Apigee Agent Gateway Governance
GoogleOfficialPublished by Google
- Skill
- Workflow
- Automation and integrations
- Apache-2.0
- Low risk
- Has scripts
AutoGineer summary
Written by AutoGineer from the skill’s own files, not by the author
This skill automates the configuration of an Apigee API proxy to act as a service extension for a Google Cloud Agent Gateway. It enables inspection of LLM traffic to perform token metering, caller identity extraction, prompt screening via Model Armor, and semantic caching. The skill follows a structured deployment process using AFT templates and gcloud commands, ensuring the proxy is correctly wired to intercept and evaluate agent requests without acting as a backend router.
What it does
- Stands up an inspect-only Apigee proxy for LLM traffic governance.
- Configures token metering per model and enforces usage quotas.
- Integrates Model Armor for prompt screening and semantic caching.
- Manages gateway network connectivity and AuthzPolicy configuration.
- Provides automated deployment scripts for consistent environment setup.
- Supports both development and production modes with defined contract schemas.
When to use it
- When you need to meter or govern LLM token usage for agents.
- When you require prompt screening or semantic caching for agent egress.
- When you need to extract caller identity from agent traffic.
- When you are wiring Apigee as an AI gateway behind a Google Cloud Agent Gateway.
Advantages
- Centralized governance for agent model egress.
- Version-controlled proxy configuration via AFT templates.
- Automated handling of complex network and service extension dependencies.
- Non-intrusive inspection architecture that does not require backend routing.
Usage examples
- “Set up Apigee governance for my existing Agent Gateway in dev mode.”
- The agent will assess the current environment, apply default configurations for metering and identity, and generate a deployment plan for approval.
- “Deploy the Apigee proxy using my production configuration file.”
- The agent will validate the provided contract file, execute the deployment sequence, and verify the proxy is reporting as EXTENSIBLE.
Install
Download the skill as a ZIP:
https://mp-staging.autogineer.com/agent-skills/google/apigee-agent-gateway-governance/downloadUnzip it into the cross-client skills folder of your project:
mkdir -p .agents/skills && unzip apigee-agent-gateway-governance.zip -d .agents/skills
Documentation by Google
Apigee as an Agent Gateway Service Extension
Wires an Apigee proxy in as an ext-proc callout on a GCP Agent Gateway. The proxy is a processor, not an API proxy: it has no backend, inspects the LLM request and response the gateway hands it, and returns a verdict.
Usage Attribution
MUST READ: Before executing any gcloud, REST API, or MCP command, you
MUST read and follow the instructions in
Usage Attribution.
You build the proxy; the user does not.
Two modes, one schema. Decide which before anything else, and say which.
Input file present → prod mode: it is the contract, every value comes from
it, and a missing or malformed field is a refusal, not a default. No input file
and the user is describing an outcome → dev mode: apply the documented
defaults, show a plan with durations and get approval, start with identity and
metering only, write apigee-agent-gateway-governance.yaml at the end as the
handoff. assets/apigee-agent-gateway-governance.example.yaml documents the
schema both modes use.
Modes, defaults, durations, cost disclosure and the interlocks that bind both:
references/modes.md. Read it before you start.
Colour the plan's ACTION column — green REUSE, cyan CREATE/RESERVE,
yellow APPEND/MODIFY; full palette in references/modes.md. Yellow is the
one that earns its place: it is the only signal that a resource the user already
owns is being changed. Rendered plain, the one row that modifies something is
indistinguishable from the dozen that do not — which is exactly the row the
approval exists for.
Prerequisite: where the agent runs
Check this before building anything. It decides whether traffic can reach the gateway at all, and it is silent when wrong — every step below still succeeds while nothing arrives.
Use Agent Runtime, created with agent_gateway_config /
agent_to_anywhere_config. It is the supported path and the orchestrator builds
the client-side PSC, routing, DNS and cert trust for you. There is no gcloud
surface for this and no console path — it is SDK-only, at agent creation time.
See
Route traffic through Agent Gateway
for the binding, and references/networking-psc.md for a worked example.
Set GOOGLE_API_PREVENT_AGENT_TOKEN_SHARING_FOR_GCP_SERVICES: "False" in the
agent's env_vars, or every invocation 401s on the agent's own
sessions.create, before user code runs. Deploy-time invisible. Full symptom
and isolation: references/gotchas.md, Agent Gateway.
