn and skip LLVM IR analysis |
{baseDir}/tools/scripts/check_rust_asm.py | Warn and skip Rust assembly analysis (STACK_RETENTION, REGISTER_SPILL, drop-glue checks). Dispatches to check_rust_asm_x86.py (production) or check_rust_asm_aarch64.py (EXPERIMENTAL — AArch64 findings require manual verification). |
{baseDir}/tools/scripts/check_rust_asm_x86.py | Required by check_rust_asm.py for x86-64 analysis; warn and skip if missing |
{baseDir}/tools/scripts/check_rust_asm_aarch64.py | Required by check_rust_asm.py for AArch64 analysis (EXPERIMENTAL); warn and skip if missing |
Common prerequisite:
| Prerequisite | Failure mode if missing |
|---|---|
{baseDir}/tools/generate_poc.py | Fail fast — PoC generation is mandatory |
Approved Wipe APIs
The following are recognized as valid zeroization. Configure additional entries in {baseDir}/configs/.
C/C++
explicit_bzeromemset_sSecureZeroMemoryOPENSSL_cleansesodium_memzeroVolatile wipe loops (pattern-based; see
volatile_wipe_patternsin{baseDir}/configs/default.yaml)In IR:
llvm.memsetwith volatile flag, volatile stores, or non-elidable wipe call
Rust
zeroize::Zeroizetrait (zeroize()method)Zeroizing<T>wrapper (drop-based)ZeroizeOnDropderive macro
Finding Capabilities
Findings are grouped by required evidence. Only attempt findings for which the required tooling is available.
| Finding ID | Description | Requires | PoC Support |
|---|---|---|---|
MISSING_SOURCE_ZEROIZE | No zeroization found in source | Source only | Yes (C/C++ + Rust) |
PARTIAL_WIPE | Incorrect size or incomplete wipe | Source only | Yes (C/C++ + Rust) |
NOT_ON_ALL_PATHS | Zeroization missing on some control-flow paths (heuristic) | Source only | Yes (C/C++ only) |
SECRET_COPY | Sensitive data copied without zeroization tracking | Source + MCP preferred | Yes (C/C++ + Rust) |
INSECURE_HEAP_ALLOC | Secret uses insecure allocator (malloc vs. secure_malloc) | Source only | Yes (C/C++ only) |
OPTIMIZED_AWAY_ZEROIZE | Compiler removed zeroization | IR diff required (never source-only) | Yes |
STACK_RETENTION | Stack frame may retain secrets after return | Assembly required (C/C++); LLVM IR alloca+lifetime.end evidence (Rust); assembly corroboration upgrades to confirmed | Yes (C/C++ only) |
REGISTER_SPILL | Secrets spilled from registers to stack | Assembly required (C/C++); LLVM IR load+call-site evidence (Rust); assembly corroboration upgrades to confirmed | Yes (C/C++ only) |
MISSING_ON_ERROR_PATH | Error-handling paths lack cleanup | CFG or MCP required | Yes |
NOT_DOMINATING_EXITS | Wipe doesn't dominate all exits | CFG or MCP required | Yes |
LOOP_UNROLLED_INCOMPLETE | Unrolled loop wipe is incomplete | Semantic IR required | Yes |
Agent Architecture
The analysis pipeline uses 11 worker roles across 8 phases, launched by the orchestrator using the Execution Contract above. Agents write persistent finding files to a shared working directory (/tmp/zeroize-audit-{run_id}/), enabling parallel execution and protecting against context pressure.
| Agent | Phase | Purpose | Output Directory |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0-preflight | Phase 0 | Preflight checks (tools, toolchain, compile DB, crate build), config merge, workdir creation, TU enumeration | {workdir}/ |
| 1-mcp-resolver | Phase 1, Wave 1 (C/C++ only) | Resolve symbols, types, and cross-file references via Serena MCP | mcp-evidence/ |
| 2-source-analyzer | Phase 1, Wave 2a (C/C++ only) | Identify sensitive objects, detect wipes, validate correctness, data-flow/heap | source-analysis/ |
| 2b-rust-source-analyzer | Phase 1, Wave 2b (Rust only, parallel with 2a) | Rustdoc JSON trait-aware analysis + dangerous API grep | source-analysis/ |
| 3-tu-compiler-analyzer | Phase 2, Wave 3 (C/C++ only, N parallel) | Per-TU IR diff, assembly, semantic IR, CFG analysis | compiler-analysis/{tu_hash}/ |
| 3b-rust-compiler-analyzer | Phase 2, Wave 3R (Rust only, single agent) | Crate-level MIR, LLVM IR, and assembly analysis | rust-compiler-analysis/ |
| 4-report-assembler | Phase 3 (interim) + Phase 6 (final) | Collect findings from all agents, apply confidence gates; merge PoC results and produce final report | report/ |
| 5-poc-generator | Phase 4 | Craft bespoke proof-of-concept programs (C/C++: all categories; Rust: MISSING_SOURCE_ZEROIZE, SECRET_COPY, PARTIAL_WIPE) | poc/ |
| 5b-poc-validator | Phase 5 | Compile and run all PoCs | poc/ |
| 5c-poc-verifier | Phase 5 | Verify each PoC proves its claimed finding | poc/ |
| 6-test-generator | Phase 7 (optional) | Generate runtime validation test harnesses | tests/ |
The orchestrator reads one per-phase workflow file from {baseDir}/workflows/ at a time, and maintains orchestrator-state.json for recovery after context compression. Agents receive configuration by file path (config_path), not by value.
Execution flow
Phase 0: 0-preflight agent — Preflight + config + create workdir + enumerate TUs
→ writes orchestrator-state.json, merged-config.yaml, preflight.json
Phase 1: Wave 1: 1-mcp-resolver (skip if mcp_mode=off OR language_mode=rust)
Wave 2a: 2-source-analyzer (C/C++ only; skip if no compile_db) ─┐ parallel
Wave 2b: 2b-rust-source-analyzer (Rust only; skip if no cargo_manifest) ─┘
Phase 2: Wave 3: 3-tu-compiler-analyzer x N (C/C++ only; parallel per TU)
Wave 3R: 3b-rust-compiler-analyzer (Rust only; single crate-level agent)
Phase 3: Wave 4: 4-report-assembler (mode=interim → findings.json; reads all agent outputs)
Phase 4: Wave 5: 5-poc-generator (C/C++: all categories; Rust: MISSING_SOURCE_ZEROIZE, SECRET_COPY, PARTIAL_WIPE; other Rust findings: poc_supported=false)
Phase 5: PoC Validation & Verification
Step 1: 5b-poc-validator agent (compile and run all PoCs)
Step 2: 5c-poc-verifier agent (verify each PoC proves its claimed finding)
Step 3: Orchestrator asks the user to accept or reject failed verification
Step 4: Orchestrator merges all results into poc_final_results.json
Phase 6: Wave 6: 4-report-assembler (mode=final → merge PoC results, final-report.md)
Phase 7: Wave 7: 6-test-generator (optional)
Phase 8: Orchestrator — Return final-report.mdCross-Reference Convention
IDs are namespaced per agent to prevent collisions during parallel execution:
| Entity | Pattern | Assigned By |
|---|---|---|
| Sensitive object (C/C++) | SO-0001–SO-4999 | 2-source-analyzer |
| Sensitive object (Rust) | SO-5000–SO-9999 (Rust namespace) | 2b-rust-source-analyzer |
| Source finding (C/C++) | F-SRC-NNNN | 2-source-analyzer |
| Source finding (Rust) | F-RUST-SRC-NNNN | 2b-rust-source-analyzer |
| IR finding (C/C++) | F-IR-{tu_hash}-NNNN | 3-tu-compiler-analyzer |
| ASM finding (C/C++) | F-ASM-{tu_hash}-NNNN | 3-tu-compiler-analyzer |
| CFG finding | F-CFG-{tu_hash}-NNNN | 3-tu-compiler-analyzer |
| Semantic IR finding | F-SIR-{tu_hash}-NNNN | 3-tu-compiler-analyzer |
| Rust MIR finding | F-RUST-MIR-NNNN | 3b-rust-compiler-analyzer |
| Rust LLVM IR finding | F-RUST-IR-NNNN | 3b-rust-compiler-analyzer |
| Rust assembly finding | F-RUST-ASM-NNNN | 3b-rust-compiler-analyzer |
| Translation unit | TU-{hash} | Orchestrator |
| Final finding | ZA-NNNN | 4-report-assembler |
Every finding JSON object includes related_objects, related_findings, and evidence_files fields for cross-referencing between agents.