Where the agent runs is otherwise settled — the premise is a working gateway and
a working agent. Do not explain how to build one or list unsupported compute
unprompted; references/networking-psc.md has the constraints if it turns out
to matter.
Tool versions
Do not assume these are installed or current.
| Tool | Minimum | Why |
|---|---|---|
gcloud | 588.0.0 | apigee apis import --from-template is on the GA track at this version; older SDKs need gcloud beta |
google-cloud-aiplatform[agent_engines,adk] | >=2.1,<3 | Agent Runtime client used to bind the agent to the gateway |
google-adk | >=2.9,<3 | only if you build the test agent with ADK |
On gcloud >= 588.0.0: every feature must keep its uid, and the template must
never declare endpoints or targets. All six features set uid today and
the template declares neither, so the shipped bundle is correct — but both are
load-bearing now, and breaking either one still compiles, still deploys, and
reports nothing. Mechanism and symptoms: references/gotchas.md, under
Authoring (AFT).
gcloud version | head -1 # confirm >= 588.0.0
gcloud components update # if older
pip install "google-cloud-aiplatform[agent_engines,adk]>=2.1,<3" "google-adk>=2.9,<3"scripts/compile_check.py needs PyYAML and names the interpreter if it is
missing. pip install pyyaml, or run it with a Python 3 that has it; gcloud's
bundled interpreter does not, and the SDK's vendored yaml is Python 2.
python3 scripts/compile_check.py assets/apigee-proxy-template.yamlExecution model
Three layers, and the choice between them is not stylistic:
| Layer | Used for | Why |
|---|---|---|
| AFT YAML template | the proxy itself | version-controlled, reviewable, diffable |
gcloud | PSC, DNS, AuthzExtension, AuthzPolicy | native commands exist |
REST (curl) | env properties, envgroups, deployments, debug sessions | no gcloud equivalent today |
The customer owns one input file
(assets/apigee-agent-gateway-governance.example.yaml). It is the
version-controlled artifact. Never hand-edit the generated proxy: regenerate it.
Run the Apigee-side sequence with the script, not by hand. Steps 1, 3 and 4
below are order-dependent and each fails in a way that reads as a different
problem. scripts/deploy_proxy.sh does all three, preserves the properties
map, polls the async operation, and exits non-zero if the deployment does not
come up EXTENSIBLE:
scripts/deploy_proxy.sh --org "$ORG" --env "$ENV" --proxy "$PROXY" \
--template assets/apigee-proxy-template.yaml [--service-account "$SA"] --yes \
[--index-endpoint-id ID --index-id ID --sc-project P --sc-region R --embeddings-model M]Run it without --yes first: it prints the plan and changes nothing. Show that
plan, then re-run with --yes once the user agrees.
The vector-search flags are the one exception to "edit the default in every
feature that declares it". Those three ids are substituted at deploy time
and checked for leftovers; hand-editing them into feature-semantic-cache.yaml
deploys fine, skips the check, and makes the file single-use.
scripts/ensure_gateway_connectivity.sh is the same idea for the gateway leg
(step 0). It is the only part of this skill that modifies a resource the user
already owns, so it applies nothing without --yes.
The steps are written out below so you can diagnose a failure, not so you can retype them.
Inputs you must resolve first
Environment prerequisites: references/setup.md — gcloud SDK (588+),
project, billing, gcloud services enable, region, credentials, IAM. Nothing
below creates any of it.
Prod: from the input file, then environment, then ask — never invent. Dev: apply
the references/modes.md defaults, and ask only for what has none.
project,regionapigee.org,apigee.environment,apigee.envgroup,apigee.hostname,apigee.proxynetwork.vpc,network.subnet,network.networkAttachmentgateway.name,gateway.matchPaths(a list, one entry per wire shape),gateway.manageNetworkConfig
matchPaths drives TWO artifacts; write both from the same list. The
AuthzPolicy paths[].suffix gets one suffix per entry, verbatim with
leading punctuation kept — it decides what the gateway routes to Apigee. The
template's LLM_URI_MATCH gets one (request.uri Like "*<entry>*") clause
per entry, OR-ed, leading : or / stripped — it decides what the proxy
acts on once it arrives. The shipped two-entry default gives:
((request.uri Like "*generateContent*") or (request.uri Like "*chat/completions*"))The AuthzPolicy is the outer gate and wins: a suffix list narrower than
matchPaths means the missing shape never reaches Apigee at all. Derive both
from the input file and never from the default when the file disagrees — the
file is the reviewable contract and a mismatch is invisible once deployed.