Detection Strategy
Analysis runs in two phases. For complete step-by-step guidance, see {baseDir}/references/detection-strategy.md.
| Phase | Steps | Findings produced | Required tooling |
|---|---|---|---|
| Phase 1 (Source) | 1–6 | MISSING_SOURCE_ZEROIZE, PARTIAL_WIPE, NOT_ON_ALL_PATHS, SECRET_COPY, INSECURE_HEAP_ALLOC | Source + compile DB |
| Phase 2 (Compiler) | 7–12 | OPTIMIZED_AWAY_ZEROIZE, STACK_RETENTION, REGISTER_SPILL, LOOP_UNROLLED_INCOMPLETE†, MISSING_ON_ERROR_PATH‡, NOT_DOMINATING_EXITS‡ | clang, IR/ASM tools |
* requires enable_asm=true (default)
† requires enable_semantic_ir=true
‡ requires enable_cfg=true
For Rust, {baseDir}/references/rust-zeroization-patterns.md catalogues 40 named anti-patterns, keyed to the script that detects each one: Section A for rustdoc-JSON semantics (semantic_audit.py), Section B for dangerous APIs (find_dangerous_apis.py), and Section C for MIR/LLVM IR/assembly (check_mir_patterns.py, check_llvm_patterns.py, check_rust_asm.py). Read the relevant section when triaging a Rust finding, writing its fix recommendation, or deciding whether a hand-spotted pattern is already covered.
Two limits on how far that reference goes. The 34 entries in Sections A-C are what the scripts detect today; Section D's six are known gaps no script covers, so treat those as unaudited rather than clean. Sections A and C are also partial — the scripts emit some classes with no entry — so a finding that matches no catalogued pattern is still a finding, carrying whatever evidence the script produced.
Output Format
Each run produces two outputs:
final-report.md— Comprehensive markdown report (primary human-readable output)findings.json— Structured JSON matching{baseDir}/schemas/output.json(for machine consumption and downstream tools)
Markdown Report Structure
The markdown report (final-report.md) contains these sections:
Header: Run metadata (run_id, timestamp, repo, compile_db, config summary)
Executive Summary: Finding counts by severity, confidence, and category
Sensitive Objects Inventory: Table of all identified objects with IDs, types, locations
Findings: Grouped by severity then confidence. Each finding includes location, object, all evidence (source/IR/ASM/CFG), compiler evidence details, and recommended fix
Superseded Findings: Source findings replaced by CFG-backed findings
Confidence Gate Summary: Downgrades applied and overrides rejected
Analysis Coverage: TUs analyzed, agent success/failure, features enabled, and any Section D patterns the crate uses that no script audits
Appendix: Evidence Files: Mapping of finding IDs to evidence file paths
Structured JSON
The findings.json file follows the schema in {baseDir}/schemas/output.json. Each Finding object:
{
"id": "ZA-0001",
"category": "OPTIMIZED_AWAY_ZEROIZE",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "confirmed",
"language": "c",
"file": "src/crypto.c",
"line": 42,
"symbol": "key_buf",
"evidence": "store volatile i8 0 count: O0=32, O2=0 — wipe eliminated by DSE",
"compiler_evidence": {
"opt_levels": ["O0", "O2"],
"o0": "32 volatile stores targeting key_buf",
"o2": "0 volatile stores (all eliminated)",
"diff_summary": "All volatile wipe stores removed at O2 — classic DSE pattern"
},
"suggested_fix": "Replace memset with explicit_bzero or add compiler_fence(SeqCst) after the wipe",
"poc": {
"file": "generated_pocs/ZA-0001.c",
"makefile_target": "ZA-0001",
"compile_opt": "-O2",
"requires_manual_adjustment": false,
"validated": true,
"validation_result": "exploitable"
}
}See {baseDir}/schemas/output.json for the full schema and enum values.