A one-entry list is legitimate and governs one shape. Dropping an entry
governs one fewer silently — deploys clean, zero transactions for the shape
dropped — and narrows feature-normalize, Model Armor and the cache together.
references/gotchas.md, Runtime.
semanticCache is a KNOWN ISSUE whenever it is on — warn, then build it.
The key is the prompt embedding alone: no caller, no model, no shape. A hit
therefore crosses callers — similar prompts share an answer — and one model
behind one shape does not make it safe. With more shapes the first model to
answer answers for the other too: empty HTTP 200 across shapes, wrong-model
body within one. Warn whenever the cache is on, not only on multi-shape, then
build. Wording: references/modes.md; mechanism: references/gotchas.md.
Each entry is a SUFFIX match. You write these, not the user — derive them
from which endpoint their agent actually calls, and do not ask them to reason
about suffixes. Vertex's OpenAI-compatible endpoint and api.openai.com need
different entries, and getting it wrong governs nothing silently; the forms and
the evidence are in references/gotchas.md, Runtime.
There is no apiShape field. Metering does not depend on the wire shape —
the count is normalised in JS across both — so the field selected nothing and
was removed. Adding a shape is an || branch in extract-model.js plus an
entry in matchPaths.
Three places carry the callout hostname and all three must match — the
Apigee envgroup, the AuthzExtension authority/service, and the private DNS A
record. You set all three from one value: a build invariant to hold, not a
question for the user. It becomes a topic only when a callout never lands, and
then it is the first check. Build order matters alongside it — the
AuthzExtension is inert until the host resolves and the proxy is deployed, so
"the extension exists" is not evidence that leg works. references/gotchas.md,
Runtime.
Workflow
0. Gateway: give it a route into the VPC
A gateway with no networkConfig has no route into the customer's VPC and
cannot resolve the callout hostname. This skill builds it — network
attachment, egress and DNS peering — so its absence is a build step, not a
blocker, and should be reported that way. Do not open with an alarm about a
resource you are about to create.
One thing here does need the user, and it is the reason this is step 0 rather than a silent prerequisite: attaching egress is one-way and affects traffic they already run. Settle it in the plan, before anything executes — see "Confirm everything up front" below. Capturing a known-good agent turn first is worth doing when they are nervous about a production gateway, because it separates "never worked" from "we broke it"; it is a precaution to offer, not a step to impose.
gcloud network-services agent-gateways describe "$GATEWAY" \
--location="$REGION" --project="$PROJECT" --format='value(networkConfig)'
gcloud network-security authz-policies list \
--location="$REGION" --project="$PROJECT"A console-created gateway already has a CUSTOM AuthzPolicy — an IAP
REQUEST_AUTHZ one, which coexists with ours and is not needed for the egress
JWT. You never create the gateway, so assess it rather than assuming.
references/gotchas.md, Agent Gateway.
Empty networkConfig output means missing, and it is easy to miss: the gateway
still serves ordinary agent traffic perfectly, because that path goes to public
Google endpoints and never enters the VPC. Only the Apigee callout fails.
If it is missing, behaviour depends on gateway.manageNetworkConfig:
true— run the script below. It creates the network attachment, then read-modify-writes the gateway to add the egress attachment and DNS peering. Agreement for this is taken in the plan, not here;--yescarries it.false— the user has said they want to make this change themselves. Print the script invocation and let them run it. Do not modify the gateway.
scripts/ensure_gateway_connectivity.sh \
--gateway "$GATEWAY" --project "$PROJECT" --region "$REGION" \
--vpc "$VPC" --subnet "$SUBNET" --attachment "$ATTACHMENT" \
--domain "$DNS_DOMAIN" # add --yes only after the user agreesEither way networkConfig has to exist before the Apigee work starts — not
because its absence is an error, but because every later step then succeeds and
governs nothing.
Use the script, not the raw commands: import is a whole-resource upsert and a
hand-built YAML silently drops the gateway's registries and protocols. Why,
and the etag and PROTOCOL_UNSPECIFIED handling: references/gotchas.md.
1. Apigee: enable the environment
The env must carry apigee-service-extension-enabled=true. No gcloud flag
exists; PATCH the properties map.