Confidence Gating
Evidence thresholds
A finding requires at least 2 independent signals to be marked confirmed. With 1 signal, mark likely. With 0 strong signals (name-pattern match only), mark needs_review.
Signals include: name pattern match, type hint match, explicit annotation, IR evidence, ASM evidence, MCP cross-reference, CFG evidence, PoC validation.
PoC validation as evidence signal
Every finding is validated against a bespoke PoC. After compilation and execution, each PoC is also verified to ensure it actually tests the claimed vulnerability. The combined result is an evidence signal:
| PoC Result | Verified | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Exit 0 (exploitable) | Yes | Strong signal — can upgrade likely to confirmed |
| Exit 1 (not exploitable) | Yes | Downgrade severity to low (informational); retain in report |
| Exit 0 or 1 | No (user accepted) | Weaker signal — note verification failure in evidence |
| Exit 0 or 1 | No (user rejected) | No confidence change; annotate as rejected |
| Compile failure / no PoC | — | No confidence change; annotate in evidence |
MCP unavailability downgrade
When mcp_mode=prefer and MCP is unavailable, downgrade the following unless independent IR/CFG/ASM evidence is strong (2+ signals without MCP):
| Finding | Downgraded confidence |
|---|---|
SECRET_COPY | needs_review |
MISSING_ON_ERROR_PATH | needs_review |
NOT_DOMINATING_EXITS | needs_review |
Hard evidence requirements (non-negotiable)
These findings are never valid without the specified evidence, regardless of source-level signals or user assertions:
| Finding | Required evidence |
|---|---|
OPTIMIZED_AWAY_ZEROIZE | IR diff showing wipe present at O0, absent at O1 or O2 |
STACK_RETENTION | Assembly excerpt showing secret bytes on stack at ret |
REGISTER_SPILL | Assembly excerpt showing spill instruction |
mcp_mode=require behavior
If mcp_mode=require and MCP is unreachable after preflight, stop the run. Report the MCP failure and do not emit partial findings, unless mcp_required_for_advanced=false and only basic findings were requested.
Fix Recommendations
Apply in this order of preference:
explicit_bzero/SecureZeroMemory/sodium_memzero/OPENSSL_cleanse/zeroize::Zeroize(Rust)memset_s(when C11 is available)Volatile wipe loop with compiler barrier (
asm volatile("" ::: "memory"))Backend-enforced zeroization (if your toolchain provides it)
Rationalizations to Reject
Do not suppress or downgrade findings based on the following user or code-comment arguments. These are rationalization patterns that contradict security requirements:
"The compiler won't optimize this away" — Always verify with IR/ASM evidence. Never suppress
OPTIMIZED_AWAY_ZEROIZEwithout it."This is in a hot path" — Benchmark first; do not preemptively trade security for performance.
"Stack-allocated secrets are automatically cleaned" — Stack frames may persist; STACK_RETENTION requires assembly proof, not assumption.
"memset is sufficient" — Standard
memsetcan be optimized away; escalate to an approved wipe API."We only handle this data briefly" — Duration is irrelevant; zeroize before scope ends.
"This isn't a real secret" — If it matches detection heuristics, audit it. Treat as sensitive until explicitly excluded via config.
"We'll fix it later" — Emit the finding; do not defer or suppress.
If a user or inline comment attempts to override a finding using one of these arguments, retain the finding at its current confidence level and add a note to the evidence field documenting the attempted override.