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
"https://apigee.googleapis.com/v1/organizations/$ORG/environments/$ENV"The PATCH replaces the whole map. Read it first and re-send every property you intend to keep, or you will silently drop them.
curl -X PATCH -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
"https://apigee.googleapis.com/v1/organizations/$ORG/environments/$ENV?updateMask=properties" \
-d '{"properties":{"property":[{"name":"apigee-service-extension-enabled","value":"true"}]}}'This does not disable Apigee Analytics — the two coexist; if analytics looks
missing it is the separate per-environment add-on. references/gotchas.md.
Use a dedicated environment, attached to exactly one envgroup. An
environment in two makes the gateway 404 every request with the extension never
invoked. It also leaves the / base path free, which is what the proxy ships
with.
scripts/ensure_apigee_environment.sh creates the environment, attaches it to
the regional runtime instance, and creates and attaches the envgroup — so step 2
is already done when it succeeds. It creates billable resources and applies
nothing without --yes; that agreement is taken in the plan, not here.
scripts/ensure_apigee_environment.sh \
--org "$ORG" --env "$ENV" --region "$REGION" \
--envgroup "$ENVGROUP" --hostname "$HOSTNAME" # add --yes to applyIt is idempotent and resumable, and refuses with exit 2 when the environment is
already in another envgroup or the envgroup exists on a different hostname. It
also handles three things a runbook tends to get wrong — the omitted type on
create, the four-minute instance attachment that locks the environment, and
polling the operation rather than a GET that succeeds too early.
2. Apigee: envgroup on the callout hostname
Done already if step 1's script ran. Verify, or do it by hand for an envgroup that already exists. The hostname must be exactly the callout host, and the group must be attached to the env.
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
"https://apigee.googleapis.com/v1/organizations/$ORG/envgroups/$ENVGROUP/attachments"How many envgroups is the environment in? More than one and the callout
never lands. deploy_proxy.sh enforces this before touching anything and exits
2 naming them; assess_integration.sh reports it. Read the failure literally if
it fires — the environment is wrong, not the script.
3. Build the proxy from the template
gcloud apigee apis import organizations/$ORG/apis/$PROXY \
--from-template=assets/apigee-proxy-template.yamlEach features: entry resolves relative to the template file's own
directory, never the working directory, so a bare filename must sit beside the
template (a subpath like features/feature-identity.yaml works too). assets/
is flat by convention, not compiler demand — but moving a file without updating
features: fails the import with a bare FileNotFoundError.
If you get Permission denied on resource ... (or it may not exist) on an org
you demonstrably have access to, it is the credential, not the access. With
context-aware access enabled the default gcloud credential is rejected. Pass the
ADC token instead:
CLOUDSDK_AUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN=$(gcloud auth application-default print-access-token) \
gcloud apigee apis import ...To change a parameter, edit the default in every FEATURE that declares it
— not in the template. gcloud apigee apis import passes an empty
caller-parameter map, so each feature resolves its own default and the
template's declaration of the same name is never read. Editing the template
changes nothing, silently, and the compile still passes. Measured: setting
MA_CONTINUE_ON_ERROR to DRY_RUN in the template shipped ENFORCE on a
fail-closed policy. LLM_URI_MATCH is declared in four features and all four
must agree. scripts/compile_check.py fails on any disagreement. There is no
--parameters flag.
Enable an optional recipe by adding its feature to the template's features
list. See references/recipes.md.
tokenMetering.models in the input file is NOT generative. It documents
which buckets exist; it does not create them. A bucket is real only when it has
an LLMTokenQuota step in feature-token-metering.yaml and a matching
*_TOKEN_LIMIT parameter. Three exist: gemini-pro, gemini-flash and other
— the catch-all for any model whose name contains neither pro nor flash.
Adding a fourth entry to the list meters nothing, and omitting other
silently unmeters every non-Gemini model: the count is extracted and then
discarded, with no ratelimit reference anywhere in the transaction. Adding a
model is a feature-file edit, not a config change.
4. Deploy
Deploy to the service-extension env, then confirm the deployment reports
proxyDeploymentType: EXTENSIBLE.
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
".../environments/$ENV/deployments"STANDARD means it will not govern the agent's off-Apigee tool egress.
If any policy calls a Google API — Model Armor, embeddings, Vector Search —
deploy with a service account or the deploy is rejected with
MISSING_SERVICE_ACCOUNT:
curl -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
".../apis/$PROXY/revisions/$REV/deployments?override=true&serviceAccount=$DEPLOY_SA"5. Networking
This is the gateway → Apigee leg only. PSC endpoint to the Apigee instance
service attachment, plus a private DNS A record. See
references/networking-psc.md. The Apigee instance consumerAcceptList must
include your project or the connection never reaches ACCEPTED.
The agent → gateway leg is the prerequisite above, and is not built here.
6. Bind the gateway
AuthzExtension then AuthzPolicy — in that order, and only once the host resolves and the proxy is deployed. The extension is inert until then.
Both document bodies ship as assets. Copy and substitute; do not invent them
— assets/authz-extension.example.yaml and assets/authz-policy.example.yaml.
They carry the fields that are load-bearing and have no obvious default:
wireFormat: EXT_PROC_GRPC, failOpen, the authority/service pair, the
metadata body flags, and the policy's customProvider / httpRules nesting.
gcloud service-extensions authz-extensions import $AUTHZ_EXT \
--source=authz-extension.yaml --location=$REGION --project=$PROJECT
gcloud beta network-security authz-policies import $AUTHZ_POLICY \
--source=authz-policy.yaml --location=$REGION --project=$PROJECTThe policy's resource paths take the project NUMBER, not the ID — both
target.resources and customProvider.authzExtension.resources. Resolve it
yourself; narrating two numbers at the user does not help. The trap, for when a
callout never lands: the number in the gateway's
serviceExtensionsServiceAccount is the Google-managed tenant project, not
theirs, and it is the only one on screen, so it is the natural thing to copy. A
wrong number imports cleanly and targets nothing. Copy the slots from
assets/authz-policy.example.yaml.
7. Verify
You cannot test with curl — the host is internal and the proxy expects the
gateway's IAP-egress JWT. Run scripts/read_debug_session.sh --arm, drive a
turn, read it back with --session. Expect one transaction per turn per
governed shape under a suffix list this narrow; zero alone does not mean the
callout is dead — the script prints the probe that settles it.
Hard rules
Gate every step — how urgently depends on your AuthzPolicy. An ungated
continueOnError="false" policy faults on any call that carries no prompt, and
that breaks the agent's turn. Historically the most common failure here.
A narrow suffix list routes only the model call to Apigee, so the trap mostly
does not fire. Broaden the policy and it fires at once: the ext-proc then sees
every agent egress — session create/read, appendEvent, OpenTelemetry exports —
measured at 12 calls for one single-question turn, of which one was the model
call. Gate the steps regardless; a condition is cheap and it is what makes the
policy safe to widen later. Full measurement: references/gotchas.md.
model call:
(request.uri Like "*generateContent*")
Never fail-close on your own metering. Keep continueOnError="true" on the
JavaScript and quota policies so a metering bug cannot break LLM traffic.
This skill meters by default and can enforce on request. Enforcement is
assets/feature-token-enforce.yaml: request-flow EnforceOnly policies sharing
each SharedName with the response-flow CountOnly half. Add it to the
template's feature list. Verified live on ext-proc traffic — the over-budget
caller gets a 429, model never called.
Never offer CountOnly=false as a substitute: in the response flow it cannot
gate (the answer is already on the wire) and it freezes the counter, losing the
metering too.
State two things whenever you offer it. It is one request late — the turn
that crosses the limit completes, because a token cost is not known until the
model answers. And it buckets on the requested model, which under an OpenAI
alias can differ from the resolved model the counting side bills. The two traps
that both present as "it never refuses": references/gotchas.md.
Normalize the model to a bucket. With an OpenAI-compatible endpoint the
model is an alias in the request body and the resolved name is in the response
body (google/gemini-2.5-pro). Exact-matching a raw name fails on the response
path.
jsonPath needs its third argument true so it returns a scalar. Without
it the quota policy receives a node it cannot parse.