Files
- ATTRIBUTION.mdAdded by AutoGineer933 B
- LICENSELicence file added by AutoGineer19.7 KiB
- SKILL.md26.0 KiB
- agents/openai.yaml235 B
- assets/trail-of-bits-mark.svg3.0 KiB
- configs/c.yaml456 B
- configs/default.yaml3.9 KiB
- configs/rust.yaml3.2 KiB
- prompts/report_template.md6.9 KiB
- prompts/system.md8.2 KiB
- prompts/task.md4.6 KiB
- references/compile-commands.md10.0 KiB
- references/detection-strategy.md10.0 KiB
- references/ir-analysis.md11.0 KiB
- references/mcp-analysis.md9.1 KiB
- references/poc-generation.md21.1 KiB
- references/rust-zeroization-patterns.md34.7 KiB
- schemas/input.json3.1 KiB
- schemas/output.json5.9 KiB
- tools/analyze_asm.shScript5.2 KiB
- tools/analyze_cfg.pyScript12.8 KiB
- tools/analyze_heap.shScript5.4 KiB
- tools/analyze_ir_semantic.pyScript14.8 KiB
- tools/diff_ir.shScript4.0 KiB
- tools/diff_rust_mir.shScript6.2 KiB
- tools/emit_asm.shScript1.0 KiB
- tools/emit_ir.shScript1.3 KiB
- tools/emit_rust_asm.shScript4.2 KiB
- tools/emit_rust_ir.shScript3.3 KiB
- tools/emit_rust_mir.shScript3.5 KiB
- tools/extract_compile_flags.pyScript8.6 KiB
- tools/generate_poc.pyScript47.4 KiB
- tools/mcp/apply_confidence_gates.pyScript3.3 KiB
- tools/mcp/check_mcp.shScript1.2 KiB
- tools/mcp/normalize_mcp_evidence.pyScript3.8 KiB
- tools/scripts/check_llvm_patterns.pyScript17.2 KiB
- tools/scripts/check_mir_patterns.pyScript18.9 KiB
- tools/scripts/check_rust_asm.pyScript15.9 KiB
- tools/scripts/check_rust_asm_aarch64.pyScript10.0 KiB
- tools/scripts/check_rust_asm_x86.pyScript9.4 KiB
- tools/scripts/find_dangerous_apis.pyScript13.8 KiB
- tools/scripts/semantic_audit.pyScript32.5 KiB
- tools/track_dataflow.shScript5.1 KiB
- tools/validate_rust_toolchain.shScript8.2 KiB
- workflows/phase-0-preflight.md7.4 KiB
- workflows/phase-1-source-analysis.md5.0 KiB
- workflows/phase-2-compiler-analysis.md6.0 KiB
- workflows/phase-3-interim-report.md1.1 KiB
- workflows/phase-4-poc-generation.md1.3 KiB
- workflows/phase-5-poc-validation.md4.2 KiB
- workflows/phase-6-final-report.md1.1 KiB
- workflows/phase-7-test-generation.md862 B
references/mcp-analysis.md
MCP-Assisted Semantic Analysis
This reference covers how to configure, query, and interpret Serena MCP evidence during the zeroize-audit semantic pass. For compile DB generation and flag extraction, refer to the compile-commands reference (loaded separately from SKILL.md).
Preconditions
Before running any MCP queries, the following must hold. These are verified during Step 1 (Preflight) in task.md — do not re-run preflight here, just confirm the relevant outputs:
| Precondition | Failure behavior |
|---|---|
compile_commands.json valid and readable | Do not run MCP queries; fail the run if mcp_mode=require |
| Codebase buildable from compile DB commands | Same as above |
check_mcp.sh exits 0 | If mcp_mode=require: stop run. If mcp_mode=prefer: set mcp_available=false, continue without MCP, apply confidence downgrades |
| Serena can resolve at least one symbol in the TU | Log a warning; proceed but mark findings from that TU as needs_review |
Rust note: Cargo does not natively produce compile_commands.json. Use bear -- cargo build or bear -- cargo check to generate it. rust-project.json is not a substitute in this workflow.