References
references/modes.md— read first. How to answer "what can you do", dev vs prod, the defaults, durations, cost disclosure, the interlocks, and reading an assess reportscripts/assess_integration.sh— read-only. Setup Status Summary then a per-check table;--jsoncarries both. Lead with the summary and read out the Enforcement row. Run it before planning: it decides CREATE vs REUSE.TODOis a build step, not a failure; onlyFAILexits non-zeroreferences/networking-psc.md— both network legs, PSC, DNS, acceptancereferences/recipes.md— Model Armor and semantic cachereferences/verify.md— debug sessions and the checklist scriptreferences/setup.md— SDK, project, billing, APIs, region, auth, IAMreferences/gotchas.md— 63 failure modes and their symptomsassets/apigee-agent-gateway-governance.example.yaml— the input contractassets/apigee-proxy-template.yaml— the AFT template. Features merge bypriorityand all sit beside it:feature-identity.yaml(10),feature-normalize.yaml(15),feature-model-armor.yaml(20),feature-semantic-cache.yaml(30),feature-token-metering.yaml(50).assets/authz-extension.example.yaml,assets/authz-policy.example.yaml— the step-6 bodies. Copy and substitute; paths take the project numberAnything read out of the request body is normalised once, at priority 15, not inside whichever feature needs it first.
LLM_URI_MATCHis shared, so widening it arms every feature gated on it simultaneously — including Model Armor, which fails closed. Model Armor and the cache both readagw.user_prompt; the quotas readagw.total_tokens, set on the response path by the metering feature's own JS for the same reason.scripts/ensure_apigee_environment.sh— create the environment, attach it to the instance, create and attach the envgroup. Idempotent,--yesgatedscripts/ensure_gateway_connectivity.sh— route the gateway into the VPC. Read-modify-write;--yesgatedscripts/ensure_vector_search.sh— only whensemanticCacheis enabled: build index and endpoint, deploy one on the other, read back the domain.--yesgated, ~34 min, bills continuouslyscripts/teardown_vector_search.sh— the only thing that STOPS that charge. Refuses until the revision dropsSCL-lookup.--yesgatedscripts/deploy_proxy.sh— the Apigee-side sequence, idempotent,--dry-runscripts/read_debug_session.sh—--arma session (printing when it actually closes) and read it back as theverify.mdchecklist, instead of parsing the transaction JSON by handscripts/compile_check.py— compile the template offline, no org needed
Files
- ATTRIBUTION.mdAdded by AutoGineer880 B
- LICENSELicence file added by AutoGineer11.1 KiB
- SKILL.md26.1 KiB
- assets/apigee-agent-gateway-governance.example.yaml20.8 KiB
- assets/apigee-proxy-template.yaml9.4 KiB
- assets/authz-extension.example.yaml1.7 KiB
- assets/authz-policy.example.yaml2.1 KiB
- assets/feature-identity.yaml6.0 KiB
- assets/feature-model-armor.yaml3.5 KiB
- assets/feature-normalize.yaml4.0 KiB
- assets/feature-semantic-cache.yaml7.9 KiB
- assets/feature-token-enforce.yaml16.3 KiB
- assets/feature-token-metering.yaml14.9 KiB
- references/attribution.md1.9 KiB
- references/gotchas.md43.7 KiB
- references/modes.md46.5 KiB
- references/networking-psc.md10.0 KiB
- references/recipes.md9.4 KiB
- references/setup.md7.2 KiB
- references/verify.md14.3 KiB
- scripts/assess_integration.shScript35.5 KiB
- scripts/compile_check.pyScript9.9 KiB
- scripts/deploy_proxy.shScript23.7 KiB
- scripts/ensure_apigee_environment.shScript17.8 KiB
- scripts/ensure_gateway_connectivity.shScript21.2 KiB
- scripts/ensure_vector_search.shScript19.0 KiB
- scripts/read_debug_session.shScript15.5 KiB
- scripts/teardown_vector_search.shScript9.0 KiB
references/recipes.md
Recipes
Each recipe is an AFT feature, not a separate setup procedure. Enable one
by adding its file to the template's features list and recompiling:
features:
- feature-identity.yaml
- feature-token-metering.yaml
- feature-model-armor.yaml # add thispython3 scripts/compile_check.py assets/apigee-proxy-template.yaml # offline; needs PyYAML
gcloud apigee apis import organizations/$ORG/apis/$PROXY \
--from-template=assets/apigee-proxy-template.yamlFeatures merge by priority: identity 10, token enforcement 12, normalize 15,
Model Armor 20, semantic cache 30, metering 50. Steps land in that order within
each flow.
Every recipe must be gated. A fail-closed policy with no condition kills the
agent's turn on the first call that carries no prompt. How exposed you are
depends on the AuthzPolicy: a suffix list of model-call paths routes only those
(measured with :generateContent alone), but widen it and the ext-proc sees all
agent egress — 12 calls for one measured turn, 11 of them promptless. Gate regardless, so the
policy stays safe to widen.
Contents
Status: lines 37-98
E1 — Model Armor: lines 99-113
E2 — Semantic cache: lines 114-178
E3 — ServiceCallout: lines 179-184
Status
The Live traffic column is the one that decides risk. "No" does not mean
broken; it means nothing has proved its runtime behaviour, which is a
different claim from "it compiles".
| Recipe | Feature file | Compiles | Live traffic |
|---|---|---|---|
| Identity | feature-identity.yaml | yes | yes — JWT verified, agw.client_id set on a real turn |
| Token metering | feature-token-metering.yaml | yes | yes — per-model counters moved on real turns |
| E1 Model Armor | feature-model-armor.yaml | yes | yes, thinly — injections refused through ENFORCE; one benign prompt passed NO_MATCH_FOUND. No false-positive rate |
| E2 Semantic cache | feature-semantic-cache.yaml | yes | yes — miss/hit measured end to end, see below |
| Token enforcement | feature-token-enforce.yaml | yes | yes — over-budget caller refused with 429 on live gateway traffic, model never called (used.count 1086 vs allowed.count 500) |
| E3 ServiceCallout | — | — | deliberately not authored, see below |
E1 is still the one to be careful with, but for a narrower reason than
before. It now has live evidence in both directions: injections were refused
through ENFORCE, and one ordinary prompt ("name a planet") returned
filterMatchState = NO_MATCH_FOUND and completed normally, so routine traffic
does survive MEDIUM_AND_ABOVE. One benign sample is not a false-positive
rate. It remains the only recipe that fails closed, so on a proxy already
serving turns recommend DRY_RUN first and say why: the unknown is not
whether it works, it is how often it refuses something it should not.
E2 measured live — one prompt sent twice inside the 60s TTL:
| miss | hit | |
|---|---|---|
| proxy-side elapsed | 2410 ms | 375 ms |
cache_hit | false | true |
nearest_neighbor_measure | — | 0.999999 (threshold 0.95) |
SCP-populate upsert | ran | skipped |
| flash quota counter | moved | absent — quota skipped |
| Model Armor | ran | ran |
Four documented traps confirmed correct by that pair: populate is skipped on a
hit, so the pre-namespaced cache_hit condition really does resolve (the
documented semanticcache.lookup.* form would have failed open and
re-upserted); metering does not double-count, because although
metering-JS-extract-model runs ungated and did extract 188 tokens from the
replayed body, every LTQ step was skipped; the matched key equals the
datapointId the miss wrote, so the round trip is real rather than a
coincidental neighbour; and a hit still pays for Model Armor, which runs
at priority 20 before the lookup at 30. The cache saves the model call, not
the scan — the 375 ms includes the scan, an embeddings call and
findNeighbors.
All six compile together: 16 policies and 22 bundle entries, steps ordered
identity → enforcement → normalize → Model Armor → cache lookup in
PreFlow/Request, and cache populate → metering in PostFlow/Response.
The base proxy — identity plus token metering — is deployed on a live org
and verified EXTENSIBLE.
Verification status is per-recipe, and the table below is the only source of truth for it. Do not generalise from this paragraph; an earlier version of it claimed none of the optional recipes had seen live traffic, which contradicted E2's own live measurements twenty lines later. Where a recipe says "compile-verified only", that means the check proved structure and nothing proved runtime behaviour — which is the distinction that matters for Model Armor, the one recipe that fails closed.
E1 — Model Armor
Authored. Screens the prompt before the model; blocks on a filter match. A
benign prompt passes; an unsafe one is stopped before Gemini and surfaces
as 400 … steps.sanitize.user.prompt.FilterMatched.
Needs roles/modelarmor.user on the deployment SA and a deploy with
?serviceAccount=. SanitizeModelResponse is the response-path analogue, its
source being $.candidates[-1].content.parts[-1].text.
It reads agw.user_prompt, not a JSONPath, and that variable is set by
feature-normalize.yaml at priority 15. Enabling Model Armor without that
feature leaves the variable unset — and because the policy fails closed, the
result is HTTP 500 on every matching request rather than a skipped scan.