Configuring Serena
The plugin.json registers Serena as the serena MCP server, launched via uvx. Serena wraps language servers (clangd for C/C++) and exposes semantic analysis as high-level MCP tools. It auto-discovers compile_commands.json from the project working directory.
Prerequisites:
uvxmust be on PATH (installed withuv— see https://docs.astral.sh/uv/)Serena is fetched and run automatically via
uvx --from git+https://github.com/oraios/serenaNo separate
clangdinstallation is required — Serena manages language server dependencies internally
Verify before querying:
{baseDir}/tools/mcp/check_mcp.sh \
--compile-db /path/to/compile_commands.jsonA non-zero exit means MCP is unreachable. Apply the preflight failure behavior above.
MCP Tool Reference
Serena abstracts LSP methods into higher-level, symbol-name-based tools. Unlike raw LSP, you query by symbol name rather than file position.
| MCP tool name | Purpose in zeroize-audit | Key parameters |
|---|---|---|
activate_project | Must be called first. Activates the project so Serena indexes it | project (path to repo root) |
find_symbol | Resolve where a sensitive symbol is defined; get type info, body, and struct layout | symbol_name, file_path (optional), include_body, depth |
find_referencing_symbols | Find all use sites and callers across files | symbol_name, file_path (optional) |
get_symbols_overview | List all symbols in a file — useful for exploring unfamiliar TUs | file_path |
Mapping from previous LSP-based queries:
| Analysis need | Serena tool | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Resolve definition | find_symbol | Search by name; returns file, line, kind, and optionally body |
| Find all references | find_referencing_symbols | Returns referencing symbols with file and line |
| Find callers (incoming calls) | find_referencing_symbols | Search for references to a function name |
| Find callees (outgoing calls) | find_symbol + source read | Get function body via include_body: true, then resolve called symbols |
| Resolve type / hover | find_symbol with include_body: true | Type information is included in the symbol result |
| Follow typedef chain | find_symbol | Look up the type name directly |
Query Order
Run queries in this order so each step's output informs the next. All queries for a given TU should complete before moving to the next TU.
Step 0 — Activate the project (activate_project)
This must be called once before any other Serena tool. Pass the repository root path. If activation fails, treat MCP as unavailable.
Tool: activate_project
Arguments:
project: "/path/to/repo"Expected: confirmation that the project is active. Serena will start indexing the codebase (including launching clangd if needed). Wait for activation to succeed before proceeding.
Step 1 — Resolve symbol definition (find_symbol)
Establishes the canonical declaration location and type information used in all subsequent queries.
Tool: find_symbol
Arguments:
symbol_name: "secret_key"
include_body: trueExpected: result with file, line, kind, symbol name, and body content. The body provides type information (array sizes, struct layout) needed for wipe-size validation in Step 3. Store this as the canonical location for Steps 2–4.
If the symbol name is ambiguous, narrow with file_path:
Tool: find_symbol
Arguments:
symbol_name: "secret_key"
file_path: "src/crypto.c"
include_body: trueStep 2 — Collect all use sites (find_referencing_symbols)
Finds every location where the sensitive symbol is referenced. Use these to locate adjacent wipe calls and detect copies to other scopes.
Tool: find_referencing_symbols
Arguments:
symbol_name: "secret_key"Expected: list of referencing symbols with file, line, symbol, and kind. For each reference in a file other than the source TU, check that file for cleanup. References in generated files (build directory) can be filtered by source directory prefix.
Step 3 — Resolve type and size
Type information is returned as part of find_symbol results (Step 1). If you need to resolve a typedef or follow a type alias chain, look up the type name directly:
Tool: find_symbol
Arguments:
symbol_name: "secret_key_t"
include_body: trueUse this to validate wipe sizes — a sizeof(ptr) bug will be apparent when the symbol body reveals uint8_t [32] but the wipe uses sizeof(uint8_t *).
Step 4 — Trace callers and cleanup paths
Use find_referencing_symbols on the function containing the sensitive object to find callers that may hold their own copy of the secret. Use it on wipe wrapper functions to find cleanup paths.
Tool: find_referencing_symbols
Arguments:
symbol_name: "process_key"For outgoing calls (what does this function call?), read the function body from find_symbol output and resolve each called function:
Tool: find_symbol
Arguments:
symbol_name: "process_key"
include_body: trueThen for each function called within the body:
Tool: find_symbol
Arguments:
symbol_name: "cleanup_secret"Step 5 — Normalize output
Before using any MCP results in confidence scoring or finding emission, normalize:
uv run --no-project {baseDir}/tools/mcp/normalize_mcp_evidence.py \
--input /tmp/raw_mcp_results.json \
--output /tmp/normalized_mcp_results.jsonThe normalizer produces a consistent schema consumed by the MCP semantic pass and subsequent confidence gating steps.
Interpreting Responses
| Response | Meaning | Action |
|---|---|---|
| Empty results | Serena could not resolve the symbol | Check compile DB path; verify symbol name spelling; retry with file_path to narrow scope |
Timeout (> mcp_timeout_ms) | Query too slow | Mark finding as needs_review; do not wait indefinitely |
| Multiple results for same name | Symbol is defined in multiple TUs or headers | Use file_path to disambiguate; note in evidence |
| References in generated files | Hits in build-generated sources | Filter by source directory prefix |
| No referencing symbols found | Symbol is unused or not indexed | Acceptable for leaf functions; note in evidence |
Confidence Scoring
MCP evidence contributes one signal toward the 2-signal threshold for confirmed findings (see SKILL.md Confidence Gating). Tag each piece of evidence with its source:
| Evidence source tag | Meaning |
|---|---|
mcp | Resolved via Serena MCP query |
source | Source-level pattern match |
ir | LLVM IR analysis |
asm | Assembly analysis |
cfg | Control-flow graph analysis |
MCP evidence alone (1 signal) produces likely. MCP + one additional signal (source, IR, CFG, or ASM) produces confirmed.
Mandatory downgrades — applied by apply_confidence_gates.py after all evidence is collected:
| Condition | Findings downgraded to needs_review |
|---|---|
mcp_available=false AND mcp_required_for_advanced=true | SECRET_COPY, MISSING_ON_ERROR_PATH, NOT_DOMINATING_EXITS (unless 2+ non-MCP signals exist) |
| Assembly evidence missing | STACK_RETENTION, REGISTER_SPILL |
| IR diff evidence missing | OPTIMIZED_AWAY_ZEROIZE |
Apply downgrades after all evidence is collected, not during querying. Do not suppress findings preemptively — emit at needs_review rather than dropping them.
Post-Processing
After collecting all MCP evidence and running IR/ASM/CFG analysis, apply confidence gates mechanically:
uv run --no-project {baseDir}/tools/mcp/apply_confidence_gates.py \
--input /tmp/raw-report.json \
--out /tmp/final-report.json \
--mcp-available \
--mcp-required-for-advancedOmit --mcp-available if MCP was unreachable. Omit --mcp-required-for-advanced if mcp_required_for_advanced=false in the run config. The script applies all downgrade rules from SKILL.md and outputs gated findings ready for the report assembly phase.
Requirements and compatibility
Works with: Claude Code, Claude apps, OpenAI Codex, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, Gemini CLI, Kiro, OpenCode, Goose, Amp, Roo Code, JetBrains Junie, Factory Droid, Devin (ex-Windsurf), Mistral Vibe, OpenHands, Letta
“Works with” means the tool reads the open Agent Skills format; a skill written for one tool may use features others lack.
Needs: Declares allowed tools, Needs Python
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Attribution and licence
- Published by
- Trail of Bits
- Publisher
- Trail of Bits (Official)
- Source
- trailofbits/skills · plugins/zeroize-audit/skills/zeroize-audit · commit e4dd0bb
- Licence
- Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (redistribution allowed)
- LICENSE (added by AutoGineer from LICENSE)
- ATTRIBUTION.md (written by AutoGineer)
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