E2 — Semantic cache
Authored and verified live. Two policies: SemanticCacheLookup in the Request
PreFlow, SemanticCachePopulate in the response phase.
Two things make this harder than it looks on a no-route proxy:
Populate must be gated on the cache-hit flag. With no target endpoint the response flow runs on a hit too, so ungated populate re-embeds and re-upserts the answer it just served.
The flag is not the documented name. Runtime emits
SemanticCacheLookup.<policy>.cache_hit; the docs saysemanticcache.lookup.<policy>.cache_hit, which never resolves — and an unresolved variable makes!= truetrue, so it fails open and looks exactly like the ungated bug.
When authoring this as a feature, the condition must be written
pre-namespaced (SemanticCacheLookup.semanticcache-SCL-lookup.cache_hit),
because the compiler does not rewrite policy-derived flow variables.
Metering double-counts on a hit unless you gate that too. The quota reads the token count out of the replayed response and counts tokens the model never produced — measured, the counter moved by exactly the replayed answer's 97 tokens.
feature-token-metering.yamlcarries the same cache-hit clause on all three quota steps. Enabling the cache without it silently inverts what the cache is for.Populate must also be gated on
response.status.code = 200. The policy is status-blind: gated only on the hit flag it caches upstream errors too. Observed — a transient 429 written to the cache and then replayed as HTTP 200 to every identical prompt for the whole TTL, turning a momentary blip into a persistent wrong answer that defeats status checking. Raised with the Apigee team; carry the gate regardless, it is the only defence today.
Measured on a live setup: cold 4743 ms versus 336 ms served from cache, with the model never called. A second run on a different prompt measured 1396 ms versus 382 ms — a 3.7x ratio.
Measure proxy-side, from a debug session, not from the caller. On that same pair the client saw 15445 ms versus 13114 ms — a 15% difference indistinguishable from noise, because agent session setup dominates the round trip. Anyone timing the caller concludes the cache does nothing.
A hit still pays for Model Armor. Feature priority puts Model Armor (20) ahead of the cache lookup (30), so the compiled request flow scans the prompt before the cache is consulted. That order is the safer one — it stops a prompt reaching a cached answer unscanned — but it means the floor on a hit is the Model Armor latency, not zero.
The cache reads agw.user_prompt too, from the same priority-15 feature.
That is what lets one cache serve both wire shapes: LLM_URI_MATCH matches
*generateContent* and *chat/completions*, and the prompt is selected from
either body layout in JS. Verified — a repeat prompt hit across shapes.
Do not widen LLM_URI_MATCH without feature-normalize present; the same
condition arms Model Armor, which fails closed.
Prerequisites are built by scripts/ensure_vector_search.sh: the index
(width fixed by embeddingsModel, STREAM_UPDATE, both immutable), the
endpoint, and the deploy of one onto the other. --yes gated, idempotent and
resumable — resumable matters because the deploy step alone runs about 34
minutes. It is also the only part of this skill that bills continuously, per
node-hour for as long as the index stays deployed; the script prints the cost
note and the teardown order before asking. You also need
roles/aiplatform.user on the deployment service account, and
<DeployedIndexID> spelled all-caps.
E3 — ServiceCallout
Deliberately not authored. ServiceCallout is on the Extension Processor
unsupported-policy list, yet it imports, deploys EXTENSIBLE and executes from
both flows. Docs and platform disagree; don't build on it until that is
resolved.
Requirements and compatibility
Works with: Claude Code, Claude apps, OpenAI Codex, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, Gemini CLI, Kiro, OpenCode, Goose, Amp, Roo Code, JetBrains Junie, Factory Droid, Devin (ex-Windsurf), Mistral Vibe, OpenHands, Letta
“Works with” means the tool reads the open Agent Skills format; a skill written for one tool may use features others lack.
Needs: Needs a command-line tool, Needs Python, Needs Node.js
Security
What our scanner noticed· Low risk
- Instructions that use the network
- Scripts that your agent may run
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Attribution and licence
- Published by
- Publisher
- Google (Official)
- Source
- google/skills · skills/cloud/apigee-agent-gateway-governance · commit 2194d3b
- Licence
- Apache License 2.0 (redistribution allowed)
- LICENSE (added by AutoGineer from LICENSE)
- ATTRIBUTION.md (written by AutoGineer)
- Synced
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